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1CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
A. Statement of the Problem
The central problem of this dissertation is a matter of
definition. As the title suggests, the main interest is in
’’nature” and "naturalism.” The quest was prompted by the am-
biguity of these terms among contemporary naturalists. The
writer has chosen, therefore, two well-known American natural-
ists as representative of this school, in an effort to find
out just what the naturalists, themselves, mean by these terms.
In order to ascertain the meaning, an investigation of
several main points is required. It is, as was stated above,
an attempt to arrive at a definition of "nature" and "natural-
ism" as used by these writers. It will also be necessary to
Investigate the main influences which prompted their respec-
tive philosophical systems, with special reference to their
conceptions of these terms. Further, a comparison of these
two thinkers must be made In order to discover their similar-
ities and differences, if any. In an effort to arrive at some
definition which would be acceptable to both, and perhaps, to
other adherents of this school. Finally, some evaluation of
the position, agreement and consistency of the theories of
these two thinkers will be made in the form of conclusions to
this study and investigation.
-.
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.
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2B. Significance of the Problem
The importance and significance of the investigation is
partly implied in the preceding section. There has been far
too much confusion caused in current philosophical discussions
by loose terminology. Many writers, using the same terms,
find themselves talking about different things. There is need
for definition and freedom from '’the tyranny of words." It
is probable that no term has been used in more ways than the
term "nature." Every good dictionary lists a dozen or more
definitions of the term. This is also true of the term "nat-
uralism. "
To add to the confusion, there is no agreement upon
the precise definitions of the terms. When we come to con-
sider the philosophical naturalists themselves, we find them
offering no exact definition. A good illustration of this is
found in the recent naturalistic manifesto. Naturalism and
the Human Spirit
,
a co-operative enterprise, edited by Y. H.
Krikorian. In the last chapter of this book, John H. Randall
Jr. attempts to sum up the various views under the title of
"Epilogue: The Nature of Naturalism," from which we quote:
Now naturalism, in the sense in which it is main-
tained in this volume, can be defined negatively as
the refusal to take "nature" or "the natural" as a
term of distinction (italics ours). As Mr. Lamprecht
well points out. It is opposed to all dualisms be-
tween Nature and another realm of being--to the Greek
opposition between Nature and Art, to the medieval
contrast of the Natural and the Supernatural, to the
empiricist antithesis of Nature and Experience, to
the idealist distinction between Natural and Tran-
scendental, to the fundamental dualism pervading
modern thought between Nature and Man. For the pres-
ent-day naturalists "Nature" serves rather as the
all-inclusive category, corresponding to the role
?j l
3played by "Being" in Greek thought, or by "Reality"
for the idealists. In this sense, as Mr. Dennes
recognizes, naturalism, in becoming all-inclusive,
ceases to be a distinctive "ism." It regards as
"natural" whatever man encounters in whatever way
—
Nature, as Mr. Costello put it, is a collective
name for "quite a mess of miscellaneous stuff.
It will be readily seen from this, that naturalists are not
greatly interested In exact definition, partly because they
think it dogmatic. Naturalism, as a philosophy, is more of
a common feeling of spirit among quite a group of men with
diverging first principles. Yet, it seems to the writer that,
if we are ever to make progress, we must have more exact def-
initions. To adopt such a view as expressed in this volume,
is to lapse into confusion worse confounded. It tends to lead
to chaos. It is the purpose of the writer to offer definitions
of "nature" and "naturalism" which will remove this confusion,
and which, from the philosophical point of view, ought to be
more or less acceptable to all schools of thought.
C. Scope of the investigation
The bulk of this dissertation will be a consideration
of the writings of Frederick J. E. Woodbridge and John Dewey.
In the case of Woodbridge, whose writings are somewhat limit-
ed, the task offers few difficulties. A statement about his
writings will appear in the next section. When we come to
John Dewey, we find ourselves at the opposite extreme. Mr.
Dewey, who has been writing for the past sixty-four years,
has written much In several fields of endeavor. P. A. Schilpp,
1. Krlkorian (ed.), NHS, 3t7-358.
..
.
.
.
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4in Volume I of the Library of Living Philosophers has a
65 page bibliography of his writings. 2 Fortunately for this
investigation, a considerable range of his interests may be
eliminated from present consideration. Many of his essays,
addresses and articles are not applicable to our subject.
Examples of these are his work on such questions as the Trotsky
case, the formation of a new political party in this country,
techincal articles on education and various other subjects,
addresses on controversial, social, political and other ques-
tions of the hour, etc.
The scope of the preliminary investigation may be narrowed
down to a brief history of philosophical naturalism which will
be taken up in the next chapter. This will be followed by two
chapters dealing with V/oodbridge ’ s conception of "nature” and
"mind." A chapter will be devoted to Dewey’s naturalistic
philosophy as a whole, covering the fields of logic, episte-
mology, metaphysics, and psychology. This will be followed
by a chapter upon the application of his naturalistic phil-
osophy to the field of values. Only by such a systematic con-
sideration can the full implications of the naturalistic thought
of these men be arrived at. Then, some evaluation of the mean-
ing and purpose, as well as the implications of "nature" and
"naturalism" as used by these men, can be made.
2. Schilpp (ed.), PJD, 611-676: see also Thomas and
Schneider, BJD, 1929.
5. In this dissertation, for the sake of consistency,
Dewey’s spelling will be followed.
..
.
.
.
.
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5D. Brief Biography of Frederick J. E. Yvoodbridge
Frederick Woodbridge was born in Windsor, Ontario, on
March 26, 1867. He died on June 1, 1940. Y/ho * s Who tells us
nothing about his early life, nor when he came to the United
States. He received his Bachelor of Arts degree from Amherst
College in 1888. He then went to Union Theological Seminary in
New York, from which he graduated in 1892. From 1892 to 1894 he
studied in Germany, at the University of Berlin. In 1898 he
received the Master of Arts degree from Amherst College. With
the passing of the years he was given a number of honorary degrees
From 1895 to 1902 he was professor of philosophy at the University
of Minnesota, leaving there in the latter year to teach at Colum-
bia University. In 1904, the same year that John Dewey came to
Columbia, Woodbridge was named Dean of the faculties of political
science, philosophy, science and fine arts. For many years he
served as an editor of the Journal of Philosophy .
Because of his administrative and editorial duties. Wood-
bridge did not write extensively. Much of his writings con-
sist of essays, published mainly after his coming to Columbia.
In fact before that time he seems to have published but four
short essays. Costello, in his chapter, "The Naturalism of
Frederick Woodbridge," says:
Woodbridge was a powerful personality. Those who
knew him will not soon forget the square-cut face
on the square shoulders, the forthright speech,
the keenness, the humor... No one can judge whether
Woodbridge might have accomplished more by writing
more himself, rather than by activities as admin-
istrator and editor.
^
4. Krokorian (ed.), NHS, 297
..
.
.
6The first book published, by Woodbridge was The Philosophy
of Hobbes
,
1903. During the next few years, 1904 to 1912, his
most important essays dealt with the problem of consciousness.
In 1916 a short book appeared under the title of The Purpose
of History
,
in which he interprets history as being made up
of many histories, and sees the whole process as naturalistic.
It was ten years before he was to publish another book; this
time it was The Realm of Mind . In 1937 a group of his friends
gathered together the most important of his essays and pub-
lished them in his honor, on his seventiety birthday, under
the title of Nature and Mind . Then, in 1940, shortly after
his death, was published his largest single work. An Essay on
Nature. The essays important for our purposes, are included
in the collected volume, and need not be enumerated separately.
E. Brief Biography of John Dewey5
John Dewey was born in Burlington, Vermont, on October 20,
1859. He is still living and still engaged in writing and
developing his philosophy. His life may well be divided into
five periods.
1. Childhood and Youth . 1859-1882. He completed his
preliminary education in the schools at Burlington. He then
entered the University of Vermont from which he received the
Bachelor of Arts degree in 1879. After graduating he taught
5. Jane Dewey, Art. (1939), 3-45.
*'
.
-
.
7for two years in the High School in South Oil City, Penn-
sylvania. During this time he read much in the field of
philosophy, becoming increasingly intrigued by the subject.
An early essay, ’’The Metaphysical Assumptions of Materialism,"
was published in the Journal of Speculative Philosophy in 1882.
2. Graduate Studies . 1882-1884. In the fall of 1882,
Dewey entered Johns Hopkins University to study for the Doctor
of Philosophy degree. At that time President Gilman was work-
ing on a plan to provide adequate graduate studies for American
students who, up to this time, had been going to Germany.
"President Gilman constantly urged upon the students the feasi-
bility and importance of original research."8 Because of the
number of clergymen interested in, and teaching philosophy,
the President suggested to Dewey that he change his major,
"but was unable to turn the enthusiastically budding phil-
osopher from his path."
1
? At the University, Dewey came under
the influence of such men as George S. Morris and G. Stanley
Hall. In 1684 he graduated, writing a dissertation on "The
Psychology of Kant."8
3. Hegelian Period . 1884-1894. During this period,
Dewey was first Instructor, and then Assistant Professor in
Philosophy at the University of Michigan, where he remained
until 1888. The next year he spent at the University of
Minnesota. The following year he returned to Minnesota as
6. jane Dewey, Art. (1939), 15.
7. Ibid., 16.
8. Schilpp, PJD, 611.

8full professor of philosophy, remaining until 1894. It was
during this period that he began to devolop his early phil-
osophical theories, most of which were influenced by Hegelian
philosophy. His Psychology was published in 1887, to be soon
followed by Leibniz: A Critical Exposition . In the latter part
of this period he turned more to moral philosophy and also
began his departure from the Hegelian influence. In 1891 ap-
peared his Outline of Ethics
,
and in 1895 a revision called
Study of Ethics .
4. The Chicago Period . 1894-1904. In 1904 he was called
to be the head of the Department of Philosophy, Psychology,
and Pedagogy in the newly-formed University of Chicago. Dewey
says: "One of the factors leading to its [the offer to teach
therej acceptance was the inclusion of Pedagogy in the depart-
ment with Philosophy and Psychology . As would be expected
from this, his interest was divided between the three fields,
with education occupying a large part of his time, especially
• through the establishment of the "Dewey School" for educational
experiment. He published the Psychology of Number , a co-
operative work in 1894. Then came School and Society in 1900.
His philosophical bent is well illustrated in his part
of the volume. Studies in Logical Theory , 1903. The empirical
or experimental view of logical theory is seen coming to the
fore as well as functional psychology. "Thinking is a kind of
activity which we perform at specific need, just as at other
9. Jane Dewey, Art. (1939), 27.
: .
' » <
.
*
9needs we engage in other sorts of activity
.
1,10 The great pro-
blem of logic is this: "How does the particular functional
situation termed the reflective behave?" 11 The combination
of functional psychology with his early Hegelianism is seen
in this: "The test of validity of idea is its functional or
instrumental use in effecting the transition from a relatively
conflicting experience to a relatively integrated one." 12
Here, in the germ, appears his Organic Logic later to be so
well developed in Logic: The Theory of Inquiry
,
1938. Dewey
says that:
After his movement from idealism to his naturalistic
and pragmatic experimental ism personal contacts had,
on the whole, more influence in directing his thought
than the books he read. 13
On the influence of Angell's functional psychology he says,
"This movement played a part in developing the logical theories
of Dewey and in making a bridge from his logical to his moral
theory." 14 As his biographer so well says, Dewey's contri-
bution bo Studies in Logical Theory marks "a final and complete
break with Hegelian idealism and launches his instrumental
theory of reflective thought." 15 Although written at a later
date his books. How We Think
,
1909, and Democracy and Education ,
1913, are the fruits of his Chicago experiment.
5. The Columbia Period . 1904- . From 1904 on, Dewey
has been closely connected with Columbia University as pro-
fessor and professor emeritus. The first important writing
10. Dewey, (ed.), SLT, 2.
11. Ibid., 18.
12. Ibid., 75.
13. jane Dewey, Art. (1939), 28.
14. Ibid., 32.
15. Ibid., 33.
'•
•
•
\ •
.
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of this period is Ethics
, 1908, which he published in co-
operation with James Tufts. In the next few years he broaden-
ed his interests to include the whole field of social phil-
osophy, but he continued his contribution to speculative
philosophy and education. In 1910, the Influence of Darwin
on Philosophy appeared. Five years later came his Schools of
To-Morrow in co-operation with his daughter Evelyn, and in
the same year German Philosophy and Politics was published.
Then came, in 1916, one of his great speculative works. Essays
in Experimental Logic . In 1917 Creative Intelligence , another
co-operative volume appeared.
When Dewey came to Columbia, Woodbridge was already there,
accepting and teaching a ’’naturalistic metaphysics of the
Aristotelian type. ”16
Contact with him made Dewey aware of the possibility
and value of a type of metaphysical theory which did
not profess to rest upon principles not empirically
verifiable. 17
Dewey also mentions the influence of James f s Pragmatism which
he delivered as lectures at Columbia. The whole realistic
atmosphere found in this new environment ’’led to a rethinking
of all his philosophic ideas."!8 His thought as found in
Reconstruction in Philosophy , 1920, Experience and Nature ,
1925, and The Quest for Certainty , 1929, are the direct result
of this new influence. It Is also true that these works contain
the whole essence of his speculative philosophy or naturalistic
16. Ibid., 36.
17. Loc. cit.
18. Loc. cit.

11
metaphysics* When Experience and Nature appeared the reviewer
for the New York Tribune wrote, "with monumental care, detail,
and completeness. Professor Dewey has in this volume revealed
the metaphysical heart that beats its unvarying, alert tempo
through his writings, whatever their explicit themes."!9 His
psychological development is well covered in Human Nature and
Conduct
, 1922, while his social interest is expressed in
"The Role of Philosophy in the History of Civilization," which
he delivered at the Sixth International Congress of Philosophy
held at Harvard University in 1929, in his contribution to
Whither Mankind
,
and The World Tomorrow . Three important
volumes of collections of his writings have been edited and
published by Joseph Ratner, The Philosophy of John Dewey , 1928,
Characters and Events
,
2 vols., 1929, and Intelligence in the
Modern World
,
1959. But Dewey himself, did not stop writing.
In 1934 came Art as Experience
,
and A Common Faith . In 1935
Liberalism and Social Action , and in 1938, Experience and
Education
,
were published. Also in 1938 appeared the volume
which many believe to be the culmination of his thought: Logic :
The Theory of Inquiry
,
a great work in the field of Organic
Logic. Most of Dewey's works since that date have been essays
and reviews, although he has published some longer works in
the social field, including Freedom and Culture , 1939. His
more recent works include Chapter I in the Krikorian volume,
1944, "Antinaturalism in Extremis ," and "Dualism and the
Split Atom," which appeared in The New Leader , November, 1945.
19. Cited on the Paper Jacket of the book published by
The Open Court Pub. Co., 1925.
..
'
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Both of these are a criticism of religion in general and
supernaturalism in particular. Then in the spring of 1946,
appeared a new volume. Problems of Men
, but* with the excep-
tion of the Introduction, it consists of previously published
articles. This, while by no means complete, gives a bird’s-
eye view of the historical development of Dewey’s thought.
P. Some Influencee on Frederick J. E. Woodbridge
When we consider the influences upon Woodbridge, the task
is somewhat more difficult than when we think of Dewey. Dewey
repeatedly acknowledges contributions to the development of
his thought. Although Woodbridge says little that is specific
on the subject, some important sources are evident. His first
\
important work was the Philosophy of Hobbes . For several
years his main writings were on the problem of consciousness,
showing an interest in the modern psychological treatment of
the mind-body problem. There is little doubt that his phil-
osophy was influenced by behavioristic and functional psychology.
He was greatly influenced by the theory of biological evolution
as is seen from such articles as "Natural Teleology." Costello,
In his chapter in Naturalism and the Human Spirit , well points
out the influence of Spinoza upon Woodbridge.
In print and in conversation Woodbridge was ever
praising the greatness of Aristotle, and he
acknowledged indebtedness to Plato, to Locke,
to Santayana, to Bacon and Hobbes. But I do
not find in his published writings echoes of
the very substance of these authors, as I do
of Spinoza. 20
20. Costello, Art. (1944), 307.
.-
.
.
.
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.
15
Woodbridge »s view of nature was undoubtedly influenced by
Aristotle and Spinoza more than by any other philosophers.
When he came to Columbia, Dewey said concerning Woodbridge,
that he "accepted and taught naturalistic metaphysics of the
Aristotelian type."^ The relation of Woodbridge to both
Aristotle and Spinoza will be taken up more fully later.
G. Some Influences on John Dewey
Dewey, as well as Woodbridge was influenced by the Greek
philosophers Plato and Aristotle, the former still providing
his favorite philosophic reading. jn hi s essay "Prom Ab-
solutism to Experimentalism, " Dewey finds some grounds for
pragmatism in the thought of Plato "whose highest flight of
metaphysics always terminated with a social and practical turn,
and not to the artificial Plato constructed by unimaginative
commentators who treat him as the original university professor ." 23
Dewey, as well as other modern naturalists, link their
thought with that of Aristotle. Writing in the Krikorian
volume Dewey says: "philosophical naturalism has a more disting-
uished ancestry than is usually recognized; there are, for ex-
ample, the names of Aristotle and Spinoza. "24 Aristotle, he
continues, regarded the physical as the lowest substratum of
nature and intellect as the highest. 'Pure intellect, pure
because free from contamination by any trace of the material.
21. Jane Dewey, Art. (1939), 36.
22. Dewey, Art. (1930), 21.
23. Loc . cit.
24. Dewey, Art .( 1944 ), 1.
*.
.
'
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is at tli© apex.” 2£> Both the material and the intellectual are
within nature. Centuries later, Aristotle's thought was trans-
formed Dy Lne medieval church philosophers and ’’the naturalistic
elements in his teaching were overlaid, covered up, with super-
natural beliefs. ”26 In giving a dynamic interpretation to nature,
modern naturalists also hold that they stand in the Aristotelian
succession. The doctrine of ’’natural teleology” is linked with
Aristotle’s thesis that nature does nothing in vain. 27
To Kant, Dewey says, Peirce, the originator of American
pragmatism, owed the term ’’pragmatic.” But Kant had a far more
direct influence upon Dewey than that. TJie great contribution
of Kant, he says, was the development of a system of belief
which would give mechanical science, conceived after the
Newtonian pattern, complete sway in all matters of
fact, in all matters whatsoever where thinking has
a claim to interfere; while he reserved a higher
ideal realm with which man’s moral and religious
interests are concerned, a realm where science has
no business to enter and where it could say nothing. 28
Against this bifurcation of experience, Dewey »s philosophy was
to be a lifelong protest. The reason for this protest he states
as follows:
It was a great comfort to many to know they could
be as scientific and as mechanistically scientific
as they desired in the realm of phenomena, and yet
retain intact a superior world of ideal values in
which freedom, instead of mechanical necessity,
reigned. But the price paid for the comfort was
unduly high. Science in such a regime becomes a
technical occupation of an intellectual class; it
25.
26.
27.
28.
Loc. cit.
Lo c . cit.
See Section on Aristotle in Chapter II; also Dewey,
GPP, 20.
Dewey, CAE, 65.
.V
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is barren in morals, where fertilization by science
is most needed, fruitful only in material appliances
and machines used in the material sphere for mun-
dane ends where the world is already too much with us.
Morals become an affair of formulas, often sublime in
themselves, but without possibility of effective trans-
lation, intellectual or practical, into the affairs
of the workaday world. 29
Kant’s philosophy only postponed a facing of this question, and
with it the time when the discoveries of science would be made
applicable to the whole of experience.
Dewey began his philosophical career as an Hegelian idealist,
and although he later rejected this position, he says, "That
acquaintance with Hegel has left a permanent deposit in my
thinking. "30 Dewey rejected Hegel’s concept of the Absolute
Mind, but retained his emphasis upon "continuity" and the
"function of conflict. "31 The Hegelian emphasis upon "coherence"
and "wholes" is clearly seen in Dewey’s logical writings. 32
Dewey was also influenced by several of his contemporaries,
the first of which was Charles Sanders Peirce whose theory is
siammarized as fol 1 ows:
Consider what effects, that might conceivably have
practical bearings, we conceive the object of our
conception to have. Then our conception of these
effects is the whole of our conception of the object. '-3
But it was not until 1898 that the work of Peirce was brought
to the attention of the philosophical world by William James. 34
James’s writings, especially Principle of Psy chology , were a
second influence. To these two men Dewey gives much credit for
his own Instrumentalism. Of James's objective psychological
theory, founded upon biology he says: "It worked its way more
T53.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
Ibid
• ,
66
•
Dewey, Art. (1925), 21.
Jane Dewey, Art. (1939), 17-18
Dewey, LOO, 104-105, 13, 25,
Peirce, Art. (1878); reprinted
James, Art. (1898); reprinted
55, 177 and others.
in Muelder & Sears,
in James, CER.
DAP.
t. t
t
.
-
.
.
.
.
•
.
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and more into all my ideas and acted as a ferment to transform
old beliefs."*^ 3 In the development of his theory Dewey is
closer to Peirce than to James* He conceived of thought as a
function of the human organism—a function which may be used to
adjust the organism to its environment. As his theory developed,
Dewey became more and more behavioristic in his psychology.
Indeed he himself says:
I should also like to point out that the essays in
their psychological phase are written from the stand-
point of what is now termed a behavioristic psy-
chology, though some of them antedate the use of
that term as a descriptive epithet. 36
But what seems to the writer of this dissertation of much more
importance is the fact that Dewey reaffirmed this position in
the Schilpp volume, 1939. 37 This behavioristic viewpoint
is acknowledged also in the other article referred to above:
The psychological tendencies which have exerted an
influence on instrumentalism are of a biological
rather than a physiological nature. They are close-
ly related to the important movement whose promoter
in psychology has been Doctor John Watson and to
which he has given the name of Behaviourism .
In the process of developing his philosophy, Dewey always
related it to human affairs and humanity. The purpose of phil-
osophy is adaptation to, and control of, environment through
the instrumentalities of intelligence, thought, or ideas. The
chief function of philosophy is the solution of practical and
social problems.
Better it is for philosophy to err in active par-
35. Jane Dewey, op. cit., 23.
36. Dewey, Preface to, EEL, vi.
37. Jane Dewey, Art. (1939), 23.
38. Dewey, Art., in Runes, TCP, 464.

17
ticlpation In the living struggles and issues of
its own age and times than to maintain an immune
monastic impeccability, without relevancy and
bearing in the generating ideas of its contem-
porary present. ”9
The aim of philosophy, then, is to become, as far
as is humanly possible, an organ for dealing with
these (social or environmental) conflicts.
. .it is
to be a catholic and far-sighted theory of the
adjustment of the conflicting factors of life. 40
Dewey insists upon the practical use and application of
philosophy. It is always for a purpose. The idea of con-
sequences, of course, permeates the whole pragmatic outlook.
This concept will be dealt with more fully in Chapter V.
H. Survey of Literature in the Field
We shall now point out some of the books and articles
which deal with the subject of "nature" and "naturalism." To
mention all the works is of course impossible. A great work
is Friedrich A. Lange* s Geschichte des Materiallsmus
, (1866),
1926, which is available in an English translation. Two
excellent works in the field are James Ward’s Naturalism and
Agnosticism
,
1899, and A. J. Balfour’s Foundations of Belief ,
8th ed., 1901. Other good works, some of which deal only in
part with this problem are, Ralph Barton Perry’s Present
Philosophical Tendencies
,
1912; Alfred North Whitehead's The
Concept of Nature
,
1920; D. H. Parker’s The Self and Nature ,
1917; James B. Pratt’s Matter and Spirit , 1922, and his
Naturalism
, 1939, although the latter rather confuses the issue
because of a very loose definition of "naturalism."; John
39. Dewey, in EHWJ, 79-80.
40. Dewey, Cl, 5; RP, 26; IDP, 45.
.
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Watson’s Psychology From the Standpoint of a Behaviorist
,
1919, as well as his other works; Chester L. Morgan's
Emergent Evolution
, 1923; Charles Darwin’s Origin of Species
,
1859, The Descent of Man
, 1871, and other writings; Samuel
Alexander’s Space, Time, and Deity
, 1920; Arthur S. Eddington’s
Science and the Unseen World , 1929, The Philosophy of Physical
Science
, 1939, and others; Roy Wood Sellars’ Evolutionary
Naturalism
,
1922, The Philosophy of Physical Realism , 1932,
and numerous articles and reviews; C. A. Strong’s Essays on the
Natural Origin of Mind
, 1930; Arthur Titius’s Natur und Gott ,
1926; Henry Nelson Wieman’s Is There a God?
,
1936, and other
works; Morris R. Cohen’s Reason and Nature , 1931; Corliss
Lamont’s Issues of Immortality
, 1932, and The Illusions of
Immortality
, 1935; George Santayana’s The Life of Reason ,
5 vols., 1905-1906, The Realm of Matter , 1930, and many others;
Durant Drake's Mind and its Place in Nature
,
1925; Arthur 0.
Lovejoy’s The Revolt Against Dualism , 1930, and others; Bertrand
Russell’s Philosophy
, 1927, and other works.
Among the works which are more directly connected with
Woodbridge and Dewey, we find the following. "The Naturalism
of Frederick Woodbridge," in Krikorian, ed.. Naturalism and
the Human Spirit
,
1944; Arthur 0. Lovejoy’s chapter, "Prag-
matism versus the Pragmatist," in Durant Drake and others.
Essays in Critical Realism , where he criticizes Dewey; D. T.
Howard's John Dewey’s Logical Theory , 1918, in which Dewey's
earlier writings are dealt with; George Santayana's article,
"Dewey's Naturalistic Metaphysics," originally published in the
Journal of Philosophy, 1926, and reprinted in the Schilpp Volume;
«*
'
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Viscount Haldane’s Human Experience
, 1926, is a very strong
criticism of Dewey’s Experience and Nature ; A. Schinz's
Anti-pragmatism
,
1909; Sidney Hook’s The Metaphysics of
Pragmatism
, 1927, and his John Dewey , 1957; A. W. Moore’s
Pragmatism and its Critics
, 1910; James B* Pratt’s What is
Pragmatism?
, 1909; Joseph Ratner’s The Philosophy of John
Dewey
,
1928, Characters and Events
,
1929, and Intelligence
in the Modern World
,
1939; then there is the volume edited
by Paul A. Schilpp, The Philosophy of John Dewey , 1939, which
is by far the most systematic and complete criticism of Dewey’s
philosophy as a whole. Nature and Values , 1945, by Edgar S.
Brightman is a recent criticism of naturalism. Besides these
there are other books, as well as a continuous stream of articles
on Dewey and his thought, in the philosophical journals, not to
mention others, for the last five or six decades.
.•
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CHAPTER II
BRIEF SURVEY OF NATURALISM
A. Purpose
In this chapter it is our purpose to give a brief resum£
of "naturalism " as a philosophical system, in order to orient
ourselves in the field, and to consider the historical theories
about "nature" which may have bearing upon the present study.
This is not intended to be a history, but simply a pointing to
some of the highlights in the use of these terms "nature" and
"naturalism," not only today, for for centuries past. For an
excellent history, those interested are referred to Lange’s
work, published in English under the title History of Materialism .
B. Definition of Terms
1. Nature. In the matter of definition, as good a place
as any to begin, is with Webster . This Dictionary lists twelve
different main meanings of the term, with additional subvariants
to many of them. It will be unnecessary to consider all of
these. One will suffice, for example. Webster's philosophical
definition of "nature" is as follows:
The totality of powers or agencies which determine
the character and process of things, in general and
in detail; that which is the gound of existing
phenomena and determines the order of causes and
effects, whether conceived as a plurality of form-
ative agencies or as a single and uniting principle
governing all reality in space and time; --often
restricted to the totality of finite agencies and
forces, in distinction from a creative and guiding
intelligence. The conception of nature has been
confused by the mingling of three chief meanings
adopted with the word in English, viz., (1) crea-
•
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tive or vital force, (2) created being in its
existential character, (3) creation, as a whole,
esp., the physical universe.!
The great variety, even in the philosophical use of the term
is quite evident from this. Further, Webster’s definition
can hardly be considered exhaustive. He goes on to say that
the "main ambiguity is between nature as active or creative
and nature as passive or created.
In an article, "A Personalistic View of Human Nature," 5
Edgar S. Brightman discusses this term "nature" at length.
Natura is derived from the Latin nascor which means "to be
born," or "to beget." It is equivalent to the Grer-k
(phusis). There are at least five general historical mean-
ings of the term with subvariants besides. (1) Nature S)
for the Greeks was the whole world, viewed as an ordered
process; law rather than development was basic. (2) For
traditional theology, especially for scholasticism, nature is
the created order as distinguished from God. (3) For the
more pantheistic thinkers, nature is all-that-there-is; as in
Spinoza’s deus sive natura . Nature as begetting, so to speak,
is natura naturans ; nature as begotten, natura naturata .
Many modern naturalists share this view vaguely, and think of
nature as synonymous with reality. (4) For Kant, nature is the
phenomenal order—the order of categorized appearances, the
1. Webster, NID, 1631.
2. Loc. cit.
3. Brightman, Art. (1945), 1-2
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sense manifold organized into a world of possible experience.
Neither things in themselves or the moral experiences are, on
this view, any part of Nature. (5) Nature is also loosely
used as the designation of what the sciences are investigat-
ing. It is no wonder that John Dewey, writing on the subject
in J. M. Baldwin’s Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology
,
says
that ’’Few terms used in philosophy have a wider or looser use,
or involve greater ambiguity.”
4
This shows clearly that all
authorities agree on the extremely indefinite usage of ’’nature.”
The need for exact definition Is clear.
2. Naturalism . Again we turn to the dictionaries.
Webster says that ’’naturalism” means:
The doctrine which expands conceptions drawn from
the natural sciences into a world view, denying
that anything In reality has a supernatural or
more than natural significance. It is the doctrine
that cause -and-effeet laws are able to give an
adequate account of all phenomena and any teleo-
logical conceptions of nature are invalid.
5
Baldwin in his article on ”Naturalism, ” in his Dictionary ,
lists three possible meanings:
(1) The theory that the whole of the universe or of
experience may be accounted for by a method like
that of the physical sciences, and with recourse
only to the current conceptions of physical and
natural science} more specifically, that mental
and moral processes may be reduced to the terms
and categories of the natural sciences.
(2) Synonymous with materialism.
(3) As a view that limits itself to the normal in any-
thing as against appeal to what transcends nature as
a whole, or, as in any way, supernatural or mystical. 6
Baldwin favors limiting the use of the term to the third sense
leaving positivism and materialism to take care of the first
4. Dewey, Art., 159.
5. Webster, Art., 1631.
6. Baldwin, Art., 138.
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two respectively. He goes on:
It is a false position from the start, as the
development of science shows, to limit ’'nature"
to physical nature, and that minus animated
nature. Indeed, the development in the mean-
ing of natural to include man is so firmly
established that it were better to yield up
the word naturalism altogether to go with it.
7
It will be seen from this that Baldwin wants to make man part
and parcel of nature. Nature, for him, is all there is.
A very good statement of what the philosophical natural-
ist ought to say, appears in the article "Naturalism ,f in
Runes f s Dictionary of Philosophy
. Professor Puller, who wrote
the article, says much in one sentence:
Naturalism, challenging the cogency of the cosmo-
logical, teleological, and moral arguments, holds
that the universe requires no supernatural cause
and government, but is self-existent, self-explan-
atory, self -operating, and self-directing ; that the
world process is not teleological and anthropo-
centric, but purposeless, deterministic (except for
possible tychistic events), and only incidentally
productive of man; that human life, physical,
mental, moral, and spiritual, is an ordinary
natural event attributable in all respects to the
ordinary operations of nature; and that man’s
ethical values, compulsions, activities, and
restraints can be justified on natural grounds,
without recourse to supernatural sanctions, and
his highest good pursued and attained under
natural conditions, without expectation of a
supernatural destiny.®
To summarize to this point, the variety of meanings which
may be applied to "nature” and "naturalism" is evident. It is
well to have them clearly in mind. Nature may be:
(1) The whole world viewed as ordered process;
(2) The created order as distinguished from God;
(3) All-that-there-is;
(4) The phenomenal order;
(5) The field of scientific investigation.
The definition of "natural" and "naturalism" will depend upon
7. Loc. cit.
8. Puller, Art., in Runes, DOP, 205

24
the definition of "nature" adhered to, or vice versa.
C. Naturalism in Greek Thought
1* The Early Greeks . The Early Greeks have often been
classified as materialists because they sought for a ground
of things within the material world. Thales, for example,
found the ground of things in "water." Anixamander suggested
"the boundless" as the ground, while Anaximenes found the
ultimate ground in "air." Aristotle in his Metaphysics says
that
:
Most of the early Greek philosophers were content
to seek a material first principle as the cause
of all things... but of what sort this first prin-
ciple is, and how many such there are, this is
the point upon which they are not agreed.
9
But there is still considerable disagreement as to the
exact meaning of "Nature" (<^WtS ) among the early Greeks. Paul
R. Helsel in an article in The Personalist
,
"The Beginnings of
Personalism in Constructive Thought," discusses the meaning of
this Greek term at some length. The great question is this:
"Did the Ancients imply by it a permanent unchanging
substratum, or did they mean coming into being or growth? "10
Was the Greek conception of "nature" static or dynamic? He
points out that the Greeks did not limit the term to one
meaning and so the term may well stand for a whole family of
ideas such as, substratum, life, power, soul, value, or God.
The restrictions were placed upon the use of the term by
Aristotle three hundred years later. Thus the use of "cause"
9. Aristotle, MET, I, 3, 983b.
10. Helsel, Art
.
(1944-45)
,
20.
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by Aristotle in the above quotation is arbitrary. Too many
have assumed that Aristotle’s use of the term was the
only use of the term. Hence Aristotle assumed, and others
following him, that the early Greeks sought only a material
cause. "Thus thinkers down to Kant began by presupposing an
objective space-filling stuff. Aristotle’s knowledge of the
Ancients is partial and inadequate . Helsel goes on to point
out that if the dynamic interpretation be given to the term,
that is, in terms of life and growth, there is as much ground
for a personalistic interpretation as a naturalistic one.
The real founder of materialistic philosophy was Democ-
ritus who taught that "only the atoms and the void are real. ”12
According to his view, reality was made up of indivisible,
impenetrable, simple atoms. What they are now, they always
have been, and ever shall be. Out of these atoms the dif-
ferent objects of experience are formed. All bodies are
combinations of atoms and spaces. Objects differ, simple
because the atoms differ in size, shape, weight, arrangement
and position. The atoms have within themselves, the power
of motion and hence no external causative agent is necessary
for a physical system. The earth is one of the bodies formed
or created by a particular arrangement of atoms, and out of
the moist earth or slime life arose.
According to Democritus, the soul is also composed of
material atoms, but the atoms of the soul are finer, rounder.
11. Loc. cit.
12. Bakewell, SBAP, 60.
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and quicker than any of the other atoms. Thilly says that
in the theory of Democritus, "we have the crude beginnings
of a physiological psychology on a materialistic basis. ”13
The extent to which Democritus carried his material-
istic view is well seen in his theory of sense-perception.
According to him, objects send out images of themselves
which pass through space and enter and directly affect the
atoms of the soul.
Writing in Baldwin’s Dictionary
,
Dewey says that there
was no clear distinction of the term "nature" before Plato.
The early Greeks were all "naturalists" in the sense
that they were basically interested in the physical
world. There was with most of them no clear distinction
between mind and matter. "Nature" was conceived of
as living and, in so far at least, as psychical; the
scheme, in a word, was Hylozoism, not materialism. 14
2. Plato . The distinction between the physical and the
metaphysical was first clearly made by Plato, thought by many
to be the greatest philosopher who ever lived. After his
time the tendency to use the term "nature" in a restricted
sense grew rapidly. It distinguished or marked off the physical
world from the metaphysical. The world of nature was the
realm of becoming for Plato, as distinguished from the realm
of being which he called the World of Ideas or Forms. One
must recognize "the existence of absolute beauty and be able
to distinguish the idea from the objects which participate
in the idea..." 15 The world of phenomena was an object of
probable knowledge only.
13. Thilly, HOP, 39.
14. Dewey, Art. (1902), 139.
15. Plato, Republic V, 476.
.'
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But it was far from being identical with what we
should term nature in the purely physical sense,
the term much more nearly expressing that.
Moreover, in general a teleological explanation
of nature was required by which it was subjected
to the good and reason.^
The distinction between the two is well illustrated by the
Allegory of the Cave in Book VII of the Republic . Nature is
the whole system of moving and changing things so far as they
are capable of realizing an end or purpose.
3 • Aristotle .
Aristotle’s concept of nature is important because both
Dewey and Woodbridge, as well as other naturalists, link their
systems with his thought. Nature, according to Aristotle, does
nothing in vain. Nature is always achieving purposes or ends.
In contrasting the results of art and nature he says: "if,
therefore, artificial products are for the sake of an end, so
clearly also are natural products. It is for a purpose that
the swallow builds a nest, the spider makes a web, and the
plant grows leaves. "It is plain then that nature is a cause,
a cause that operates for a purpose.”^ Aristotle rejected
Plato’s attempt to separate the world of Forms from the world
of changing things. Instead he conceived of form and matter
together as making up nature. There is no matter which does
not have some form. But Aristotle, at the same time, arrives
at Pure Form, the unmoved Mover, or God as the ultimate final
cause of all things. 19 All the order and uniformity and system
16. Dewey, Art. (1902), 139.
17. Aristotle, Physics, 199a.
16. Ibid., 200b.
19. Aristotle, Metaphysics , 1064ab, 1071b, 1072b.
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of nature is due to the fact that it represents "the transition
of the potential to completion under the teleological influence
of forms, and the supreme Form, God. "20 Aristotle's view may be
summarized as:
(1) The system of moving, changing things, so far as
directed to realizing an end, or the end, the
absolutegood;
(2) as the standard of reference to which all
particulars of a given cause as well as failures,
etc., can be measured. But it is distinguished
from Art in that the efficient cause is internal
not external.
4. The Stoics and Epicureans . In the Epicurean philosophy
the teleological factor is eliminated and "nature is simply the
sum total of the mechanical impacts and arrangements of the
purely quantitative elements, the atoms. "22 This view is found
in its greatest expression in Lucretius's De Rerum Natux-a . Here
the term "nature" is limited largely to the physical world.
Lucretius says:
If you will apprehend and keep in mind these things,
nature free at once and rid of her haughty lords is
seen to do all things spontaneously of herself with-
out the meddling of the gods. 23
H© held to a form of physiological psychology. "...must
we not admit that the mind and the soul are of a bodily nature? "24
The mind is formed of "exceedingly minute bodies." He was much
influenced by Democritus in his theory.
He, likewise, saw nature as not guided by a Purposer, "for
verily not by design did the first beginnings of things station
themselves each in its right place by keen intelligence, nor
20. Dewey, Art. (1902), 140.
21. Loc. cit.
22. Loc. cit.
25. Bakewell, SBAP, 309.
24. Ibid., 311.
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did they bargain sooth to say what motions each should assume.”^
By the Stoics, nature was regarded as self-moved, both
efficiently and teleologically. Nature was not merely ordered and
attracted to perfection by God; it was God. Man's greatest
virtue is to live in accordance with nature, in fact, it is
his only virtue. Man was conceived of as a cog in the great
machine of nature. He must find his happiness in conformity
to nature's laws and demands.
•_ »
D. The Middle Ages
During the Middle Ages there were three strains of thought
concerning nature, all vying for the dominant position on the
philosophical scene.
1. The first line is that of orthodox scholasticism
which follows Aristotle and defines nature as the essence of
anything, in so far as it operates in a regular way to bring
things to an appointed end. God was considered as the ultimate
cause of all things.
a. Augustine . 353-430. Although Augustine pre-
ceded the period known as the "Middle Ages” by many centuries,
he is included here because he stands in the orthodox tra-
dition and because of his influence upon the Schoolmen.
According to his theory, God created the world out of nothing
( creatio ex nlhilo ). It is not an evolution of his own
being as the pantheistic thinkers suggest. It is a contin-
uous creation, ever dependent upon him. God is timeless and
25. Ibid., 316
'.
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spaceless. He created time and space when he created the
world. The world or nature is not eternal, for it had a
beginning. God was the creator of all things. His view is
simply that of God the creator and "nature" the created.
b. Thomas Aquinas . 1225?-1274. After the period of
the Dark Ages, we enter into the period of Medieval philosophy -
the period of systematic development of church philosophy.
According to Thilly, the fundamental aim of his system "is to
demonstrate the rationality of the universe as a revelation
of God." Aquinas held to the same general view of God as
absolute, as did Augustine, but his whole development was
strongly colored by Aristotelian concepts, indeed he called
Aristotle "the philosopher." Forms are, for him, necessary
principles of explanation in metaphysics, but they do not
alone account for the natural world. The principle of matter
is also necessary. Nature is a union of form and matter. The
nature of a corporeal being consists of form and matter. Matter
always has some form but there are forms without matter, that
is spiritual beings. God is pure form or pure actuality. But
essentially, his view of nature as form and matter is the same
as that of Augustine. God is creator, and all else is created.
"It must be said that every being in any way existing is from
God." 28 "Since God is the efficient, the exemplar and the final
cause of all things, and since primary matter is from Him, it
follows that the first principle of all things is one in reality
26. Thilly, HOP, 191.
27. Summa Theologica II, 217.
28. Ibid., 2147
29. Ibid., 221.
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Only those created beings which have both form and matter belong
to the world of nature. The soul of man is not a part of nature
but only the body.
2. The second was the mystical strain which continued
the Platonic, and even more so, the Neoplatonic influence, but
it was more pantheistic on the whole. It tended to make nature
the mysterious, vital, creative energy of God.
a. Giordano Bruno . 1648-1600. One of the most
interesting figures of the Middle Ages was Giordano Bruno, a
monk of the Dominican order who broke with the church and was
finally condemned by the Inquisition and burned at the stake.
So far as we know, Bruno was the first to develop a theory of
monads. All things are made up of atoms which are both mental
and physical. The soul of man is an immortal monad and God is
the monad of monads. The whole of nature then, is one living
system - a world of monads.
Let a thing be even as small and tiny as you will,
it has within itself some portion of spiritual
substance ... spirit is found in all things, and
there is not the least corpuscle which does not
contain within itself some portion that may be-
come living. 30
All things, he goes on, contain within themselves a soul and
have the essentials of life. God is immanent in the infinite
universe. He is the active principle in it.
The universal intellect is the most intimate, real,
and essential faculty and effective part of the
world-soul. This is one and the same thing which
fills the whole, illumines the universe and directs
nature to produce the various species as is fitting.
30. See Rand (ed.), MCP, 14
..
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and has the same relation to the production of
natural things as our intellect to the parallel
production of our general ideas. 31
The world of nature follows from him with inner necessity.
God is really the world-soul permeating all things.
3. The third line was that which came through the Arabian
interpretation of Aristotle. Form and purpose were wholly
immanent in nature. From this strain come the distinction
of nature into Natura naturans
,
equivalent to God, and Natura
naturata, the world as materialized form.
E. Modern Philosophy
1. General Introduction
. John Dewey says:
Modern thought has added little change to the concept
of nature. It has brought out the homogenity of
nature, its identical structure and operations in all
its parts. The mechanical conception of nature may
be said to have become, through the writings of
Descartes, Galileo, Hobbes, and Newton, completely
victorious, as against Platonic and Aristotelian
conceptions .^2
But here Dewey seems to be referring to nature as the physical
universe only. On this basis, the physical universe would be
the whole of reality. It does not mention, for example, that
Descartes would make a very marked distinction between the
world of extension and the world of thought. It is true though
that the conception of the world of sense experience was re-
garded as mechanical.
Josiah Royce summarizes the contribution of this period
as follows:
These three ideas, then, th it nature is a mechanism,
that human reason is competent to grasp the truth
of nature, and that, since nature’s truth is
essentially mathematical, geometry is the model
31. Ibid., 7.
32. Dewey, Art., in Baldwin, DPP, 140.
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science, whose precision and necessity philosophy,
too, must imitate, --these are the ideas of our
first period. 33
He refers of course, to the early part of the period of modern
philosophy leading up to the time of Spinoza. With this in-
troduction, we turn to a consideration of four men who had
a profound influence upon the development of naturalism,
Hobbes, Spinoza, Kant, and Darwin.
2. Thomas Hobbes . 1588-1679. An interesting naturalistic
view was that of Thomas Hobbes. He. lived in the age of awaken-
ing of modern science and was greatly influenced by Newtonian
physics. The completely mechanistic conception of nature
ruled the day. He rejected theology completely, as a science
in any true sense of the term, and accepted instead "the
new natural science of Copernicus, Galileo, and Farvey, whom
he regards as the founders of science, and fearlessly deduces
the consequences of the mechanical theory in his materialistic
philosophy
.
Thilly goes on to say that for Hobbes,
philosophy is the science of the motions and
actions of natural and political bodies, and
everything can be explained by motion or mech-
anically: the nature of man, the mental world,
and the State, as well as the occurrence of
physical nature. 3
5
Hobbes worked out his philosophical system in three
stages. First, De Corpore , where he developed a systematic
doctrine of Body, showing how physical phenomena were univer-
sally explicable in terms of motion, as motion or mechanical
33. Royce, SMP, 41.
34. Thilly, HOP, 264.
35. Ibid., 265.
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action was then understood.
All which qualities, called sensible
,
are in the
object, that causeth them, but so many several
motions of the matter, by which it presseth our
organs diversely. Neither in us that are pressed,
are they anything else, but divers motions; for
motion produceth nothing but motion. 36
The theory of motion was then applied (following Galileo and
others) in the light of mathematical science. In the second
stage, Hobbes, in his De homlne
,
separates man from the realm
of nature and shows what specific bodily motions are involved
in the production of such bodily phenomena as sensation and
knowledge, as well as the feelings and passions which result
from the relations of man with man. Hobbes explained all
functions of the human organism, both physiological and psy-
chological, on the basis of complete mechanism. Man’s every
action is the result of rigid and unchangeable mechanical laws.
Sense is a
phantasm made by the reaction and endeavour
outwards in the organ of sense caused by an
endeavour inwards from the object, remaining
more or less... 37
Mind, he says, is motion, (or sometimes, the effects of motion),
in the brain. The third stage is developed in De cive , his
philosophy of the state. Here he shows how men who are naturally
enemies gradually developed the better relation known to us
as society. He thus united into one coherent whole, a material-
istic philosophy of Body, Man and State.
3. Baruch de Spinoza. 1632-1677. For the most part we
36, Rand ( ed. )
,
MCP, 58.
37. Molesworth (ed.), EW, I, 391.
..*
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will follow Royce ’s account of Spinoza. One cannot help com-
menting on the beauty of Royce ’s work. Spinoza’s basic axiom
was that everything in the world must be explained either by
its own nature, or by some higher nature. By explanation he
meant the comprehension of what a thing is. To illustrate his
point, Spinoza used geometry. All the diameters of a circle,
for example, must be equal and that is what a circle is. Any-
thing in the world that does not contain its own explanation
must be a part of some larger nature of things which does
explain it and which forces it to be just what it is. "Cause
and explanation mean for Spinoza the same thing. He knows
only rigid mathematical necessity. 1 ' 5® Nothing comes by chance
in the world, but everything must be what it is by necessity.
Spinoza goes on to say that "there must be some one highest
nature of things, which explains all reality." 5^ The world is
one, and so all things in it must be parts of one self-evident,
self-producing order, one nature. The supreme nature of things
Spinoza called the universal "Substance . "4°
In it are we all, it makes us what we are; it does
what nature determines; it explains itself and all
of us; it isn’t produced, it produces; it is uncre-
ated, supreme, overruling, omnipresent, absolute,
rational, irreversible, unchangeable, the law of
laws, the nature of natures; and we --we, with all
our acts, thoughts, feelings, life, relations,
experiences--are just the result of it, the con-
sequences of it, as the diameters are the results
of the nature of a circle. 41
This Substance, Spinoza calls God.^ Thus all that happens.
38. Royce, SMP, 59.
39. Ibid., 60.
40. Spinoza, Ethics , I, Def. III.
41. Royce, SMP, 60-61.
42. Spinoza, ETH, Def. VI.
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happens because of the one Substance or God. It is also
Nature. For Nature equals God equals Substance, in Spinoza’s
thought. It is all that there is. "Besides God no substance
can be granted or conceived . "43 Again he says, "whatsoever
is, is in God, and without God nothing can be, or be con-
ceived. "44
God, Substance, or Nature has an infinite number of
attributes of which we can know only two. One of these at-
tributes is the material world, bodily substance, or extension.
The other is thought. "These two worlds, Spinoza holds, are
equally divine, equally full of God, equally expressions of
the supreme order. "45 All material substance is subject to
natural or mathematical law. The law of cause and effect is
true in the world of material substance and in the psychological
world
.
Then, likewise, thought produces and acts on thought alone.
The two worlds are parallel but do not affect each other in any
way. They are completely independent of each other. Where
-
ever there is a body, God, says Spinoza, has a thought corre-
sponding to that body. "46 Our thoughts are a part of God’s
thought, just as our bodies are a part of the embodied substance.
The order and connection of ideas is the same as the order and
connection of things. 47 The human mind is a part of Nature, just
as much as the human body, for Nature, God, or Substance is all
43. Ethics I, Prop. XIV.
44. Ibid.
,
Prop. XV.
45. Royce, SMP, 63.
46. Ibid., 64.
47. Ethics II, Prop. VII; Rand (ed.), MCP, 170.
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that there is.
Spinoza differs from Aristotle on the point of nature
achieving ends or purposes. He says "there is no need to show
at length, that nature has no particular goal in view, and that
final courses are mere human figments. "48 Instead he holds that
everything that is, is by absolute necessity.
The influence of Spinoza's doctrine upon philosophical
naturalism has been very great. Dewey says:
With Spinoza the nature of a thing is its essence
and its idea and so the supreme essence is also,
Natura, natura naturans or Deus, while the world
of modified existence is Natura naturata . 4 ^
4. Immanuel Kant . 1724-1804. It would be presumptuous,
to say the least, to even attempt to give an outline of Kant's
thought in a few short paragraphs. Our purpose is to mention
only the main ideas of Kant concerning the phenomenal world,
and that in bare outline. We begin with space and time, which
Kant calls the Forms of Sensibility. In the antinomies, Kant
shows that to consider space and time as real entities is
unthinkable and contradictory. He concludes that they are
not real. They are not properties of things in the same sense
that color is a property of a thing at all. They are rather
necessary conditions for our sense perceptions. We know
phenomena under the forms of space and time. "Space and time
appear to us to belong outside us, merely because they are
conditions in us of our seeing and feeling things, forms of
our sense. "50 Kant makes a great distinction between phe-
nomena or objects of sense, and noumena or objects of thought,
48. Rand (ed.), MCP, 166.
49. Dewey, Art., in Baldwin, DPP, 140.
50. Royce, op. cit., 124-125.
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the things in themselves.
The world of phenomena is the world in space and time
as built up through sense-perception. Out of sensations
we gradually build up the whole ordered existence known as
the physical universe. In the world, the law of cause and ef-
fect is true, for Kant firmly believed in the validity of
Newton’s physics. Royce says:
What he wants to be sure of is that nature, seeing
or real, in show-space or in itself, has discover-
able law and order in it, uniformity, causal fixity,
genuine reasonableness, about it. 5 ^
Kant concludes in his Critique of Pure Reason that:
In so far as the world is seen by us in our sense-
forms of space and time, it is bound to appear to
us as conformable to their laws. Nature, then, is
forced to obey geometry, because nature, after all,
is just show-nature, our own experience, and so
conformable to our own fundamentally geometrical
ways of viewing it...-52
The important point for us is that Kant considers "nature”
to be the world that is experienced in organized sense per-
ception. What is not in the order of sense is not nature.
Kant, thus, specifically defines this term nature for us.
Nature is the object of all possible categorizable experi-
ence. By experience Kant means:
Our sensations as ordered in space and time in
accordance with such necessary principles as the
law of cause and effect, which Kant calls cate-
gories . 55
Kant excludes the world of moral experience from the realm of
61.
52.
53.
Ibid., 126.
Ibid., 126-127.
Brightman, NAV, 36-37.
r.
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nature. It will be interesting to relate this view to that
of Wood.bridge and Dewey, as well as the view of Spinoza which
is opposed to that of Kant in that for Spinoza, nature is all
that there is.
5. Charles Darwin . 1809-1882. Probably no one theory
suggested to men caused such a furor in so many circles as
that of biological evolution as given to the world by Charles
Darwin, mile his is essentially a theory of what happens in
nature, its influence upon philosophical naturalism is so great
it must be considered. In his book The Influence of Darwin
on Philosophy
,
Dewey says:
That the publication of the "Origin of Species" marked
an epoch in the development of the natural sciences is
well known to the layman. That the combination of
the very words origin and species embodies an intel-
lectual revolt and introduced a new intellectual
temper is easily overlooked by the expert. The con-
ceptions that had reigned in the philosophy of nature
and knowledge for two thousand years, the conceptions
that had become the familiar furniture of the mind,
rested on the assumption of the superiority of the
fixed and final; they rested upon treating change and
origin as signs of defect and unreality. In laying
hands upon the sacred ark of absolute permanency, in
treating the forms that had been regarded as types
of fixity and perfection as originating and passing
away, the "Origin of Species" introduced a mode of
thinking that in the end was bound to transform the
logic of knowledge, and hence the treatment of morals,
politics, and religion. 54
What Dewey says is indeed true. Since the times of the
Greek philosophers, the idea of the fixed and immutable had
dominated the scene. The doctrine of evolution revolution-
ized the thinking of the world. It destroyed forever the
64. Dewey, IDP, 1-2.
' k
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concept of fixed and eternal forms and species. It was argued
that
If all organic adaptations are due to constant vari-
ations and those variations which are harmful and
useless are eliminated in the struggle for existence,
there is no call for a prior intelligent causal
force to plan and preordain them. 55
F. Naturalism in America
In the Krikorian volume, Harold A. Larrabee has a chapter
on ’’Naturalism in America." The value of this account is partly
destroyed because the author has a biased point of view. However,
it does contain some valuable information. "The career of
naturalism in America is the history of the slow growth of an
attitude rather than of a specific philosophical doctrine. "55
What he means, I take it, is that Americans are gradually
coming to see the "naturalistic" light. Then, while he admits
that the philosophy of the "schools" has been, on the whole,
mainly idealistic," it was not so fully in control of American
thought in general and still less of American living. "57 "For
our professed philosophers have endlessly refuted naturalism,
while our practical philosophies have steadily confirmed it."68
Larrabee would have us believe that every American was and is
really a naturalist at heart. It is unfortunate that he carries
his prejudice so far as to make statements like these:
Theological doctrines which had all the appearance,
at least, of defeatist rationalizations of earthly
'BS. Ibid., 3.
56. Larrabee, Art. (1944), 319.
67. Ibid., 320.
68. Ibid., 321.
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scarcity, frustration, and despair could hardly
retain their hold in a land which has turned out
to be one of plenty and of hope. 59
It was thus that millions of Americans lived, as
it were, naturalistically
,
long before a few phil-
osophers among them began to make theoretically and
systematically explicit and underlying premises of
American enterprise.
Larrabee would have us believe that the vast majority of people
are naturalists at heart, and that only here and there does
one find a theistic soul.
He goes on to consider the deistic movement, for example,
as the permanent collapse of supernaturalism. Of the work of
Franklin he says:
Thus, at a time when, after the fervor of the Great
Awakening, godliness was again rapidly declining,
he united in the popular imagination the two main
secular tendencies that were ultimately to furnish
the broad foundations of American naturalism. 51
The chief contribution of the Revolutionary Period was that
of the deists whose revolt against Calvinism "undoubtedly af-
forded philosophical naturalism, in the form of Anglo-French
sensationalism, its first brief opportunity to take root in
America. "^2 Then came the early medical materialists who did
not offer anything that was completely permanent but yet made
some contribution. It was to be another century before man
"as a biological organism was to become the starting point of
a convincing philosophy in the hands of a James or a Dewey ."53
69. Ibid.
,
322.
60. Ibid., 323.
61. Ibid. 331.
62. Ibid. 333-334
63. Ibid., 335.
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It took, however, the triple earthquake of Darwin,
the panic of 1857, and the Civil War to bring the
ancient structure down; and to arouse both scien-
tists and philosophers to a belated realization
that supernaturalism had overstayed its era and
that a new America—urban, industrial, and secular
—
was on the way. 64
After the Civil War the American Colleges began to grow and to
appoint men who were not clergymen to the presidency. The
effect of this was a shift to German idealism which was almost
completely out of touch with "the issues raised by the labor-
atory sciences for revelation," but also "with those gener-
ated by the emerging social studies for entrenched plutocracy . "65
He does point out that the greatest single influence in
the history of naturalism was Darwin’s Origin of Species which
reached America in 1860. Then came the revolt of Realism and
Pragmatism against idealism. "Just as the Civil War killed
transcendentalism, so the first World War and its disillusion-
ing aftermath precipitated the downfall of the feebler Roycean
idealism which had succeeded it ."66 He says, concerning the
present period, that most of the teachers of philosophy at the
universities are naturalists. Naturalism has changed places
with idealism.
After reading this account of American naturalism, one is
inclined to conclude that American naturalism is of a com-
paratively recent origin and growth. In the early period,
Larrabee was able to show little, if anything, of the positive
and tangible nature, which is strange for one who must give
64. Ibid., 244.
65. Ibid., 549.
66* Ibid., 351.
10
.
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such an important place to the existential. The real be-
ginning of naturalism, as a philosophy, was after the pub-
lication of Darwin’s Origin of Species . Naturalism as a
vigorous philosophy came with the Columbia School of Realism
and Naturalism. Indeed, the greatest work was done by Wood-
bridge and Dewey. This work has been continued through their
pupils as is quite evident from contemporary naturalistic
writings. Among the younger naturalists, there are few names
found which were not at some time connected with this School.
Among the older naturalists, not connected with Columbia, nor
influenced so much by Dewey, are George Santayana, Bertrand
Russell, and Roy Wood Sellars. Wieman of Chicago has been
much influenced by Dewey ’ s thought
.
G . Summary
In this chapter a survey has been made of philosophical
naturalism. Five possible views of nature have been suggested;
(1) The whole world viewed as ordered process . Here, the
various conceptions held by the ancient Greeks may be classi-
fied.
(2) The created order as distinguished from God . This is the
view of Augustine and the Schoolmen.
(3) All-that-there-is . Spinoza held this view; for him, the
term "nature" was synonymous with God.
(4) The phenomenal order . This is the view of Kant who held
that nature is the world of organized and categorized sense
experience
.
..
.
*
.
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(5) The field of scientific investigation . Hobbes, who held
to a mechanistic view of all physical, psychological, and
social events is best classified here.
In the rest of the chapter the influence of Darwin upon
the development of modern naturalism was noted, and the history
of naturalism in America discussed. Most of the work of this
school has been done within comparatively recent years under
the leadership of Dewey, Woodbridge, Sellars, Santayana, and
a few others.
.
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CHAPTER III
WOODBRIDGE * S CONCEPT OF NATURE
A. General Introduction
As w© begin a consideration of Woodbridge’s naturalistic
metaphysics, it will be of interest to compare him with George
Santayana and John Dewey. Costello, in his article on "The Natu-
ralism of Frederick Woodbridge," remarks that he can find no
agreement among naturalists either old or new. "Professor
Dewey and Mr. Santayana are so far apart that no one can have
profited by both and still be fully able to accept either."!
This is also evident from Santayana’s article on "Dewey’s Natu-
ralistic Metaphysics," and Dewey’s reply to that article which
have been referred to above in Chapter I. Woodbridge’s phil-
osophy, Costello goes on to say, is decidedly different from that
of either Santayana or Dewey. Costello quotes an answer he
received from Woodbridge to questions concerning the position
of these two naturalists. To Santayana's thesis that mind has
no causal place in the world, he replied: "When Santayana says
that, he is ignoring obvious fact for the sake of theory. The
existence of his own book, lying on the table there, is evidence
to the contrary." Then concerning Dewey’s reply to a simple
question, Woodbridge says that: "Dewey defined and distinguished
1. Costello, Art. (1944), 296.
..
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and qualified, in such a maze of dialectic, that not only I
did not get any answer, I didn’t even know where my question
went to* And do you know, when he gets that way, he thinks
he is being empirical. Such was his opinion of two quite
well known fellow naturalists. We will consider Woodbridge’s
view under several headings.
1.
Nature . In An Essay on Nature he says that "Nature"
is used as "a name for the familiar setting of human history.
In the words of Santayana, It is ’public experience’."
5
In recognizing it as the setting of human history,
I would not exclude other histories from it—neither
that of living creatures other than man nor that of
the stars--for I must think of it as expansed not
only into the eyes of all, but into the eyeless also,
for heaven and earth, and sea, and all that in them
is, make up a sum which seems to leave nothing out.
"Nature" is here used as a name for that sum.
4
This is, of course, a preliminary definition. Nature is all
that there is. She is one. "Personification is difficult for
me to resist; I am afflicted with a sense of indecency whenever
I refer to 'Nature’ as ’it’.’’5 But "let Nature’s proper pronoun
be ’it’ for those who like it better and would avoid all sug-
gestions of personality . "6
But, whether we personify Nature or not, we must accept
her as genuine. Heaven and earth, and sea, and all that in them
is are very real, so real that is is difficult to think of
reality in competition with them, especially when that "all
2. Loc. cit.
3. v'/oodbridge, EON, 3.
4. Ibid., 4.
5. Ibid., 4.
6. Ibid., 5.
-
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that in them is, is so far from having been discovered. "7
2. The Natural . Leaving "Nature" for a moment, we turn
to Woodbridge’s definition of "natural." The natural is that
which "is characteristic of Nature and leads us naturally to
expect this or that consequence."® The great difficulty has
been that adjectives and adverbs suggest their opposites.
Natural suggests unnatural, artificial, or super-natural, and
thus tends to confuse the issue. We are all working with
Nature, striving to change her, and to make her adaptable to
our needs. We change the "natural" into the "-unnatural." "We
are natural artists working with Nature and upon Nature in ways
that transform the natural into the unnatural. "9 Besides,
The behavior of Nature, although all of it must be
said to be natural, often exhibits the universal and
the astonishing, leading us to call these exhibitions
unnatural and sometimes monstrous when they are not. 10
The natural is what one would- expect to find in Nature. Wood-
bridge desires to avoid by the use of the term "natural" any
suggestion of "supernatural" as a realm of existence. There
is but one realm of existence, the realm of Nature, and all
events are natural events.
B. Epistemology
Our knowledge of Nature is obtained from Nature herself.
We gain all our knowledge in the way that the chemist or the
physicist gains his knowledge.
I must do precisely what the chemist does, go to Nature,
put questions to her, and accept her answers and
refrain from trying to imagine what knowledge should
77 Loc. cit.
8. Ibid., 6.
9. Loc. cit.
10. Loc. cit.
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be like before any knowledge is acquired.
H
But his theory of knowledge is not always clear. He says
that knowledge is more than the immediate data of consciousness.
"Knowledge is acquired, not given. "12 Further, it is acquired
from Nature. He points out that if immediate knowledge were
possible, one would know all at the moment of perception. All
we do is set ourselves apart, just as anything else is set
apart, for the purpose of study. Yet, man always remains
part and parcel of Nature, no matter how he may set himself
apart from her for the purpose of gaining knowledge.
Distinguishing man is not taking him out of Nature
in order to secure for him a privileged position
wherein he is fitted to receive Nature as a gift
from an alien benefactor
.
Our natural status is as inseparably bound up with
Nature as is that of the largest star or the small-
est microbe. 14
Nature is a coherent and integrated system, an order,
a cosmos, a universe which can find expression in
language and, so expressed, be handed on from gen-
eration to generation improved. 15
Thus when we see ourselves in the presence of Nature, we see
ourselves in the presence of our owner. "To regard Nature as
the symbol of God f 3 glory is not at all strange or unnatural.
It is very human."!® Our knowledge of all things comes from
Nature. Nature, with all her grandeur, all her majesty, all
her beauty, all her power, naturally suggests a personal God,
11. Ibid., 11.
12. Ibid.
,
12.
13. Ibid., 13.
14. Ibid. 14.
15. Ibid. 15.
16. Ibid., 17.
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even to the human spirit. But it would be most unscientific
to say such a God exists, since all our knowledge comes from
our one source, nature.
In the foregoing, Woodbridge says that knowledge is acquired
from nature, not immediately given. In another passage, he seems
to say that knowledge is perception. "Knowledge is of what
we perceive, and I have named that ’Nature ’." 17 Again he says:
"We are limited in knowledge by our ability and equipment on
the one hand and Nature in which they operate on the other. "IS
To this writer, his position is not quite clear. Knowledge is
"of what we perceive" suggests that knowledge is perception, or
given in perception, yet in the previous passages he says that
it is "acquired" nor "given."
Our instruments for acquiring knowledge are our bodies.
Our livin, bodies are in nature. To begin with, they are rather
ingenious instruments, and we supplement them with others almost
equally ingenious which often perform more effectively than our
bodies themselves. The miracle of the present age, with all its
scientific inventions for the bettermeht of man, is not the
instrument but the human body. "The greatest instrument in the
triumphs of art is the human body with its natural equipment,
and the great miracle, if one wants one, is the response which
nature makes when that instrument is employed. "Increasing
the effectiveness of o\r natural instrument by such supple-
mentation is proof that there is no break between nature and
17. Ibid., 21.
18. ibid., 25.
19. ibid., 28.
..
.
.
50
ourselves, that intimate reciprocity prevails, and that we are
interposed in Nature rather than set over against her. "20
Idealists would likewise agree that there is no break in reality
(Woodbridge f s Nature) but differ radically as to just what
reality really is.
C. The Human Body
Our bodies, he says, are instruments by which we may know
Nature. Yet, they are a part of Nature. The body is an all-
important part of Nature for Woodbridge. All mental states are
really physical states, that is, parts of the body. It is be-
cause we hav6 bodies that we can come to grips with Nature as
a whole. Consciousness he recognizes, but it is not a fact to
be explained but a fact to be observed. We have conscious
bodies. Concerning the body he says:
We cannot, however, escape the fact that it is
also what we call a conscious body and that its
"consciousness”—a word that means no more than
that it can and does perceive, feel, observe,
and think— is illusive. Its behavior is, as we
say, externally observable, but its conscious-
ness only internally or by introspection, with
the consequence that the consciousness of others
is not accessible to me, nor mine to them. So
far as consciousness is concerned, each of us
has his own exclusively; there is no common con-
sciousness, even if the word "consciousness"
has, as Hobbes l<3ng ago pointed out, the verbal
meaning of "knowing together." Nature seems to
have made herself, as the common residence of
us all, into exclusive personal experiences
yearning for companionship .. .We are Isolated
souls, feeling nonetheless that we are not. 21
20. Loc., cit.
21. Ibid., 32.
'-V
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Our bodies are instruments for co-ordination of our
activities* This co-ordination does not produce Nature, but
something that occurs in the natural world. A body is an
instrument to be used in all of the many and varied functions
that make up life, from building a fire to burying the dead.
And, further, it is an instrument for "discovering that all
this is done because Nature and the body are inseparably and
intimately bound together, even when the body is reduced to
ashes." 22 According to his position this reduction to ashes
is the end of the human personality for the body is all that
there is. Consciousness and life both cease with the decay of
the body.
The body is not an instrument for changing the effects of
its environment upon it into a visionary world.
The student of the human body as an instrument is
under no obligation to try to find in a head, in
the interstices of a brain, or anywhere else
—
call it "in the mind" or "in consciousness" or
"in intuition" or "in the immediately given" or
"in us"—some semblance of an "external world"
like the substance of a dream. Neither it nor
its external world is composed of that sort of
substance
.
2^
There is only one kind of substance in Nature and that is the
3tuff of which she is made up
,
he would say. The only pos-
sible way to discover her and know her is by experiment. A
passage like the following brings us to the heart of his
naturalism: "If we want to know out of what sort of substance
both are composed, physicists and chemists are the sort of
22. Ibid., 34.
23. Ibid., 35.
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knowers who g ive us anything like an Intelligible answer . "24
He goes on to say here that different bodies produce different
results. The fact that a color blind person sees differently
is cited as evidence of the primacy of the body. We may use
the term "sensation" if we wish, but it does not mean any such
thing as "mental content." "Its use will be the recognition
that the word has been restored to its natural status of in-
dication that the mental operation of sensing has been per-
formed. "25 we are justified in using an adjective like "mental"
because it has been used so long and because it is important
for the distinction of a certain kind of operation. Its use
distinguishes activities such as seeing and hearing, from such
activities as walking and breathing. The language of mental
activity is such that "its words are names for what we do when
we try to find out what we and Nature are and use knowledge as
a name for the result. "26
All of which does not lessen the importance of mind. In
fact it increases it. We have not lost our souls. "We have
found that the more we learn about our bodies, the more their
dignity is enchanced; for we have found that through them
(souls) our intimacy with Nature has no discovered parallel. "2
1
?
If matter, if that which is made of the dust of
the gound, can think and worship, could anything
by any other name do better? If the discovery
of our bodies is the discovery of our ownership
by Nature, what then must that owner be? We
mount together. 28
24. Ibid.
,
35-56
25. Ibid., 36.
26. Log, cit;•
27. Ibid. 36-37
28. Ibid. 37.
..
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D. The Visible World
Nature is the visible world. It is heaven and earth and
sea and all that in them is, to use his own favorite expression.
It is public experience—that which lies spread out before us.
It is the kind of experience which is shared in
such a way that in that experience the sharers
are identified as sharing in it, clasping hands,
as it were, with other hands identified as not
one’s own and belonging to other bodies similarly
identified, but not the kind of experience in
which the clasp of another’s hand is alien pres-
sure on one’s own skin. 29
By this he means that nature is qualitatively one. But why is
there a visible world at all? One might as well ask, with
Heidegger, why there is anything, rather than nothing. "Nature
and Nature as preeminently the visible world does not need any
justification."^ When we ask whether a thing really exists as
such and push the question to nature "we confuse the question of
existence with that of justification. "^1 His argument is that
we must take nature--as the visible world--as she is. We must
accept her and in accepting her, that very fact becomes at the
same time an adequate and sufficient explanation of what she is.
This is not pleading the cause of realism as over
against idealism. It is not pleading the cause of
common sense. It is pleading the cause of intel-
lectual clarity. It is pleading the fact that with
the visible world made problematic, intellectual
clarity has van 3- s]i©d
,
and the reign of confusion
has begun. 2
It is hard to agree with Woodbridge that making the visible
world problematic destroys intellectual clarity and produces
confusion, for scientists agree that there are problems in
nature. To offer some explanation or justification for
29. Ibid.
,
61.
30. Ibid. 70.
31. Ibid. 70-71
32. Ibid.
,
72.
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Nature seems to be a legitimate problem. He goes on to say
that the visible world
is not a state of mind, but the sphere of existence
both visible and invisible. The astronomer never looks
at stars which it does not contain. The physicist
never deals with forces or energies which do not
operate in it. The chemist does not analyze sub-
stances which he finds elsewhere .. .When the phil-
osopher robs it of its reality and seeks another,
he adds nothing to all those enumerated enterprises.
He is seeking, not knowledge, but justification. He
has good reasons for that, for Nature drives him to
it... But he makes a mistake when he turns the fact
of the visible world into a problem of knowledge.
He claims incentive for so doing, but Nature refutes
him by making the visible world the justification of
his claim. 33
1. Optical Structure . Woodbridge considers next the
problem of vision. Why should there be vision conditioned by
optical structure? This is a fact that has never been ex-
plained. There _is vision and it jLs conditioned by structure;
these are facts we recognize without trying to give evidence
for their existence. All of this simply brings confirmation
that Nature herself is optically structural throughout, "that
she is preeminently the visible world, the world wherein
existences are present and operate, and that ’wherein’ as
’space’ is, not in vacuo , but in an integrated optical struc-
ture, the meaning being the same whether we say Nature is in
space or that space is in Nature." 3^ He is to qualify this
statement though, as we shall see. "This optical integration
is explorable, and optical science is the consequent knowledge
33. Ibid.
,
72-73.
34. Ibid., 105-106.
35. Ibid. 106.
”35

55
2. Space . In the discussion of space he admits the in-
adequacy of his discussion of light and optical structure. He
had gone off into the realm of the imaginative, whereas we
never pass beyond the limits of this earth. Woodbridge says
that we ought not to allow ourselves to be carried away by
vain picturing. Nature is not in space, but space is in Nature.
Space, he says, is but the shifting yet integrated interplay of
the geometrical distinctions we observe. Nature includes space
as such for she is all that there is.
3. Time . Past, present, and future are adjectives before
they are nouns. They qualify events before they quaLify time.
Only after they have been allowed to qualify time are they
turned into nouns, the past, the present, and the future, as
if they were original divisions or divisors. In qualifying
events those adjectives show a classification into kinds of
events rather than a sequence of events, all of the same kind.
Events are "present in" or "absent from" Nature. An event
not present in Nature is either a past or future event. "Present
events are; past and future ones are not ."36 A present event
finds a place in the class of past events only by ceasing to
be an event. Future events may be divided into sub-classes
such as necessary, possible, probable, etc. We, ourselves, are
a part of Nature. "While we are in Nature, we are just as much
her residents as the heavenly host. Our presence is just as
much an event as any other event that comes and goes. "37
36. Ibid., 140.
37. Ibid., 149.
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Nature cares no more for us than she does for events such as
hydrogen. She is no more anxious about what we do than she is
about what it does. We are just as natural as any other of
Nature’s many beings. Nature consists throughout of possibil-
ities realized and in the process of realization. We are in
Nature, making her just what she is. There is no picture of
her possible except the picture of Nature with us in her.
That is why we are forever saying that Nature "does”
this or that; or, fearful lest the word ’'Nature”
should convict us of peetry, we use ’’matter” or
"energy” or both together and say that they ”do”
this or that; or, again fearful of a doer, we change
from the active to the passive voice of the verb
and say that this and that ’’are done” and, in the
doing. Nature or matter or energy ”is transformed. ”38
Nature is the realm which nourishes us all. We are dependent
upon her for all things. If Nature fails us, we are helpless.
E. Matter
Matter is that which supports the historical processes
present in Nature. It is the material world, the physical
world, set over against ourselves. We are companions with
heaven, and earth and sea. All of this is clearly visible.
Substance, inertia, resistance, solidity, the dead-
weight of the hard-to-move, the horror of sheer
emptiness, always the something that is there fil-
ling the present world with its presence during
every period of the calendar and at every second
that the clock ticks, something as unescapable as
space and time themselves, lasting and keeping its
own constitution while events come and go telling
the tales of history--that is what we usually
name ’’matter. ”39
38. Ibid., 150.
39. Woodbridge, EON, 181.
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So we incline to think of matter as the perpetual
off-stage of all that is dramatic, whether that
be present, past, or future, whether it be the
march of the heavenly host of the cities and wars
of men, Nature expansed unto the eyes of all. 40
Matter is but another name for Nature itself. Or, in his words,
"Nature appears now as matter clothed and it is our cognitive
necessity to strip that clothing off in order to find the real
skeletal structure it conceals."41 To use different names to
describe it, tells us no more about it. Actually we have very
little knowledge about matter. We know that it is and that is
about all. Trying to see matter with a microscope is like
trying to see it with the human eye.
Eventful Nature is also material, with the conse-
quence that her space and time seem like emptiness
filled by something that persists in spite of
changes and has a native constitution or structure
of its own. 42
Materials are the blocks that make up the universe. But matter
is not one of those blocks for it is what they all are; it is
the structure which all things possess. Materials are trans-
formed only with the use of other materials. There is no
first material or basic matter. Such a substance is meaning-
less because Nature’s processes are historical. They are
continuously making the present world different from what it
was, but they are doing It through material agencies. Work
is done, but it is done by material things. All that we can
discover about material things is their structure. It is the
40. Ibid., 181.
41. Ibid., 182.
42. Ibid., 184.
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discovery of the laws by which materials are transformed.
Matter is simply the name for material Nature* not an un-
knowable cause of anything.
F. History
Nature is also historical. We discover history and write
it down. We talk of past events and future events as a con-
sequence. We are inclined to see causal connection in this
natural progress of history, but it is not actually there.
Woodbridge develops his theory in another volume called The
Purpose of History. Here he sees no over-all purpose in his-
torical events. To quote him:
There is discoverable in history no purpose, if we
mean by purpose some future event towards which the
whole creation moves and which past and present
events portend; but there is purpose in history, if
we mean that the past is titilized as material for
the progressive realization, at least by man, of
what we call spiritual ends .. .History is itself
essentially the utilization of the past for ends,
ends not necessarily foreseen; but ends to come, so
that every historical thing, when we view it ret-
rospectively, has the appearance of a result which
has been selected, and to which its antecedents
are exclusively appropriate. In this sense purpose
is discoverable in history. But this purpose is
not single. History is pluralistic and implies a
pluralistic philosophy. There are many histories
but no one of them exists to the prejudice of all
others. ^3
This seems to be a common naturalistic position. The natur-
alists admit that there is purpose in a certain sense, or
rather in many senses. But they refuse to admit that there
Is one single purpose guiding the events of history. History
is pluralistic and purpose is likewise pluralistic. There
43. Woodbridge, POH, 4.
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is no one far off event to which the whole creation moves.
There is rather the independent development of many events and
many histories.
Our history (as persons) appears (italics ours) thus to
be a utilization of material, a*“realizat ion of ends,
a movement with purpose in it... Such a destroying,
conserving, utilizing, selective, and purposeful
movement in time, history appears to be (italics ours)
when we restrict it to the domain of human knowledge. 44
But here the word "appears" is all important. It is not really
purposive. It looks purposive from our point of view. "Time
is, thus, constantly rounding out things, so to speak, or bring-
ing them to some end or fulfilment. That is why we call its
movement purposive. "45 He rejects any view which sees the world
as finished and complete because:
History would thus be a kind of temporal revelation
of the absolute and we should read it as we read a
book, from cover to cover, discovering page by
page a story which is itself finished when we
begin. 46
But very few philosophers see history in this way. He is knock-
ing down another man of straw.
Nor is history a matter of cause and effect.
Whatever happens is thus conceived to be the effect
of what has already happened, rather than the active
conversation and working over of what has already
happened. The past is made the cause and producer
of the present, so that the state of the world at
any moment is only the result or outcome of what
it was in the preceding moment. To-day is thought
to be the effect of yesterday and the cause of to-
morrow, and is thus but a transition from one day
to another. 47
44. Ibid., 33.
45. Ibid.
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On the basis of such a position as this, he believes that
purpose becomes an illusion. Such a view represents the way
we conceive of things but not nature’s way of doing things.
Human history is history conscious of itself, for human
beings are conscious beings. As he said, in the Essay above,
our bodies are conscious bodies. Human history is the time
process at work. Such history is selective and so purposive.
But purpose does not mean predestination, as he said above,
but a specific line of development which the person or nation
is striving to fulfill.
Every history is a particular career in the de-
velopment of which some facts, persons, and events
have been more significant than others, so that
the limitation of the career at any time is like
an end that has been reached or a consequence to
which its antecedents are peculiarly appropriate. 48
Selection is not a device which the historian invents. It is
rather imposed upon him by his purpose to preserve and promote
a particular end. The essence of purpose for him then, is ’’the
converging of means upon a specific end.’’4® It is not design,
intention, or foresight. ’’The end is to be conceived not in
terms of any good ultimately reached but in terms of the career
of what it is the termination. ”50 But apart from beings who
foresee and plan, Woodbridge sees no evidence of intention in
the world.
When we speak of nature’s designs we speak fig-
uratively, and impute to her rational and de-
liberate powers. But we can not clearly aflirm
that the rain falls in order that the garden may
be watered, or that the eye was framed in order
48. Ibid., 43
49. Ibid., 47
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that we might see. 53-
All the evidence, he says, for this sort of purpose has been
disproved. But such a statement is definitely questionable.
When we say that nature is full of purpose, we are not thinking
about a preconceived plan, but rather that nature is an his-
torical process. It is the changing of the possible into the
actual and the record of the process. Again he denies the
singleness of purpose:
When we try to reduce them all to some show of
singleness we again do no more than try to tell
what a temporal order is like. It is metaphysics
and not history we are writing. 52
So far as man is concerned he is just another event or
incident in the universe. The universe as a whole, or nature,
is the stage on which his career is played.
Absolutely considered the history of man can not
claim preeminence over the history of the stars.
He is no more the darling of the universe than
is the remotest nebula. It is just as intelli-
gible and just as true to say that man exists as
an illustration of stellar evolution as to say
that the sun exists to divide light from dark-
ness for the good of man. Absolutely considered
the cosmos is impartial to its many histories. 53
What he is saying is that all history is relative. One event
is just as important as another.
Undoubtedly man Is a part or instance of nature,
governed by nature* s laws and internally in-
volved in her processes. But he is so governed
and involved not as matter without imagination,
but as a being whose distinction is the histor-
ical exercise of his intelligence. Nature is not
what she would be without him and that is why his
history can never be remembered or understood If
he is forgotten. He can not be taken out of
51.
52.
53.
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nature and nature be called upon to explain him
as a part or instance of nature. Man is to be
remembered and understood, but as the part or
instance which he himself is, and not another.
His history, consequently, can never be adequate
ly written solely in terms of physics or chem-
istry, or even of biology; it must be written
also in terms of aspirations.'^4
Human history, he says, is a rational enterprise.
G. Teleology
The question of purpose has already been partly discussed
in connection with history. Woodbridge maintains that there is
*
no one purpose in history. History is not moving toward one
goal. But there are many histories moving toward many goals.
In this latter sense alone, is purpose discoverable. But there
is on one purposive cause behind all the events of history taken
as a whole.
In An 3s say on Nature he says that ’’Nature stirs in us the
suspicion of plot or design, of purposes first conceived and
then executed. Nature is teleological in fact. Her time-
scheme declares it. Our knowledge is dependent on it. Although
we cannot explain them, there are very intelligible things dis-
coverable in Nature. "Intelligibility is the discovery of an
order or orders in Nature which are not only followed but which
can also be expressed in formulas that in their turn can guide
and practice. Teleology and intelligibility go hand in hand."°^
54. Ibid., 56-57.
55. Woodbridge, EON* 194.
56. Ibid., 196.
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Teleology is not opposed to mechanism. A machine is anything
which runs in an orderly fashion. The hammer is no more a tool
then the hand or the eye. "If Nature can rejoice, I must
believe that she rejoices more over the machine which makes an
automobile than over the automobile made."57 Man is just a
more intricate mechanism.
One needs only to consider how levers, pulleys, etc.,...
are found in Nature so variously unified in operation and
working so effectively .. .without the aid of anything
like a factory managed by a human corporation with a
board of directord, ... there are the stars, the seasons,
...mechanism and teleology supplementary and comple-
mentary.^®
By teleology here he means exactly what he meant in reference
to history. It is the natural movement of an event in a specific
direction. It is historical progression. It is natural tele-
ology. Indeed he has an article of that very name. It will be
considered in due course. In writing natural history, such as
the history of the eye, we are but writing Nature's teleology.
We are artists employing Nature's own brushes in the writing
of her history. Is there then an artist who has painted the
whole picture of Nature? It is interesting to consider his
answer. On the basis of all that he has said, there is not,
but here he adds:
An artist for the whole of Nature, without one
jot* or tittle left out--we may find ourselves
compelled at last to believe in that with all
our heart and soul and mind and strength; but
that artist, we must admit, has made the whole
of Nature precisely what it is. If we ask why
he did so, there is but one conceivable answer
in Nature's terms--that is, that teleology might
57. Ibid., 197
58. Loc. cit.
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be exemplified in fact and that it should be ac-
knowledged and lived, with all its far-reaching
consequences, by every creature. That there are
creatures in Nature who make that answer is,
perhaps, the most significant illustration of her
teleology. Teleology does not explain why there
is teleology, but it does explain the human be-
lief that it has a significance not expressed in
its existence* It does explain the religious
attitude
.
59
When one reads a passage like this, one begins to wonder just
what Woodbridge really did believe. In moments like this he
seems to be a ’'naturalist" who had very little trouble be-
lieving in a personal God. In other places he holds to an
unconscious teleology for there is no one purpose behing Nature
but only the movement of many events to many natural ends.
Here, however, he suggests one "Artist" guiding all events.
He goes on to say that we are conscious beings. We suffer,
act, and think. We change the course of events by what we do.
A living person does what a dead one cannot. "But I do not see how
invoking life or consciousness explains the difference or adds
to the situation anything which clarifies it, even if the
invocation does identify the difference between life and death
or between body and soul."®^ Cause and effect means simply
that agents are acting in the historical process. Nature
is going forward, growing older, and the very act of growing
is an instance of teleology. A seed is a cause of its own
growth in age because it acts characteristically in response
to the characteristic action of other causal agents on it.
This is the kind of causality that is discoverably in Nature.
59. Ibid., 199-200.
60. Ibid., 201.
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The view that knowledge is mediated by anything else
than our bodily organization seems to me unsound.
In plainer speech, the view that it is mediated by
,,messages ,, received by us at the door of the "mind,"
informing us that there is a world external to them
and enabling us to adapt ourselves to it seems to me
to be intolerable .61
Our consciousness is itself an example of Nature’s teleology*
By it we can know Nature in terms of her actually observed
processes reduced to formulas and not in terms of messages
that must be decoded.
The subject of teleology is also taken up in Nature and
Mind . In the essay on "Evolution," he says that the world is
no more and no less matter’s than it is spirit’s; it is no
more man’s than it is the microbes, but no less. 62 But most
of his work on teleology is found in the essay "Natural Tele-
ology." He also says that Nature is a domain, not of chaotic
changes, but of definite, teleological changes pointing toward
particular results. But the teleology is natural. It is a
datum in metaphysics but its presence has no special signif-
icance. "It becomes incredible that the uses of nature have
any other explanation than in a power good enough and intelli-
gent enough to contrive their manifold adaptions . "63 But he
insists that such an admission as this does not mean any per-
sonality behind Nature. This is nothing more nor less than
what is called the hypostatization of the term "Nature." In
order to illustrate his point he takes the case of the spider
61. Ibid., 205.
62. Woodbridge, NAM, 141.
63. Ibid., 115.
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and the fly. The spider’s web is adapted to catching a fly.
Are we to say that the fly is adapted to be caught I This
brings into the situation the question of the problem of surd
evil which he does not consider. The point is that there is
another possible explanation of the example he uses. The whole
problem of evil enters into the picture.
He goes on to say that there are causes and effects in
nature for the mind is able to discover them. But he insists
that there is no discoverable connection between intelligence
and use. Use is not limited to the field where intelligence
operates. All of which is true but this does not prove that
intelligence did not set in operation or operated there at some
previous time.
Nature, he says, produces thinking beings as well as fall-
ing stars. It is no more surprising that men should philos-
ophize than that bodies should fall, or that Nature should
operate intelligibly rather than unintelligibly. 64 The term
"Nature” for Woodbridge is practically a synonym for God. We
are not, he says, able to trace the genesis of intelligible
beings but that is no reason for saying that nature did not
produce them. "Nature may be spoken of as a whole if one in-
tends to include the whole.
"
6o This latter statement sounds
very much like Spinoza, and even more like Hegel, despite
Woodbridge’ s remoteness from Hegel.
64. Ibid., 121.
65. Ibid., 121-122
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To affirm that nature is intelligent, he says, is to affirm
that among the total of its specific operations intelligence is
to be included. This obviously leaves intelligence loosely re-
lated to nature. His purpose in the article is to show: (1) That
there is no relevant connection between the fact of teleology
and the operations of chance or design. (2) That intelligence
may not be regarded as the source of the distinction between
means and ends, because it cannot be credited with creating the
distinctions it discovers and because it is itself an instance
of teleology. 66 The presence of mind or consciousness is the
result of his unconscious teleology.
Teleology, he says, exists and is unexplained. There can
be no final cause. "In other words to put the end of a process
into the beginning of it in order to explain why the end is
reached is either meaningless or absurd.'’^*? To do this would
result in a static world. But this is not true either. It
would simply mean a consciously purposive, and to a certain ex-
tent, a determined world. To say that God or a Pinal Cause is
the cause of all things does not make a static world. To the
writer it seems that without this Pinal Cause we have a static
world. To explain teleology naturally, is difficult, for it
is hard to see how purposes can originate in unconscious mat-
ter-
Then he points out that teleology is always in individ-
66. Ibid., 124-125
67. Ibid., 125.
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ualized directions. It involves controlled movement. All of
which only strengthens the case for a causative, intelligible
universe
.
Woodbridge seems to be overcome by the immensity of the
universe as compared with the littleness of man. Being a part
of mature, he (man) must measure himself up against the whole,
laying his little stature off as something practically neg-
ligible in the vastness of things. There is such an over-
whelming magnitude in the universe and his existence is so
irrelevant that he can no longer instinctively regard human
civilization as the supremely important event in the history
of the universe. It may be supremely important to him but
to say that it is supremely important in nature appears like
an untruth or an absurdity.
But this cry from the lips of a man conscious of his own
littleness in the midst of an awful universe is not new, nor
can it be wholly justified. The Psalmist looked up into the
heavens and likewise cried, "What is man that thou art mindful
of him?" It is not true that man is irrelevant to any or even
to an overwhelming part of the universe. All parts, all that
the universe contains, even to the tiniest particle is neces-
sary for all the rest. This question *has often been raised and
just as often answered. An article on the subject appeared in
a recent issue of Christian Herald . The article which is en-
titled "A Scientist Searches for God," is an account of an inter-
view with Dr. Kirtley S. Mather, well-known Harvard professor and
geologist. One of the questions put to this distinguished
*
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scientist was this, Man is so infinitesimal, how can God pos-
sibly have any interest in him? To which he replied.
All too often we think of man as we think of a fleck
of foam on the crest of a wave in the middle of the
Pacific Ocean—existing for a moment, then gone for-
ever in the swirl of the boundless deep. But workers
in every field of science have been discovering the
great ^significance of little things. In physics we
know how important are the extraordinarily minute
components of the atom. It is simply impossible for
the human mind to imagine anything smaller than the
proton and the electron; yet, if a single proton and
its companion electron are removed from the interior
of an atom of mercury, that atom is transformed into
one of gold. All the differences between gold and
mercury depend upon the presence or absence of those
two trivially small units of matter. In biology, the
factors that determine the hereditary equipment of
an animal or a plant are known as genes. A gene is
so small that not even the electron microscope is
powerful enough to permit its being seen, yet these
units are so important that even yet we cannot fully
grasp their significance. All the differences be-
tween the potential genius and the congenital moron
seem to be due to the presence or absence of a few
of these superlatively important little things in
life. 3!he same principle carries into the field of
human relationships. Each person in a community or
nation has relatively as great importance in the life
of the entire group as have the individual protons,
electrons, or genes in the composition of matter and
the structure of animals and plants. 68
Argument that man is insignificant in the universe is no more
valid than the argument against anything else for the same
reason. Size and position do not constitute evidence for
or against value.
H. Woodbridge f s Pantheism
1. Nature and God . In the volume of collected essays,
published under the title of Nature and Mind , we find added
68. Lenz, Art., in Christian Herald, 20.
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material on the subject. In several essays Woodbridge deals
with the subject of metaphysics. In his "Confessions" he says:
Rather than boast, however, I would make this the
first step in metaphysics--th.e recognition that
existence is primarily what it is and can neither
be explained nor explained away. The most that
can be done is to find out what it implies. And
the great error of metaphysicians is the suppo-
sition that the implications of existence are its
causes and lead us to something more fundamental
than existence, or prior to it, or in itself ir-
relevant to it. 69
There is joy, he says, in going to the senses--to experience
—
so long as one does not stay there. The senses open the door
to the realm of mind, to order, to structure, to the inev-
itable, to freedom, to substance, to God--if God is that which
our view of things compels us to seek. Woodbridge never offers
any consistent argument against one's believing in God. It
becomes clearer and clearer that he does not object to the use
of the term God but exactly what he means by the term is the
question.
Metaphysics takes, or ought to take, things as they are.
It must take things in their obvious plurality. The great
trouble is that metaphysicians try to reduce the plurality of
experience to ultimates by a miracle or some process of evolution.
That there are space and time, and matter and energy,
and life and death, and thought--a world to know
and minds to know it— it admits beyond question. 70
In other words, metaphysics, true metaphysics, admits the facts
of experience, as it finds them, but so soon as it seeks a co-
69. Woodbridge, NAM, 7
70. Ibid., 23.
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herent explanation of these facts, then metaphysics is inter-
fering where it ought not to be concerned. What he wants us
to do is to admit the existence of the world of nature, all
that there is, but never seek to offer an hypothesis as to
why it is, or even exactly as to what it is. He takes the same
attitude toward nature, as many take toward God. We can only
assert that God is, not what he is. Woodbridge says that we
cannot deny that Nature is, but that we can never explain what
it is. Nature for him is God, for it is all that there is. We
need, he believes, no more coherent explanation than to say that
Nature is.
Faced with these things, it has no interest in why
they are as they are --why the body has a mind or
the mind has a body. It does not try to justify
the ways of God or matter. 7 1
It ^metaphysics]] is content to take the productivity of nature
as a fact without asking for a reason. But the human mind is
curious, it does seek further, even though it may know that an
explanation is impossible.
What we want to know is, what is the meaning of
nature, and above all, what is its ideal meaning;
and the moment we raise that question, we demand
an answer that includes design of some sort. We
are strong to interpret nature, and to interpret
it without design is an impossibility. 72
This is of course leading up to his idea of natural teleology
dealt with previously. But there are many questions that are
raised in nature for which we seek an explanation. For example:
Since truth and error, freedom and necessity,
good and bad, are conceptions which we do not
find in nature, but which by virtue of our intel-
ligence, we read into nature, then the question
7T. Woodbridge, NAM, 23
72. Ibid., 35.
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becomes not, can we find design in nature, and
so infer a designer, but, what is the most lofty
conception we can frame of beneficence in design
in order adequately to explain the terribly
earnest life of man in the world which he strives
to explain, to enjoy, and to master?^
2. Nature and Man . Although he sees values as the product
of man’s will, not nature’s own, he firmly holds to a natural-
%
istic view of all of man’s capacities.
It would be absurd to suppose that a man thinks in
a sense radically different from that in which he
digests, or a flower blossoms, or that two and two
are four is a sense radically different from that
in which a flower has a given number of petals.
Thinking, like digesting and blossoming, is an
effect, a product, possibly a structure. 74
But man, himself, can take no pride in being nature’s last and
supreme act. Nor was nature made especially for his conquest
and domain.
He has become a part of nature, her master only as
he has first become her attentive and obedient ser-
vant. She nourishes him in her bosom, but sedulous-
ly conceals from him the amount and length of her
concern; her greatest child, but questionably her
favorite. As a part of nature he can claim only a
natural origin and destiny; he can no longer spon-
taneously believe that he can survive her. Being
a part he must measure himself up against the whole,
laying his little stature off as something practically
negligible in the vastness of things. There is such
an overwhelming magnitude of universe to which his
existence is entirely irrelevant that he can no
longer instinctively regard human civilization as
the supremely important event in the history of the
universe. It may be supremely important for him,
but to say that it is supremely important in nature
appears like uttering an untruth or an absurdity . ^5
What Woodbridge is saying is that astronomically speaking, man
73
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is negligible. I am again reminded of what one theist replied
to this agnostic attitude, as quoted by President Marsh at a
meeting of the Boston University Philosophical Club, "Astronom-
ically speaking man is the astronomer." It is man who has de-
veloped the science of astronomy.
3. Naturalism and Materialism . Two factors in modern
life have led us to think of nature as a vast machine control-
led by mechanical laws. The first is modern physical science,
and her it seems that Woodbridge refers to Newtonian physics.
Had he been alive today, he too would have questioned this
first, for the opinion of present day scientists has been re-
versed in this connection, especially by the principle of
indeterminacy. The second factor is the part played by machines
in our industrial and social development. But the fact still
remains that someone must invent the machine. The history of
the science of machines is very suggestive to the student of
civilization for it shows how a study of appliances has been
turned into a theory of the universe. Woodbr idge is not in
sympathy with this mechanistic interpretation. He believes in
natural teleology along with his mechanism as he has many
times said. He criticizes Galileo for trying to make the world
wholly after the pattern of a machine. Nature herself was
responsible for his overthrow, for nature will not readily
submit to this mechanical treatment. Today he feels, that
the mechanical explanation of nature, including mind, is gen-
eral, although the facts of mind do not fit too wel 1 the
mechanical expression. But the mechanical view can hardly
be considered universal, so there seems to be no reason for saying
.
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that it is. Besides, he himself rejects behaviorism as shall
be seen. But he goes on:
Not only has man been dethroned from his exalted
position as the lord of creation and made a part
of nature, but he has been made a part of a machine...
Nature is a mechanism and man is a part of that
machine. 7^
Mechanism has been forced upon him as inevitable. We try to
personify the world but we cannot because we know that it is
machanical. But such a view has not been satisfactory for a
mechanical world is emotionally bankrupt. What he has been
talking about is the older naturalism of materialism. His view
is the newer one which allows for teleology as well as mechanism.
The newer philosophy might still be called naturalism,
for it would own nature as its source; but it might
equally well be called humanism, for it would realize
that nature affords the proper mechanism to minister
to the ambitions and hopes of humanity. 77
The older naturalists were mistaken in their view of nature.
They saw that nature was mechanical, but they did not see that
the machinery of nature exists to support and maintain its
product
.
We have been so afraid of the doctrine of final causes
and of assigning deliberate intentions to nature,
that we have forgotten that she has produced, sup-
ported, and sustained human civilization. For man
is a part of nature, carried on by her forces to
work the work of intelligence. 7 ®
Man ha3 grown out of nature’s own stuff. He is one of the great
examples or instances where nature has evaluated herself. Just
how, is not at all clear. But nature does not just run on
and on in complete indifference to her products. It is hard
76. Ibid.
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to see how nature could he anything but indifferent on a
naturalistic basi3, but nevertheless he insists that she is
not*
Rather we must regard it as that which supports and
maintains what we choose to call ideal products, and
finds in them its significance and justification
as the germ finds its reason for existence in the
life it engenders. We have been half-hearted evolution-
ists, seeking the causes of valuation and neglecting
the fact that nature is always achieving results
which may justify her labors.
He concludes this chapter or essay by seeing a well developed
naturalistic philosophy as the foundation of enlightened ed-
ucational progress. In this he is very similar to Hook who
sees our social development hampered by a failure of nerve due
to the prevalent theistic philosophy of the present day.
This world is no more matter’s world than it is the spirit’s,
nor is it any less. It is no more man’s world than it is a
microbe’s. Intelligence is no more or no less a part of the
world than any of the processes it is able to discover.
That the world should have become the home of
the imagination is no less cosmically important
than that it should have become the home of
stellar systems. If man was destined to be an
instance of physics and chemistry, he was also
destined to be an instance of the "life of
reason. "60
Intelligence is more than an instrument of truth. It is also
an instrument for the recovery of the past. But the great
question still remains unanswered. If man was destined for
anything, then obviously there must have been one who destined
him. This whole question will have to be considered after
79. Ibid., 94.
80. Ibid., 146
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we take up Woodbridge ’s view of the part of nature which we
call "mind.”
4. Relation to Aristotle and Spinoza , On the question of
natural teleology, Woodbridge follows Aristotle rather than
Spinoza. Indeed Spinoza rejects the view that nature has par-
ticular goals in view in favor of nature being what it is by
absolute necessity. 8 ^ Woodbridge * s natural teleology may be
linked with Aristotle’s thesis that nature does nothing in
vain. 8 - There are, however, some very close connections be-
tween Woodbridge and Spinoza. In an article on Spinoza, Wood-
bridge makes the following more or less general statement:
Integrated order ane connection, substance, native,
ultimate essence, existence, idea, power, and God--
these are all only different expressions for that
in which everything that is i_s and without which
nothing can be nor be conceived. 85
Spinoza’s Propositions8^ which state that God is the one sub-
stance that exists would be just as acceptable to Woodbridge
if "nature" or "ultimate existence" were substituted for God.
The meaning of "nature" to Woodbridge is pretty well Spinoza’s
meaning of "God."
Then with Spinoza, Woodbridge comes to the conclusion
that the substance of knowledge and the substance of Nature
are the same substance. Ordo et connexio idearum idem est
ac ordo et connexio rerum . Nature is as much a universe of
discourse as she is a universe of matter moving in space and
time. "As a universe of discourse she is recognized as the
81. Supra, 35, 37.
82
. Supra , 27
.
83. Woodbridge
,
Art. (1932), 117.
84. Supra, 35, 36.
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ultimate ground of intelligibility, the reason why she can be
addressed in many languages whose proportions communicate what
she is and is not discovered to be ." 85 There are no terms in
the vocabulary of the intellect which are not, first, he says,
terms in the vocabulary of sense. There are bodies for mind,
but mind is not a body. "With its home, energy is at work;
with its body, mind thinks ." 88 Mind he reduces to energy.
But one must now remember that the mind has not been dethroned
by this reduction to energy .
Nature is not a body with a mind. She is what the
distinction between body and mind is. I do not
mean that she perceives, thinks, remembers, imag-
ines, and pursues happiness, but I do mean that we
are not deceived when we speak of her qualities, her
quantities, her places and times, her histories,
her continuities, her promises and potencies, her
predictable events, her teleology, her order, her
linkages of pleasure and pain. 8 '
Woodbridge now mentions his reasons for personifying
nature. It is not to prove that she is a person. It is rather
a confession of piety. Nature is neither active nor passive.
She is not an agent but such an integration of agents that
knowledge and happiness are linked together in her. So far as
the pursuit of knowledge is concerned nature herself is not a
problem. She is rather the field of knowledge, and as that
field she is preeminently the familiar visible world. She is
heaven and earth and sea and all that in them is. Nature is
all that there is.
In hid^article, "The Naturalism of Frederick Woodbridge,"
Professor Costello offers some further criticism of his great
85. EON, 255.
86. Ibid., 261.
87. Ibid., 264.
.'
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teacher. His criticism is made because Woodbridge was not
quite naturalistic enough. Woodbridge disagreed with Santayana
and Dewey, the latter because he could not understand him, and
the former because he denied the causal place of mind in the
world. 88 He explains for us what "Nature” meant for Woodbridge
To Woodbridge, as to some of the other naturalistic
philosopher, it carries a connotation of something
very solid and real, an emotional unification of
all things. Toward Nature they feel a natural piety,
as toward the great Mother of us all. For myself, I
do not feel that piety, whether expressed by a
Marcus Aurelius or a Woodbridge. To me Nature seems
rather a collective name for quite a mess of miscel-
laneous stuff. Nature should not, by some "pathetic
fallacy," become a substitute for God ... To Woodbridge
the world was not alien to men, nor too solicitous
either. It does not answer prayers, and we may be
thankful that it does not answer other people’s; but
it does offer us material for building the better
life. 89
For Woodbridge then, this writer agrees. Nature is a synonym
for God. yet within the realm of Nature man is an actor, a
part of the whole drama, never a spectator. To him "Man’s
life and Nature were all one piece." 99 It is little wonder
that one thinks of Spinoza, although there is some difference
on many details. Our conclusion is that Nature for Woodbridge
is practically synonymous with God and that his position is
close to that of Spinoza’s view of God or Nature. The greatest
difference between them is that Spinoza looked upon nature
existing as it is by necessity, while Woodbridge held to a
theory of natural teleology. Costello also offers some criti-
cism of Woodbridge ’ s treatment of mind. Coming from another
88 .
89.
90.
In Krikorian, NHS, 296.
Ibid., 299.
Loc. cit.
-
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naturalist it is certainly worth quoting:
...We may note certain features of Woodbridge’s
characterization of mind. He begins by saying
that the body thinks, just as the body walks;
there is no such thing as mind, but only forms of
behavior. Woodbridge himself qualifies, even
reverses, these statements later ... If mind is be-
havior, it is behavior directed toward things
remote, in the past, perhaps imaginary, perhaps
abstract .. .To say it is the brain or the ’’organism”
that thinks, is to deceive ourselves with an
explanation that would indeed by simple, if only
it were true, that we have a strong wish to be-
lieve it and to disregard the complexity of the
fact .9i( Italics ours)
He likewise criticizes Woodbridge » s statement that we each
have different inner lives because we have different bodies.
However, he agrees with Woodbridge on the naturalness of
teleology.
Pratt in his Naturalism agrees that man is not. a misfit
in Nature but that he is at home in the world. He has grown
out of Mother Nature as her own child. The great and impor-
tant question, however, is what we mean by nature. What is
Nature? He says:
It has become increasingly clear that Mother Nature,
with which he is at home and from which he sprang,
is not a mere collection of atoms acting solely
according to mechanical laws, but a much richer
organic whole within which many more influences
and processes and qualities of being are at work
than are dreamed of in the mechanistic philosophy.
7/hen we have put li.^e and mind into Nature, the
concept of Nature is significantly enlarged. Be-
tween man and his Mother there is a certain family
resemblance. It does, indeed, characterize him
to realize that he has sprung from Nature; but this
fact characterizes her as well.^2
91.
92.
Ibid., 307.
Pratt, NAT, 141.
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I • Summary
Woodbridge ' s concept of nature may now be summarized.
Nature is "heaven and earth, and sea, and all that in them is."
It is the familiar setting of human history of "public experi-
ence."^ The "natural" is what is "characteristic of nature,"
for the definition of "natural" and "naturalism" depends upon
the definition of nature. Nature then is the visible world and
that is all-that-there-is No further explanation, he holds,
is needed than the recognition of nature as existing. She has
definite structure. 95 Space is the shifting yet integrated
interplay of geometrical distinctions observable in nature.
Time has reference to the presence or absence of events in
nature. Present events are; past and future one are not. 96
Matter is another name for nature but with reference to the
materials of which it is made up rather than the whole. 97
All knowledge about nature is obtained by the method of
scientific experiment. To learn what sort of substance nature
is made of, it is necessary to perform experiments such as are
performed by physicists and chemists and only in that way can
QQ
any true knowledge of nature be obtained. 570
Man is part and parcel of nature. He is one of nature's
events, but no more important than any other of her events. 99
He is not nature's last supreme act. 100 His body is an instru-
95. Supra, 46.
94. Supra, 53.
95. Supra, 53.
96. Supra, 55.
97. Supra, 56-58.
98. Supra, 47, 51
99. Supra, 55-56.
100. Supra, 72-73.
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ment by which he acquires knowledge of nature. Mental states,
for nature, has but one kind of stuff. 101 Man is natural in
all his capacities, both in walking and in thinking. 102 He
had a natural origin and will have a natural destiny. There is
no survival after death. 10^ In this Woodbridge differs from
Spinoza who holds that "The human mind cannot be absolutely
destroyed with the body, but there remains of it something
which is eternal . "I04
There is no one purpose discoverable in nature. History
itself is the natural progression of many events to many ends. 105
Historical events do "suggest" purpose but this is appearance
only. 106 The whole of nature stirs within us the suspicion of
plot or design, but no such design can be found. 107 There is,
however, what he calls "natural teleology" which is the uncon-
scious realization of purposes or ends. 10^ Nature is going
forward, growing older, and this is an instance of teleology. 100
That nature has produced man is no more surprising than that it
has also produced microbes, falling stars or hydrogen. 110 In
holding to natural teleology, Woodbridge is following Aristotle. 111
Woodbridge criticizes metaphysicians for their failure to
take things as they are and for trying to reduce the plurality
of experience to ultimates
.
110 To recognize nature in all its
101. Supra, 50-51.
102. Supra, 72.
103. Supra, 51.
104. Ethics V, Prop. XXIII; see Rand (ed.), MCP, 188.
105. Supra, 58-59.
106. Supra, 59.
107. Supra, 62.
108. Supra, 62, 65-66.
109. Supra, 64.
110. Supra, 65-66.
111. Supra, 27.
112. Supra, 70.
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plurality, as all-that-there-is
,
is as far as metaphysics
can go. When an explanation of nature is sought, one is
driven back finally to the assertion that nature i_s and farther
one cannot go.^° While holding to naturalism, Woodbridge re-
jects the older mechanistic materialism. Mechanism is true
of nature but nature is not wholly mechanistic; it is also
teleological.^^4 Dewey and other naturalists, as well as Wood-
bridge, reject the mechanistic theory that followed the rise
of Newtonian physics in favor of the Aristotelian concept of
nature always achieving ends. -^5
Woodbridge' s concept of nature is in general the same as
Spinoza's concept of G-od as all-that-there-is . US The substance
of knowledge and the substance of nature are the same. But
Woodbridge differs from Spinoza in that he holds to natural
117teleology and rejects personal immortality.
J. Criticism
Some criticisms of Woodbridge 's concept of nature will be
offered here, but the bulk of the criticism will be reserved
until the close of the following chapter.
1. In most of his writings Woodbridge is much of a n&ive
realist. He points out many facts and then says that they need
no explanation other than pointing out their existence
.
In his An Essay on Nature there is a strong mystical element
113. Supra, 71.
114. Supra
,
73-75.
115. Supra, 27.
116. Supra, 76-78.
117. Supra, 62f , 51.
118. Supra, 46, 48, 50,
..
.
,
.
.
-
-
.
83
throughout. He is inclined to stand in awe before "Nature"
and to make "her" the object of religious devotion. Such an
attitude is not consistent in a philosophical and scientific
investigation.
2. At times Woodbridge becomes somewhat idealistic in his
statements. For example, he says, nature seems to have made
herself into exclusive "personal experiences . "120 He also
speaks of "conscious bodies," although he says there is no
"common consciousness." While Woodbridge would deny any ten-
dency to idealism, such passages may be called ambiguous and
inconsistent with ordinary naturalism.
3. Woodbridge is rather impatient in dealing with some
problems. He dismisses them without adequate examination. This
is seen, for example, in his rejection of a consideration of
solipsism because the discussion would be "unprofitable. "121
4. Woodbridge states that making the visible world prob-
lematic destroys intellectual clarity . to make the world
a problem begins a "reign of confusion." Just what is meant
by "making the visible world problematic" is not very clearly
stated. If he means that nature has no problems to be ex-
plained, then he is out of step with practically all scien-
tists. Probably what he means is that the existence of nature
must be taken as a fact that needs no further explanation or
justification. To try to offer any explanation as to why
119. Supra, 66, 70.
120. Supra, 50-51.
121. EON, 32-33.
122. Supra, 53-54.
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nature exists is to raise questions that cannot be answered
and ought not to be raised. Such an attitude as this stale-
mates speculative inquiry. It is quite possible that nature can
be explained in terms other than itself.
5. Woodbridge’s theory of knowledge is the scientific
method taken in its narrowest sense-l-^For him, truths is what
can be scientifically verified in the same way a physicist or
chemist verifies an hypothesis, that is, by a laboratory ex-
periment. In this position he is not in agreement with many
other philosophers, idealists and naturalists alike. Regardless
of their metaphysics, many philosophers agree on the probability
thfeory of truth. Absolute certainty is impossible and all
knowledge is probability.
123. Supra, 47-49; 51-52.
124. See Bowne, TTK; Brightman, ITP; Dewey, LOG;
Larrabee, RK, and others.
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CHAPTER IV
WOODBRIDGE'S THEORY OP MIND
A. Mind as a Universe of Discourse
The subject of "mind*
1
must begin with a tentative def-
inition of what mind is, before considering it in all its
relations, functions, and aspects. As good a place as any to
begin is with Woodbridge’s essay "Mind Discerned," reprinted in
Nature and Mind .
1. Mind Discerned . Mind, he says, is a universe of dis-
course.
The universe which we investigate is, in a very
genuine sense, a universe of discourse--certain-
ly a universe discoursed about— a sort of total
object of thought, the totality of which seems
to be in no wise impaired by any of the distinc-
tions discovered or set up within it... In other
words, the world of material objects and the
mind which inhabits animal bodies lie, as it
were, discriminated in a single universe of dis-
course and may be subjects of thoughtful in-
quiry even if such inquiry may seem never to
occur except with the presence of some animal
body with a mind inhabiting it.
Mind is a part of the whole natural universe --the world of
nature. No one has ever succeeded in separating mind from this
universe as a whole. There is no universe of ideas apart from
objects, nor a universe of objects apart from ideas. To use
the words of Spinoza: Qrdo et connexio idearum idem est ac
ordo et connexio rerun!. ^ But mind, it must be remembered.
1. Woodbridge, NAM, 162.
2. Supra, 76.
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is not a thing. It is first, last, and always a name for a
realm of discourse, it is a term we use because of its con-
venience and usefulness, Woodbridge makes this very clear when
he says:
Since the universe of discourse is a universe of
this kind, we might give to it with some appropri-
ateness the name of mind. Such a name would be
used in the transcendental sense, for it would be
used to indicate possibilities, the possibility
of knowledge, of inquiry, of discursive thinking.
It could not mean that a mind was taking thought
of a world. In this laTTter sense the name could
have no specific meaning. Neither could such a
mind be said to have an origin. One might reluc-
tantly admit that the universe of discourse itself
might have an origin, that it was not self-sus-
tained and self-sufficient, but mind in the trans-
cedental sense, could have no origin within it,
since mind in that sense is but a name given to
the universe <s salient character. And that name
would indicate the sum total and mere fact of
existence as constituting the universe wherein
inquiry is active and productive. Clearly this
mind is also not a determinate form of being, a
distinguishable part of the universe known to
experience and discourse. It does not inhabit
animal bodies and is not structural In psychology.
Nor does it explain the universe It constitutes,
for it is not a substance which supports the
universe, nor a cause of which that universe is
an effect. It is a name Qtalics oursj for the
fact that object and idea are already married when-
ever their union is open to consideration. It is
a protest against the divorce courts of epistemology .3
He goes on to say that the physicist and the psychologist
have the same subject-matter, likewise the moralist and the
economist. All inquiry is relevant to the one and only realm
of discourse.
2. Psychological Concept of Mind . What then of the mind
3. Ibid., 166.
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that inhabits animal bodies? It is a fact that the mind of
psychology is mind which remembers, imagines, perceives, reasons,
etc. Are there, then, two minds? Is there one mind trans-
cendental, and another that inhabits animal bodies? Of course
not, for his objection is to mind as a separate entity inhab-
iting a body. Such a view is untenable. Yet, Woodbridge seems
to think that many (probably the idealists) do have such a view.
He says:
In other words, I can make nothing intelligible out
of the attempt to start with animal bodies fully
equipped in their animality and then by adding mind
to them construe their thoughtful consideration of
their world in terms of this addition only. The
attempt has been made many times, but it has always
been wrecked ultimately by our inability to exhibit
what animal bodies are without any implication at
all of mind. . .4
Ho philosopher ever held to the view he is trying to criticize.
so far as can be found. He then draws a conclusion that any
idealist would also make, but apparently he believes that no
idealist could possibly assent to it.
It would seem as if animal bodies become seeing,
thinking, remembering, imaginative, and passionate
bodies in much the same ways as they become di-
gesting, breathing, walking, and reproductive
bodies.^
We ought rather to affirm that the possibility of
mind as a determinate form of being inhabiting
animal bodies resides in the fact that there is
mind in the transcendental sense. Such a view
makes of the genesis of the mind studies in psy-
chology something wholly natural--I know of no
better word--as natural as digestion or breathing,
with the death of all animal bodies thinking it-
self might cease, but that which made thinking
4. Ibid., 169-170.
5. Ibid., 171.
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possible would not cease. The latter would remain
something characteristic of the world in which
animal bodies had come to be. That is, mind in
the transcendental sense can have no genesis.
6
He goes on to say that mind so considered indicates a
logical structure to which living things must conform just as
they confirm to other structural facts. But the fact also
remains that the logical structure exists because mind already
esists. For,
As by conforming to the mechanical structure of
things they maintain their equilibrium, so by con-
forming to the logical structure of things they
think in propositions, they make distinctions and
so finally come to discover themselves as distinct
from the world, recognize themselves as the hab-
itations of mind, and undertake the study of
psychology.*7
But this is possible only because mind is transcendental in
the universe, at least, according to Woodbridge, as eternal
as the universe itself--for mind as such had no genesis, 'l'he
logical structure of things as we find it, depends upon the
presence of mind in the universe. Before arriving at any
definite conclusions, a consideration of The Realm of Mind is
necessary.
B. The Realm of Mind
In the "Preface" to his book. The Realm of Mind , Woodbridge
begins by relating his observation of the conversation of two
deaf-mutes on a New York bus. As he watched them this thought
flashed through his mind. What if one of them should exclaim,
"Matter is indestructible?" To all of this he says:
6. Loc. cit.
7. Ibid., 172
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A miracle, and yet the common miracle of all
language, for language is ever matter in some
shape—fingers moving in space, sounds Vibrating
in air, marks showing in light, synapses charging
and discharging in brains--matter, matter every-
where, the one and only means of conveying its
own indestructibility.
' We describe matter in
figures of speech because the figure of speech is
what matter indestructibly is.
8
In the first sentence of the text proper, he defines mind
as "not an individual agent or being which thinks, but the
realm of being in which thinking occurs. y The thinking agent
is a self and there are many selves, which is another way of
saying that many minds are taking thought of the world. Yet
all of this, he admits does not tell us what mind actually is.
If we analyze ourselves, we do not find any mind--we find only
our bodies. Our bodies are the only agents of thought that
we ever discover. Just as soon as we look into the fact of
mind, we are carried beyond ourselves to the object of thought.
We enter into a realm of being in which thinking becomes an
event. It is the realm of being to which our bodies belong,
in other words, it is the space-time realm. This realm is so
connected that we can discover what one event or fact implies
in terms of another event or fact. We live in a realm of
logical structure. ’’This I take to be the discovery of the
essential nature of mind. M^
Vs/hat then has caused the distinction between the mental
8. Woodbridge, ROM, viii.
9. Ibid., 1.
10.
Ibid., 2.
..
.
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and physical worlds? This is what Whitehead calls, "the
bifurcation of nature." Our activity falls into two major
classes which we denote by names. To activity such as think-
ing, remembering, and imagining, we give the name of mental;
and activity such as walking, sleeping, and digesting, we call
physical. "Nor has the physical ever been successfully reduced
to the mental, although some philosophers have attempted to
do so, impelled by the logic of their own speculations . "H
Thus these are simply terms used to distinguish different
kinds of activity of the human organism, not different objects
or things. The objects took on the character of their activ-
ities and were named in terms of what they did. What is
thought unless there is something thought about? What is
motion, unless something is moved? There is, he says, no mind
unless there is mental activity; nor no body, unless there is
physical activity. "It is what the man does that divides him
into body and mind. "12
In so far as explaining these two kinds of activity, meta-
physics of any kind has had little success, in fact no success.
He says:
Metaphysics, no matter how much it has exalted the
mind and set it over against the body, has never
succeeded in revealing by analysis a mind and a
body as primary facts from which the distinction
between the mental and the physical is derived.!^
Man is never found as possessing a body and a mind, but these
terms are used to explain that he walks and thinks, that is.
11. Ibid., 3.
12. Ibid., 5.
13. Ibid,, 5-6
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engages in two kinds of activity. The object which thinks and
walks, the man himself, is one. He is undivided. Mind and
body are simply terms to express concisely things that man
does. They, in themselves, explain nothing. Any special con-
tent of meaning we may give to them is the result of transfer
not of discovery.
The whole of man’s unitary life may, however, be examined
in terms of his behavior. The world in which we live is a
physical world filled with physical bodies, not spiritual
bodies. It is a world in which these physical bodies inter-
act. Why have we not been willing to take it as such? The
answer is that we think. Our mental activity seems irrele-
vant to the world of physical things. It seems to be apart
from It. The heart of the whole body-mind problem he states
in one sentence. "HOW CAN THE SITUATION BE CONSTRUED SO THAT
THE FACTS OF MENTAL ACTIVITY AND A PHYSICAL WORLD ARE COM-
PATIBLE?”
Woodbridge now devotes several pages to a view with which
he disagrees. It is the view that reality is made up of two
realms, mental and physical. He seems to forget that ideal-
ists object to this bifurcation, just as much as do natural-
ists. Since he refutes or attempts to refute this view, it is
worth dwelling upon. The world is conceived of as being filled
with physical objects which stimulate our sense organs. These
objects cause nervous impulses which are conveyed to the brain.
We are then driven to the conclusion that there is something
in us which responds to the stimuli from the physical world.
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Man is conceived of as having a mind and a body which are two
separate things. Thus we endow our bodies with an agent which
uses the body to reach the physical world, via the senses.
Eventually this view refutes itself. The mind grasps the phy-
sical processes in the brain. The brain does not contain the
bodies which stimulate it. The objects accomplish effects
within the brain itself. The immediate objects of the mind are
nervous processes in the brain. Objects stimulate the brain
to action. But the immediate objects of the mind are never
brain processes, although nervous processes in the brain are
the immediate occasions of thought. The immediate objects are
something with which the brain processes are somehow correlat-
ed. They are not the external objects for the mind is associ-
ated with the brain alone and has no contact with the external
bodies
.
All that is left is the content of the mind itself and this
content is perceptions or ideas. What the mind thinks about is
its own perceptions or ideas. These constitute a mental world
of their own in which all our thought and reasonings proceed.
"We are thus confronted with tv;o worlds, a world of physical
bodies from which the mind is wholly excluded and a world of
perceptions and ideas from which the physical world is wholly
excluded. y\je thus lose contact with the physical world and
all we have is our perceptions and ideas. Then from our own
ideas we proceed to establish the existence of the physical
14. Ibid., 14-15.
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world. An object is now not a body in the physical world but
a perception in the mind. Its qualities are in the mind while
its counterpart is a physical process or thing in the world
outside. The physical world is no longer a world of bodies
and qualities but rather a vast system of mechanical relations.
If the physical world is excluded from the mind, the
problem is to find reasons for believing in its existence. How
can we, from the contents of our minds, arrive at the physical
world? According to this view the physical world becomes a
product of the mind itself. It is a system of ideas which the
mind works out or builds up in view of its own contents. Even
the location of the physical world involves some kind of mental
pro j ection.
This in general is an idealistic view of the physical
world. All that exists is ideas in a perceiving mind. Add to
that the objective existence of the world in the infinite Mind
and a good picture of Berkeley’s idealism can be seen. The
last sentence in the paragraph above might have been taken
from Bowne. But Woodbridge has stated this view in order to
criticize it. His criticism will be considered.
The physical world, he says, according to this view, re-
quires a mind that it may be known. But the mind knows no
other physical world than that which it constructs out of its
own content. This, to him, is unintelligible.
That such a piece of metaphysics should hold a
respectable place in history, is due, I imagine,
not to the coherency and intelligibility of the
argument, but to the obvious fact that we dis-
cover the physical world by thinking, and, when
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we have discovered it, it is found to be some-
thing radically antithetical to thought. It is
objective to thought and yet somehow thought’s
achievement. This fact, the argument with all
its attendant philosophy does most emphatically
disclose in spite of its vitiation by unintel-
ligible assumptions. And these latter ought to
afford abundant evidence of the unsoundness of
any metaphysics of the mind which begins with
the physical process involved in thinking and
assumes an agent quite independent of that process
to do the thinking. 15
He learns from this digression that the physical world
is discovered by thought. Our thinking constructs our know-
ledge of the physical world. It is the process of exploring
the realm of being within which our thinking occurs in all its
concreteness. The problem is to discover the extent of thought
as we think about the common objects of every day life and try
to understand them and their relations. We take the world as
common sense finds and takes it. Perceptions and ideas are
retained as names for the contents of the mind but we must
understand what these terms really mean in this connection. A
perception means that a thing is perceived. An idea means that
we think of an object. They tell us nothing at all of the nature
of the object or thing perceived. All the terms mean is that
we are aware of the existence of things, never that we have
discovered something about them.
All we have really done Is to affirm, for example,
that whatever we think about is an idea and an
idea is whatever we think about. But precisely
what the whatevers are, is left wholly undetermined. 16
We simply think about facts and events near and remote.
15. Ibid., 18
16. Ibid., 21
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What then is the realm of thinking? He says that if we
follow the lead of what we think about, to the acceptance of
thinking as an event in time and space, as an event, that is,
in the same realm of being in which are the objects of thought.
"It is the world of space and time in which we think, just as
much as it is that world in which we walk.'’ 117 Our brains and
our legs are but instruments for different kinds of activity.
This view is similar to Dewey’s instrumentalism. Thought
is simply a function by which the human organism is able to
adjust itself to its environment.
If this is more than a fashion of speech, if the mind
is, metaphysically, the domain of thought, then, in
considering it, we are evidently not considering a
realm of being in which thinking occurs. At any rate,
thinking is so bound up with the objects of thought
that we find ourselves dealing with their world in
every attempt to deal with its... Since we think be-
yond our body's place and our life’s duration, there
is no intelligible divorcing of time and space from
the realm of mind. 18
Next, Woodbridge considers some possible objections to
this position. It is argued that only the effects of the ob-
jects which exist in the space-time realm are in the realm of
mind. To this he replies that the space-time order existed
long before and will exist long after we cease to think. How,
he says, could we write histories or make scientific pre-
dictions, if our thinking is cut off from the subject matter
involved? But this reasoning seems to be based on the as-
sumption that the space-time realm is the only one there is.
17. Ibid., 24.
18. Loc. cit.
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He goes on to deny Kant’s statement that space and time
belong to the mind. Mind is in no way responsible for space
and time, yet at the same time mind is not bound to the realm
of space and time. "Since we think, no limit is set by time
and space to what we think about. Our thinking goes on in a
realm where time and space are accessible . "19 This is similar
to idealistic space and time transcendence. He makes no attempt
to explain this but says that it is so and must be accepted as
such. When we deal with the place where thinking goes on, we
are never dealing with an event, but a realm of events.
Next, what do we think about? We think about the infin-
ite variety of things in the world, which we collectively call
being. But things do not exist only when we think of them,
but they exist all the time. The realm of being is not de-
pendent upon the realm of thought nor is it created by think-
ing minds. But if what we think about is in the mind, then the
realm of mind is co-extensive with the realm of being. Further,
the realm of being is in the mind.
The realm of being has a logical structure. It is unified
and coherent. It is so systematized that one fact in it leads
one to think of other facts and events. It is this fact
of logical structure that identifies the realm of being with
the realm of mind. There is no possible way of solving any
problem if we maintain two separate realms in reality, those
of mind and matter.
The world of mind is the world of thinking. It is a
world which is immediate and concrete subject matter for our
19. Ibid., 29
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inquiries. It is the world about which we think. But we must
not, when we think, assume that there is an agent mind that does
the thinking for us. Thinking finds the fact of logical con-
nection interwoven with whatever we think about. It is a logical
world in which thinking is an event. If this world is the
mind’s world, then the mind is not properly a being, but a realm
of being.
Mind is a collective name for the experienced objects of
thought or just another name for experience itself. Mind is a
term used to denote the fact that while experience is a matter
of space and time, of objects, qualities, and relations, it is
also a matter of implications and inferences. "The realm of
experience is the realm of mind." 20 If we accept experience
as it isgi the realm of experience is the realm of being, the
realm of mind. All are one and the same. "This is the ultimate
metaphysical fact in no need of further explanation. " 2 ^-
Mind, he goes on, seems to be an implication of existence
rather than existence itself. It is something demanded by
considerations which seem to lead to it and to make it neces-
sary. If we follow these considerations, we may find what
creates the demand. The quest for mind originated in efforts
to construe our thinking about the world in which we live.
His general position up to this point is: (1) We have
found that the difference between acts of thinking is so
different from acts of walking that we are accustomed to
20. Ibid., 40-41
21. Ibid., 41.
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call the former mental and the latter physical. Thinkers are
minds for mind is the name for a being who thinks. ( 2 ) Given
ourselves as thinkers, we find nothing besides our bodies
which does the thinking. The answer to the question con-
cerning the agent of thinking is the same as the answer con-
cerning the agent of walking--the one identical agent is the
same no matter how diverse the activity--our bodily selves .
We can find no other agent nor anything that has value in
metaphysical analysis. For all such analysis the thinker
and remains a body
. (3) Thinking is co-extensive with the
subject matter. It is a bodily activity and depends upon the
body for its vigor and sustaining, but it comprehends the body
and very much more. It has limitations traceable to the body,
but others not traceable at all. If our thinking is to be
wise and correct, it is not the body which makes it so, but a
genuine coherence among the things we think about.
C. Objective Mind
He next considers the logical structure of the realm of
being, that is, the rationality of the universe or nature. In
this realm one fact or event leads us on to other facts or
events. There is a logical structure in things.
In this sense the mind is not a being or an agent
or an existence. It is rather the implications of
all beings, agents and existences, revealing some-
thing basic about the realm of being itself
.
22. Ibid., 46.
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Mind as such a logical structure is discoverable. The co-
herence of things is found out by thinking. Mind as logical
structure is objective mind and now he goes on to consider that.
The psychologist is interested in mind as a specific type
of human or animal behavior. This behavior exhibits itself
in ways that are identifiable and which are subject to exper-
imentation. The results of the experiment must then be verified
without regard to any metaphysical interpretation which may be
placed upon them. The subject matter is a specific type of
behavior and never an elusive thing called consciousness or
mind in any metaphysical sense. The mind of psychology, as a
kind of behavior, we take for granted. What does such a type
of behavior, that is, behaving thoughtfully, really mean or
imply?
The implication he finds is that mind as logical structure
is objective, that is, the universe is rational. It has to do
with the make-up of the world in which thinking occurs. It is
something we discover for being is logically constructed and
constitutes in some measure a realm of intelligibility quite
irrespective of our efforts to comprehend it. This is similar
to Aristotle’s idea of entelechy.
It is natural to think of mind as objective and logical.
Men look for reasons to make the operation of things intel-
ligible. Men naturally seek a reason deeper than themselves
for the cause of things. They want to know why they are here,
whereas the reason is found in their own natural history
.
’’Men believe in a God because it seems impossible that our
fate here has no significance beyond ourselves and no part in
.1
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a wider plan. "23 We think that in the nature of things there
is something discoverable which will, if found, tell us the
secret of all things. It seems impossible to believe that the
world is without rhyme or reason in itself and devoid of sig-
nificance and intelligibility, while we seek to discover in
it a way of life which is intelligent and rational.
The basic categories of the world are space, time, and
existence, but these alone cannot make an intelligible world.
They cannot be separated from the interplay of thought.
When thinking is not accepted as an actual partic-
ipation in existence, but as something essentially
supernatural—either as the subjective accompaniment
of a brain or as the generator of its own categories
—
it is not likely that absurdity and illusion will
be avoided. 24
The subject of knowledge is considered. Knowledge is a
fact of existence just as much as any other fact. Knowing a
thing is not becoming the thing nor knowing its existence. He
denies the metaphysical theories that knowledge is a matter of
ideas. An idea is never a copy, image, or likeness of anything
whatsoever. Ideas are acquired through bodily operations. They
are wholly indifferent to the medium of expression. Yet know-
ledge is a matter of ideas without, of course, any implications
from the use of the term idea. ’’Knowledge is a very practical
problem of getting ideas, of making them clear, and of keeping
them from getting in one another’s way. "25 Their agreement
with their object is their effectiveness in making clear what
their objects are.
23. Ibid., 51.
24. Ibid., 54.
25. Ibid., 65.
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But what he means by making clear is the important thing.
Man’s brain is an instrument in the same way - a phonograph is
an instrument for making ideas clear. "Both are forms of
mechanisms so both may get out of order."26 The goal of ideas
is to be clear and adequate. They are made clear through some
conveyer or translator.
In short ideas are made clear by translating from
one set of words into another set, from one language
into another language, from one brain process into
another brain process, from one bodily condition
into another bodily condition, and they are never
made clear in an other way.^7
Thinking is nothing more nor less than self-communication.
It has a language, though the body may suppress public modes of
expression, such as the control of the muscles of the face. By
language he means not words, but a way of communication. There
is an internal language or way of communication. Consciousness
or states of consciousness or mental processes are simply ways
of expressing the instrumentation of thought. Thus the language
of thought is a material language. Our knowledge of the world
is gained by or through an instrument of translation. His
whole position he sums up in three convictions: (1) That lang-
uage, which everybody says conveys ideas, is a material ex-
change and as such is on a par, metaphysically, with every
other material exchange and they with it. (2) That ideas, al-
though they are conveyed by something material, are not the
material which conveys them, but an effect wrought in the ex-
change, and so not material at all; and furthermore he says,
26. Ibid., 65-66.
27. Ibid., 70.
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(3) That Ideas, because they are acquired and clarified by
experience, that is by the contacts of our bodies with the
rest of the world, and because they are conveyed from one
person to another, are, in spite of their immateriality, not
some peculiar idiosyncrasy jLn ourselves, but genuine discoveries
and genuine constituents of the system of things, showing that
that system is also a realm of being which can be investigated
and rendered intelligible in discourse. 28 Objective mind is a
necessary implication of the axiom, Man thinks.
D
.
Many Minds
Leaving this subject, consideration will be given to the
meaning of "many minds.” There is no relation, he says, between
objective mind and the human mind. The objective mind neither
thinks nor remembers. It is an abstract thing. Often person-
ality and the authorship of the universe are attributed to it.
It is like the First Mover in Aristotle's philosophy. His own
position has been well stated, that objective mind is simply
the logical order of things. He finds in it nothing personal,
and no causation whatsoever.
The only similarity between objective mind and human minds
is the use of the same term. It is the result of the activity
of thought. But the objective mind is neither essential or
necessary to the existence of many minds. To discuss the
existence of many minds we must begin with many minds, never
with objective mind. "Many minds are many men and many men
28. Ibid., 81-82
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are many bodies of a sort.”29 To study many minds we must
begin with many bodies, for he said at the beginning all that
we can find is the body.
The interplay of a man’s body with the world about
it is not only a matter of giving and receiving
impacts, but also a matter of perceiving, remem-
bering, and thinking, making up an individual’s
perceptions, memories and thoughts. 50
All of which is simply a relation to be stated, not a problem
to be solved. Man is a mind. He is one individual, one
undivided. Mind and body are not two distinct and substantial
elements of his composition. When he explores his mind he
explores his own world. And as he explores, it is always his
body he finds, never his mind.
E. Mental Development
His treatment of the development of mind will be con-
sidered. There is much evidence of instrumentalism here, as
appeared many times before. Man uses instruments. Primitive
man used a club. "He wields it with his arm and it bruises
his foe. It does what his body without it would have to do..
It is a real instrument • The same is true of ideas.
Ideas are thus the things that keep art from
being only an instrument. But they are them-
selves instruments as well as- symbols. They are
substitutes for the things they signify, so that
a sentence uttered may take the impact of a blow.
And so between man and nature intervene the whole
symbolism and instrumentality of his ideas. They
mean and they fend. They suggest and they con-
trol. They represent and they operate. They are
the supreme intervent ian of art, at once the highest
29
30
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form of Instrumentation and the highest form
of symbolism, 52
Man's development has been his intellectual development. His
history is the history of his ideas. The way he has put be-
tween himself and nature the symbols which are his instruments.
When we speak of the growth of mind we are speaking really of
the growth of art. We are setting forth incidents in the life
of these beings in whose reactions art is a factor and trying
to follow those incidents in their manifold connections. Viewed
in time, these incidents become centers from which radiate the
past and future countless series of connections. These centers
have no one past nor no one future. By arrangement these in-
cidents or events become history.
P. Behavior
All actions, whether mental or physical, are forms of
behavior.
Every act, from the movement of a body in space to
the movement of a thought in an inference, seems
to be done by an agent in which can be found a
structure, constitution, or organization without
which the act is not done. 55
Yet, while he emphasizes the importance of thought as a
form of action, he most emphatically rejects behaviorism as a
psychology.
I would avoid, if possible, any suspicion of giving
aid and comfort to those misguided souls who seem
to identify behavior with structure. .. So also, while
he (man) will not speak unless he has an apparatus,
the pattern of his discourse is very little deter-
mined by his vocal chords and his nervous response. 54
32.
33.
34.
Ibid., 176
Ibid., 183
Ibid., 184
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For behavior is a teleological matter and without
considerations of ends reached no differences are
recognizable or definable. 35
It is hard for me, he says, to think on behavior in any
other way.
Behavior being so pre-eminently a teleological
matter, the science of behavior might be called
a teleological science...
Yet it seems to me clear that in so far as a con-
sideration of behavior involves a consideration
of ends, we ought frankly to admit that we have
entered the realm of teleology and that there the
analysis of structure is not helpful...
It seems to me foolish to deny that there are ends
in nature, but it also seems foolish to affirm that
these ends operate to determine the structure and
constitution of things. 35
In other words the structure and constitution are prior to the
ends or purposes. The purposes did not produce the structure,
but the structure resulted in the ends. It still remains to
be seen what he means by structure that produces ends or pur-
poses. This is taken up in his essays on ’’Structure” and
’’Natural Teleology” and in other passages already dealt with
in our consideration of teleology.
He summarizes his view of mind as follows:
Starting with the fact that what things are is not
an indication of what they do, I would observe,
(1) That behavioristic distinctions are made, not
in terms of structure, but in terms of ends ac-
complished by behavior;
(2) That behavior is consequently a teleological
matter implying a natural teleology;
(3) That the admission of natural teleology does
not necessarily involve either the doctrine that
ends operate or the doctrine that structures con-
35. Ibid., 186.
36. Ibid., 187.
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tain resident powers by virtue of what they do:
(4) That the relativity of ends is confirmation
of teleology and not its undoing:
(5) That natural teleology constitutes the intel-
ligibility of nature; and
(6) That mind may be construed as an instance of
teleology rather than the cause of it. 37
It is evident from this that he sees mind as one of the many
natural teleological factors which arise out of nature’s
unconscious material stuff in the course of history. It,
like the other factors, arose naturally for there is no ul-
timate cause in nature. Teleology is simply observable
progress in a definite direction. At the same time the
direction is that which one observes.
G. Consciousness
The subject of consciousness is, of course, prominent all
through the discussion. But a more definite and unified state-
ment of what Woodbridge means is in order. It is evident that
consciousness is a bodily action. There is no mind or con-
sciousness unless there is mental activity, nor any body unless
there is physical activity. "It is what the man does that
divides him into body and mind. "38 The essence of his Realm
of Mind is that consciousness is a kind of activity. In his
essay, "The Nature of Consciousness," he says: "Consciousness
should, therefore, be defined as the same general type of
existence as space, time, or species. Its nature is akin to
theirs. "39 His nearness to the neorealists is seen in this
quotation:
37. Ibid., 190.
38. Woodbridge, ROM, 5.
39. Woodbridge, NAM, 308
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And just as we may have a body of knowledge built
up from the fact that things are in space, so we
may have a body of knowledge built up from the
fact that objects are in consciousness .40
It is seen from this that things in space may also be objects
in consciousness. Consciousness is a system of things or events-
or as he said previously, an existence in space and time. "Con-
sciousness may be defined, therefore, as a kind of continuum of
objects.
"
4 ^ This is akin to what has been called "panobjectivism
Each consciousness is individual because two continuums
of the same kind cannot be parts of each other. We can relate
them to each other just as we relate objects to each other.
This relation is always by means of our mediating bodies. He
agrees with James’s aim to "take consciousness out of the realm
of terms and put it in the realm of relations .
"
4^ He admits
that ther • is a differentiation within experience, into objective
and subjective, into the physical and psychological, but "I
have been unable to discover that the differentiation throws
light on the nature of consciousness .
"
4^ The division of
consciousness into two parts does not isolate a field where
consciousness is found. His conclusions are that "things or
a part of them, may be in consciousness, but they are in it as
things are in space."44 The world, before this time unknown,
has not suddenly been changed into ideas, by consciousness,
but the world has been connected up in a new way. He seems to
mean that a new relation of events has been discovered.
40. Ibid., 309.
41. Loc. cit.
42. Ibid., 313.
43. Loc. cit.
44. Ibid., 314.
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H. The Nature of Man
What is man as a whole? What, then, is his essential
nature?
One result of this remarkable development (in modern
psychology) is that psychology seems to have lost
the human soul. Perhaps it would be better and
more proper to say, that the soul has been progres-
sively transformed, until it has at last become no
more than the physiological, physical, and chemical
behavior of human beings. We no longer have a soul
or the soul is no longer a thing we can have. It
is rather what we do, our activity as a whole. 45
There Is no soul which exists as in another world or realm. There
is but one realm--that of nature. The soul is the functioning
and activity of man, one of nature’s most active and problematic
children.
There are not two worlds, to be played off against
each other, one with men and one with all sorts of
other things. I find it impossible to think that
the world is divided into two the moment a man
perceives it or thinks about it. I cannot look
upon the activity of man as an exception. Our
philosophy should be wholly positive. 46
When I consider the results of the historical crit-
icism of human opinions, philosophical, religious,
o*r otherwise, and also the results of positive in-
quiry into natural events, I am compelled to con-
clude that we should not believe that man is an
exception in the natural history of the world. He
comes from nature and to nature he returns. He
comes and goes like any other event in the world;
and the world exists for his sake as little as it
exists for the sake of anything else. We should
not believe differently. There are many who will
believe differently. But they will to believe; and
the "will to believe," although it may often be a
comfort, is not an attitude which is intellectually
grounded. . .What I would affirm is this, in the face
of all our discoveries, it has become intellectually
impossible to believe that man is not a natural in
the same sense as animals, plants, and atoms. 1 e
45. Ibid., 249.
46. Ibid., 250.
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may put this unbelievable thing away in the interest
of hopes and fears, but we cannot think it away,
when we thoughtfully and purposfully plan for our
daily life. 47
We ought not to believe that we are otherwise than we actually
are
—
products of nature. We ought to believe that we really
are just what we are. We must develop a thoroughly natural-
istic philosophy in order to realize our proper place in
nature. Naturalism, as a philosophy, is becoming more popular
There is no doubt about this. Since the death of Woodbridge,
it has continued to grow and flourish. A platform for Natural
ists has been recently stated in the volume. Naturalism and
the Human Spirit
,
published in 1944.
Woodbridge continues:
Pew philosophers and still fewer psychologists
have attained a clear knowledge of the fact that
this incorporation of man into Nature is of the
greatest metaphysical significance. They seem
to be content with the conclusion that something
thereby has happened to man. He has been changed.
His relatives have been changed. He is no longer
a child of God and an inheritor of the Kingdom of
Heaven. His once high position in the cosmos has
been abased. His relatives have become the animals,
the plants, and the atoms, and this is taken to
mean that the nature of man is to be found at last
in the nature of the atom. There are few who can
find in Heisenberg’s principle of indeterminism
the hope that there is yet a Promethean spark of
freedom in the world, but beyond this the incorpor-
ation of man into Nature is a profound transform-
ation of what he is, a change of his destiny and
his relationships. 4 ®
The popular attitude today, he feels, agrees with this con-
clusion. Naturalism gives to man chiefly his animal rights.
His intelligence is only an instrument of his animal life,
to be used to find channels through which his natural im-
47. Ibid., 252.
48. Ibid., 253.
»'
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pulses may freely flow. We see here again his instrumental
view of intelligence. His psychology is close to the function-
al psychology of Angell and Dewey, which in turn is Aristotelian.
The incopo ration of man into Nature may well do
something to man, but it must also do something
to Nature. It is impossible that the word "Nature"
can mean the same after this incorporation that it
meant before. The incorporation is really revolu-
tionary. It does not permit us to think of Nature
as if it were wholly predetermined, irrespective of
man's incorporation into it. What has naturalism
really done to man? It has changed him from an
illustration of what Nature is not, to a profound
illustration of what Nature is. He reveals what
Nature is fully as much as any other natural event.
The nature of man and the nature of Nature go to-
gether. 49
He asserts that a thorough-going naturalism will not
separate man from Nature. It will not allow us to think of
Nature as something first created or first discovered and then
man added to it. Nature can be no more adequately defined
without men than she can without atoms or anything else. Man
is as important for the revelation of the nature of atoms as
the atoms are for the revelation of the nature of man, but no
more so. Nature is equally tolerant of everything in it whether
it be birds, animals, plants, atoms, or men. Man explains
Nature only in the sense that he discovers her, and he discovers
her only as a consequence of the fact that his whole life from
birth to death, from waking to thinking, is a genuine co-working
with what she is. The question why and how man lives, how and
why he walks and thinks, is, in principle, the same sort of
question as why and how the atoms move. "This does not mean
49. Ibid., 254.
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that the movement of atoms is the thinking of a man, or that
thinking is some curious addition to motion, but that both
motion and thinking are a co-working with Nature under con-
trolling laws. f, 50 A thorough naturalism demands not only an
emancipation from a traditional conception of man, but also an
emancipation from a traditional conception of Nature. "I must
believe that Nature reveals herself in man more adequately than
in anything else, that in him her laws come to expression and
meaning, that human life is not set over against Nature, but
is Nature illuminated and inspirited. ”51
The modern kind (of naturalism) is new only in the
sense that it is not founded on the naturalisms of
the past, but is a product of modern science, modern
psychology, modern criticism, and the technical
demands of modern life. It is a challenge to us to
revolutionize our traditional thinking. The first
consequence is not surprising. Man feels himself
changed, he asks what he has lost and what he has
gained. He does not first ask what Nature has lost
and what she has gained. 5 2
Man is first and last, then, part and parcel of Nature. But
Nature is earth and heaven and sea and all that in them is.
Nature is all that there is.
Now what have these observations, which are for the
most part obvious and naive, to do with man and the
nature of man? Much, I believe. Guided by the
philosophy of naturalism we have incorporated man
wholly within nature. This now means that, with
respect to human life, there is propriety in nature
fully as much as in any other instance. Man, from
his lowest physiological functions to the highest
aspirations of his thought, illustrates the pro-
priety of Nature. The world in which he lives is
controlled not only by physical and chemical laws,
it is controlled also by logical, moral, and spirit-
50.
51.
52.
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ual laws. When a man walks, we readily admit that
Nature is appropriate to his walking, when he sees
or thinks, should we say something different?
Should we say something different even when he
prays? He is doing what is natural. Nature is as
adapted to the life of man as it is to plants,
animals, and atoms.
^
Nature must be so arranged that the spiritual life of man is
not alien to her. The nature of man and the nature of Nature
coincide. The world does not exist for purposes other than
itsown. Nature is not a creation, but the challenge and the
opportunity to create. Thus man's intellectual and spiritual
nature can produce all sorts of novelty. But such is never
outside of nature, for nature is all-that -there-is
.
His idea
of nature is that of an Absolute. As pointed out, it is very
similar to the Absolute of Spinoza in which God and Nature and
Substance are synonymous terms.*^ Just as God contains both
thought and extension for Spinoza, so Nature contains both
physical and mental activity for Woodbridge. They are both
phenomena which are found with earth and heaven and sea and all
that in them is. The "all that in them is" is a very inclusive
term for Woodbridge. Woodbridge continues his argument about
the place of man in the universe in an even more unscientific
manner.
Not only has man been dethroned from his exalted
position as the lord of creation and made a part
of Nature, but he has been made a part of a machine.
No matter how we try to personify the world, we cannot, he says,
because we cannot escape the conclusion that the world is
mechanical. This is inevitable.
55. Ibid., 257-258.
54. Supra, 76-78.
55. Ibid., 87.
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I . Summary
In this chapter an outline has been given of Woodbridge’s
theory of mind. Mind is a part of the natural world. It
cannot be separated from this world. It is a realm of dis-
course, not a separate entity, inhabiting a body. 56 In his
Realm of Mind he says that mind is a bodily function wholly
within the space -time realm. Mind shows that things have a
logical structure. The world of mind "is the world of space
and time in which we think, just as much as it is that world
in which we walk."
Thinking is a function of the human organism. (1) We name
certain acts "physical” or "mental" for convenience. (2) Our
bodily selves are the only discoverable thinking agents.
(3) Thinking is co-extensive with the subject matter. 58
To speak of "objective mind" means simply that a logical
structure is discoverable in things, the universe is rational.
His view of mind may be summed up as follows: (1) Lang-
uage is a means of a material exchange of ideas. (2) Ideas
are not the material itself, but an "effect" of the transfer.
(3) Ideas are genuine constituents of the system of things. 59
There is no relation between objective mind and the
existence of "many minds." The only similarity is the use of
the term. Many minds means simply that there are many bodies
in existence. 66 Mind is evidence of man’s development. He
56. Supra, 85-86.
57. Supra, 89; ROM, 24.
58. Supra, 97-98.
59. Supra, 101-102.
60. Supra, 102-103.
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Is on© who uses instruments. Mind is an example of man’s
adjustment, but all of his activities, both mental and phy-
sical, are forms of behavior. Woodbridge rejects complete
behavioristic psychology in favor of a functional view of
mind. 62 Consciousness is likewise a function of the human
organism. "Conscious should, therefore, be defined as the
same general type of existence as space, time, or species. "^3
It is a continuum of objects.
Man is part and parcel of Nature. He has no "soul" or
mind which exists in any other realm. 34 All his activity is
"natural" activity. Man is wholly a product of Nature - an
emergent. The identification of man within Nature gives to him
his natural animal rights. He is shown in his true perspective
as no more important then any other thing with nature. 35 This
identification reveals something of what nature really is.
Nature is equally tolerant of everything in it, whether birds,
animals, plants, atoms, or men. Man has be^n truly made a
part of this "natural machine."
J. Criticism
1. Woodbridge says that mind in the transcendental sense
has no genesis. 36 just what he means by this is not well
61. Supra, 104-105.
62. Supra, 104^105.
63. Supra, 106; NAM
64. Supra, 108.
65. Supra, 108-109.
66. Supra, 88.

115
explained* If mind has no genesis, then it is eternal. In
that case it is not an emergent from unconscious matter by
some process of biological evolution at all. Furthermore,
if mind is eternal in the universe, this would be idealism,
not naturalism. In any case, his position is by no means
clear.
2. Woodbridge is inconsistent in his treatment of the
status of ideas .
^
He insists that there is one realm of be-
ing--the space-time realm. Mind belongs to this realm. But
he says that ideas are not material things, hence, cannot be
in space-time, nor are they "idiosyncracies " of ourselves.
Just what they are is not made clear. He then says that ideas
are "objects'' in their logical connection. If they are not
material, how can they be? His statements here are very dif-
ficult to make out.
5. Woodbridge is troubled by the facts of behavior,
especially mental behavior. Behavior, he sees as teleological
.
This involves a consideration of ends or purposes. These ends,
he says, cannot be explained on the basis of " structure • " While
there are "ends in nature," he will not admit the possibility
of these ends as operating "to determine the structure and
constitution of things. 69 To admit purpose, he says, is not
to admit any directing agency. At the same time, he says,
such a view "is beset with difficulties which only increase
the farther it is pursued."^ 9 Woodbridge sees great difficulty
67. Supra, 101.
68. Supra, 105.
69. Supra, 105; NAM, 186-187.
70. NAM, 189.
.
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in his own view. Mind in a teleological world is natural and
at home hut in a non-teleological ’world it would be irrelevant
and absurd.’7 -*- Woodbridge is agnostic on the existence of an
infinite personality here. He is inconsistent and knows it,
yet he feels unable to do anything about it. He admits that
the contradiction might be solved on a theistic basis, but
this solution is of no value because the existence of a per-
sonal God is not scientifically verifiable. 72
4. His view of consciousness is somewhat neorealist ic
.
7 3
Abody of knowledge results from objects in consciousness. This
view has little or no psychological or philosophical standing
t oday
.
5. Costello points out that Woodbridge 1 s theory of mind
is not always consistent. 7 ^ He says a body thinks just as a
body walks. Mind is a kind of behavior. But later he qual-
ifies and reverses his position.
6. Since Woodbridge offers several criticisms of idealism,
and since his statements sometimes represent a misunderstanding
of the idealistic view, it seems best to make some comparisons
of the two systems. As there are several kinds of idealism,
this discussion will be limited to the position taken by per-
sonal idealists. By personal idealism is meant that the whole
of reality consists of minds; there is the infinite mind of
God, and the world of nature is a part of his experience;
there are also finite minds which exist apart from the divine
71. NAM, 190.
72. Supra, 51-52.
73. Supra, 106-107
74. Supra, 79.
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mind, but are ultimately dependent upon it, Personalists or
personal idealists would agree with Woodbridge in his insistence
that reality is metaphysically one^ 5 but differ as to the nature
of that one. The naturalist insists that reality or nature is
basically unconscious matter, while the personal idealist holds
that reality is basically mental and that nature is part of the
experience of the divine mind, or God. Woodbridge says that
"nature” is the ultimate explanation of all things. Beyond
nature it is impossible to go.^ The personal idealist says
that nature is not ultimate but must be explained in terms of
the eternal mind of God. V/oodbridge sees mind, purposes, and
values as arising from unconscious matter.^ The personal
idealist sees all thbse things as unexplained, including matter
itself unless the infinite mind is postulated.
One of Woodbridge’ s arguments against the prior existence
of mind is that mind itself is an emergent and hence cannot be
the cause or source of this fact of emergence.*^ But here
Woodbridge confuses the issue. Practically all personal ideal-
ists would agree that finite mind is an emergent and that it is
not the cause of the process. The cause of the process is the
eternal mind of God which was in the beginning, and the personal
idealist holds that finite minds as well as matter exist only
because there was the eternal mind of God in the beginning.
It seems that Woodbridge is refusing to see just what the per-
75. Supra, 51.
76. Supra, 55.
77. Supra, 59f, 72-73.
78. Supra, 67.
.
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sonal idealist means.
Again he says that it is -unintelligible to start with
animal bodies and then add to them minds. *79 The implication
seems to be that some idealists do this very thing. But no
good psychologist whatever his metaphysical beliefs may be,
would hold to such a view. Surely the mind-body problem is
dealt with by all schools in a more scientific manner than
this. In a long discussion of idealistic metaphysics in gen-
eral, Woodbridge argues that this position divides reality
into two worlds, the physical and the mental. Actually, the
basic position of such thinkers as Berkeley, Bowne, Brightman,
and Flewelling is complete rejection of all metaphysical dual-
isms. In this particular discussion Woodbridge is confusing
epistemological dualism with metaphysical dualism.
Another important difference between the naturalist and
the personal idealist is on the problem of teleology. Wood-
bridge holds to a "natural teleology." He sees nature as
producing ends. Purposes arise out of unconscious matter. 81
He refuses to see any one purpose or purposer guiding the
events of the universe.
The personal idealist again takes the opposing view. He
holds that the presence of purposes warrants the conclusion
that events are being intelligently and consciously guided to
some ultimate goal. The personal idealist sees an immortal
79. Supra, 87.
80. Supra, 91-93.
81. Supra, 62-69.
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future for man, while the naturalist sees physical death as
the end of personality. 88 It is interesting to notice that
Woodbridge toys with the idea of one artist for the whole of
nature but he rejects this possible solution as being un-
scientific.^
The heart of the controversy between the personal ideal-
ist and the naturalist is this. Which is basic, God or matter?
The naturalist holds that nature is a sufficient, or at least,
the only logical explanation for one to accept. The personal
idealist holds that the emergence of mind, the facts of
teleology, the existence of values, etc., can only be satis-
factorily explained if the eternal mind of God is postulated
as the ground of reality.
K. Woodbridge’s Contribution to Naturalism
Dewey remarks that when he came to Columbia, woodbridge
was teaching naturalistic metaphysics of the Aristotelian
type. 84 The influence of Spinoza, and that of the biological
evolution of Darwin, have also been noted. While it is
hard to separate the contributions of Woodbridge from those of
others, such as the thinkers mentioned above, some points can
be stated.
Nature, he holds, is an all-inclusive term. Nature in-
cludes all realms of experience, whether sense, intellectual.
82. Supra, 51..
83. Supra, 63-64
84. Supra
,
13.
85. Supra, 35-36 39-40.
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moral, religious, or axiological. 86 Man in his every activity
is an inseparable part of nature. The central problem is, of
course, that of the nature of mind and its place in nature.
Man, he says, has a conscious body. Mind is not something
outside of nature which comes in and lives in human bodies.
It is rather, a natural function of the organism. 87 Mind is
always the realm of logical structure in which thinking occurs. 88
This insistence that nature is composed of one kind of sub-
stance only, is the heart of his naturalistic theory, 89 and
this one substance exists in space and time, the world of
physics and chemistry. Woodbridge rejects the supernatural
because the existence of any such realm of being is scientif-
ically unverifiable.
Nature as "preeminently the visible world" is all-that-
there-is. No explanation or justification is possible other
than the statement that nature is.. Beyond this it is impos-
sible to go. 90 This is the ultimate metaphysical explanation. 91
Man is in nature and nature would not be what it is without man.
That naturalists are inclined to use "nature 11 in an all-inclusive
sense has been pointed out by Randall in the Krikorian volume. 99
Nature may be used like "Being" in Greek thought, or like
"Reality" for the idealists; or it is whatever man encounters
in whatever way; or as a name for quite a mess of miscellaneous
stuff. It would appear that naturalists as a whole are not
86. Supra, 46, 74-75.
87. Supra, 49, 85-86.
88. Supi*a, 89.
89. Supra, 51-52, 86, and others.
90. Supra, 53.
91. Supra, 69-71.
92. Supra, 2-3.
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particularly interested in an exact definition of nature.
One of his most important contributions to naturalistic
philosophy has been his insistence upon the oneness of nature,
which he supports by appealing to the scientific method. This
has a strong appeal to many who refuse to accept anything but
carefully tested scientific facts.
Another important contribution of Woodbridge was his de-
velopment of natural teleology. 9^ The theory of biological
evolution provided the machinery by which the process might be
carried on.^ Mind emerges naturally by the biological evolu-
tion of the organism. It is, consequently, no more surprising
that nature has produced thinking beings than microbes or stars. 98
In his consideration of mind as an emergent, Woodbridge
agrees pretty well with the instrumental view of the functional
psychologists, such as Angell and Dewey. 98 Ideas are instruments
or tools by which man operates. 9 ^ Woodbridge thus tries to com-
bine the teleology of Aristotle, the pantheism of Spinoza, the
biological evolution of Darwin, the discoveries of modern
physics, and the functional psychology of Angell and Dewey in
his naturalistic philosophy. 98 His attempt will be evaluated
when it is compared with that of Dewey himself. Woodbridge makes
it evident that even if man is unique in that he has a mind,
modern discoveries show that he has far closer connections with
his natural environment than have often been supposed.
93. Supra, 62-69.
94. Supra, 39-40.
95. Supra, 66.
96. Supra, 110.
97. Supra, 15-16; infra, 131-^132.
98. Supra, 33-36, 73-75, 110
.
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.
122
CHAPTER V
DEWEY ' S PHILOSOPHICAL FRAMEWORK
A. Dewey’s Conception of Philosophy
In his reply to critics in the Schilpp volume, Dewey ex-
presses his gratitude to Mr. Parodi for
his grasp of the main purpose of my philosophical
writings: "To reintegrate human knowledge and
activity in the general framework of reality and
natural processes." For I doubt if another as
brief sentence can be found to express as well the
problem which has most preoccupied me.^-
A discussion of Dewey's general conception of philosophy is
certainly in order.
Mr. Ratner, in his article in this same volume takes up
the question at some length. He points out that Dewey discus-
sed this question in the first chapter of Studies in Logical
Theory
,
1905. There he outlined his general conception which
was to be developed during the subsequent years. At that time
Dewey outlined the purpose of philosophy in three areas which
may be represented by concentric circles, covering three general
areas of inquiry. (1) The inner circle represents logic or
inquiry, the field of reflective thought; (2) The second rep-
resents the typical modes of human experience, such as the
practical, ethical, religious, esthetic, and scientific;
(3) The third represents the socio-cultural world or society
1. Dewey, Art. (1939), 597.
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organized in its institutional forms 2
Ratner well points out that what is unique is not this
system of representation but
the idea of the interrelation of the three areas:
that they are functional distinctions, discriminable
divisions within one inclusive field of experience,
the boundary lines being neither fixed nor imper-
meable, marking off, but not insulating any one from
any of the rest.'5
The second stage in the process of development is found
mainly in Dewey's contributions, Creative Intelligence , 1917,
and Reconstruction in Philosophy
,
1920. In these Dewey, under
the weight of the world situation, sees philosophy in a larger
perspective. In the earlier work we read:
Philosophy recovers itself when it ceases to be a
device for dealing with the problems of philosophers
and becomes a method, cultivated by philosophers,
for dealing with the problems of men.
Philosophy is an instrument to be developed for the solving of
specific and practical problems. In the latter work its chief
function is "to free men's minds from bias and prejudice and
to enlarge their perspectives of the world about them. The
chief task of future philosophy "is to clarify men's ideas
as to the social and moral strifes of their own day." 6 The
great social interest of Dewey shows how seriously he took
this task. It will be seen that this position is not a reversal
but a development of his earlier view.
2. Ratner, Art. (1939), 49-50.
3. Ibid., 50.
4. Dewey, Cl, 65.
5. Dewey, RIP, 21.
6. Ibid., 26.
..
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The third stage in this process is found in his Experience
and nature
, 1925, and this writer believes also in his Logic ,
1938. In the first of these two, Dewey sees philosophy as
criticism. It must be also self-analysis. He maintains that
"philosophy is inherently criticism, having its distinctive
position among various modes of criticism in its generality; a
criticism of criticisms, as it were."*'7 His Logic is important
because here he is developing his instrument, "inquiry." Logic
is, he says, inquiry into inquiry. He is trying to develop a
more and more perfect tool for dealing with the problems of the
day.
Confirmation of this general view as developed here is
found in Dewey’s most recent book. Problems of Men , 1946. In
his "Prefatory Note" to this volume we read that certain tech-
nical essays are included
because they present aspects of that work of self-
criticism, of purging, which, as I said in the
Introduction, philosophy needs to execute if it is
to perform under present conditions the role that
properly belongs to it. 8
The "Introduction" which is the only new essay in this book, is
a fuller discussion of this question.
As we give consideration to the various aspects of Dewey’s
philosophical system, it is well to bear certain things in mind.
The main difficulty in making the discussion under various
heads is well stated by Mr. Piatt when he points out:
There is bound to be much overlapping in these
7. Dewey, EAN, 398.
8. Dewey, POM.
..
.
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essays because Dewey’s philosophy is all of one
piece: metaphysics, epistemology, logic, differ
not in their ultimate subject matter but in
phases or perspectives of the same subject
matter. For Dewey as for Hegel, continuity is
pervasive and all-embracing .. .Experience and
nature are not separate entities conjoined or
added together; experience is rather the forms
which nature assumes in interactions of non-
organic and organic events including human events.^
If Professor Piatt had just added psychology to the others,
the list would be more complete. Consideration will now be
given to Dewey’s psychology, logic, epistemology, and meta-
physics in the order named, although this order is by no means
the only one which might be followed.
B. Psychology
It is very important to have a clear understanding of
Dewey's conception of psychology. He wrote his doctor’s dis-
sertation on the psychology of Kant, and many, in fact most,
of his early articles dealt with psychological problems.
Allport remarks that ’’John Dewey’s productive years span
almost exactly the life-time of modern scientific psychology . ”10
Though his psychology takes second place to his philosophy,
yet, "so close is the dependence of his philosophy upon the
actual conduct of living men that he finds himself frequently
forced to deal with psychological principles . His earliest
interest was to gain a clear understanding of the term
"experience”--a concept which was to occupy a central place
in his later philosophical development. Experience, he felt.
9.
Piatt, Art. (1959), 106-107.
10. Allport, Art. (1939), 265.
11. Loc. cit.
•.
.
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was more than sensational impressions. It can never be ac-
counted for by referring it to something else. Sensation is
not prior to consciousness or knowledge; it is but a consequent
dependent upon experience. It is only in experience that we
find the proper fusion of subject and object. Allport sees
Dewey’s conception of psychology as follows:
Psychology does not deal with mere subjective states
minus the object world, because both subject and
object are contained within the experiential whole;
they cannot be characterized separately. It is
the work of psychology to determine the relations
of subject and object as they arise within con-
sciousness .12
It is well to mention that in his early years, Dewey was
an Hegelian idealist. This fact influenced his early psychology.
It is evident that this early position can be given very little
weight since he later departed from It entirely. For example,
in 1886 his Psychology was published. In this work he sup-
ported "the older rationalistic, soul psychology, on the one
hand, and the newer sensory and reaction psychology, on the
other. "^3 The soul was retained to keep the unity of the
mental hfe. But "eight years later Dewey would regard the
unifying self as a useless redundancy, accounting in other
terms for such unity as mind achieves; but in 1886 he was still
far from this position. " 14
Under the influence of James’s Principles of Psychology ,
Dewey soon abandoned transcendental psychology for the newer
funct ionalism. Concerning the position taken in the Principles »
12. Ibid., 266.
13. Loc. cit.
14. Ibid., 267.
..
.
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.
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Dewey writes: "It worked its way more and more into all my
ideas and acted as a ferment to transform old beliefs. "IS gut
Dewey, by no means, agreed with all the theories of James. He
at once set about to remove same of the well-known inconsis-
tencies in James’s psychology. "So wholehearted is his con-
version to the functional position that Dewey accuses James of
faint-heartedness • "IS Dewey soon reached the conclusion that
the individual and his actions are completely one. There are
concrete attitudes, habits, desires, ideas and ignorance; "but
there is no ego behind these states . "I? There is no need to
postulate the ego to explain the will anymore than to explain
consciousness. "If the stream of thought can run itself in one
case, the stream of conduct may administer itself in the other. "18
Allport remarks: "There is for Dewey no longer any self separate
from musculature. "^9 Attention no longer causes the sense of
effort; it is the sense of effort. Dewey was henceforth to
insist on the seamless character of experience. To be aware of
oneself is merely a part of the total field of awareness. Dewey
has become a thorough-going functional psychologist.
His next interest was to find a unifying agent for his new
conception of the mental life. He was searching for "a new
guarantee of consecutiveness and coherence in behavior . The
reflex arc concept had recently been taken over into psychology
from physiology. Dewey, after due consideration, rejected this
15. Jane Dewey, Art. (1959), 23.
16. Allport, Art. (1939), 268.
17. Ibid., 268.
18. Dewey, Art. (1894)4, 340.
19. Allport, Art., 269.
20. Allport, Art. (1939), 269.
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concept in one of the most important psychological articles he
has ever published, "The Reflex Arc Concept in Psychology."
Dewey’s central criticism of the reflex arc was that it makes "a
patchwork of disjointed parts; a mechanical conjunction of
unallied processes. Dewey held that the stimuli of both the
beginning and end of a situation belong to the same act. Every
reaction is a circuit leading to the redistribution of stresses
and tensions within the organism. Adjustment is not a matter of
response to stimuli but a "re-established rapport within one’s
environment . "^2
Although Dewey here rejected the reflex arc concept, it was
to be many years before he hit upon a satisfactory unifying
agent. This he eventually found in the concept of "habit."
His interpretation of the place of habit is found well stated
in a passage from Human Nature and Conduct
,
his social psychology.
While it is admitted that the word habit has been
used in a somewhat broader sense than usual, we
must protest against the tendency in psychological
literature to limit its meaning to repetition. This
usage is much less in accord with popular usage than
is the wider way in which we have used the word. It
assumes from the start the identity of habit with
routine. Tendency to repeat acts is an incident of
many habits but not of all. A man with a habit of
giving way to anger may show his habit by a murder-
ous attack upon someone who has offended. His act
is nonetheless due to habit because it occurs only
once in his life. The essence of habit is an acquired
predisposition to ways or modes of response, not to
particular acts except as, under special conditions
these express ways of behaving. Habit means special
sensitiveness or accessibility to certain classes of
stimuli, standing predelictions and aversions,
rather than bare recurrence of specific acts. It
means will. 23
21
22
23
Dewey, Art. (1896)1, 358.
Allport, Art. (1939), 270
Dewey, HNC, 41-42.
..
.
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It is the consecutiveness and consistency among habits, achieved
through a gradual process of selection, that constitutes char-
acter. This selection appears through the modifying of sur-
rounding conditions. It becomes effective when the organism
learns to co-operate with the environmental conditions in a
deliberate manner. Dewey means by deliberation, "an ex-
periment in making various combinations of selected elements
of habits and impulses, to see what the resultant action would
be like if it were entered upon. Deliberation and will are a
matter of trial acts executed incipiently in imagination not
in overt fact." 24 But Dewey himself did not consistently fol-
low his theory of habit, and its influence has not been wide-
J
spread
.
1. Nature of thought . Dewey, along with many others,
believes that less confusion would result if we spoke of think -
ing instead of thought
,
etc. To a consideration of his view
of thinking we now turn. In his Studies in Logical Theory he
says that: "Thinking is a kind of activity which we perform at
specific need* just as at other need we engage in other sorts
of activity. "25 "Thought arises in response to its own oc-
casion.” 2^ "Thinking is what some of the actual existences
do ."S? First of all we see that thinking is an activity . With
that neither psychologists nor philosophers have any quarrel.
"Thinking is the process of instituting these mutual references,
24. Ibid.
,
190.
25. Dewey, SLT, 2; see Woodbridge, supra, 95, 110.
26. Ibid. 3; Supra, 98.
27. Dewey, EEL, 31
.
..
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of building up the various scattered and independent building-
stones into the coherent system of thought.” 28
But thinking is more than just activity ; according to Dewey,
it is physical activity .- He says:
Thought, intelligence, is to it (his logic) just a name
for the events and acts which make up the processes
of analytic inspection and projected invention and
testing which has been described. These events,
these acts, are wholly natural; they are ’realities’;
thgr comprise the sticks and stones, the bread and
butter... of ordinary experience
.
29
Thinking, for Dewey, is an experimental operation. Using the
example of one analyzing a disease and discovering a possible
remedy, he says: "to try the suggested remedy and see whether
the disease is helped is the act which transforms the data and
the Intended remedy into knowledge objects. "30 gut the im-
portant thing is that the transformation is physical, "and this
transformation into knowledge objects is also effected by
changing physical things by physical means . "31 ( italics ours.)
The solution of the problem, he says, is in every case a matter
of finding some given physical existence as a sign of some other
existence not given in the same way as in that which serves as
a sign.
Dewey’s conception of thought or thinking as an organic
activity is prompted by the desire to make thinking an actual
fact of experience. It is wrell to remember Dewey’s conception
of "experience" mentioned above. Dewey rejected the idealistic
28. Dewey, SLT, 76-77.
29. Dewey, EEL, 31; supra,
30. Ibid.
,
31-32.
31. Ibid. 32.
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conception of thought because he felt, on this view, that it
was something "outside” of experience which was added or brought
in. He felt that "a thought which is apart from experience
and not in it, which is shut up to the contemplation of its
own mental states is, by its definition, non-empirical.
g
e
holds that experience must be explained in terms of itself and
wants to do away with all transcendental factors in explain-
ing reality.
2. Mind as Instrumental . For Dev/ey, mind is instrumental.
It is an instrument of adaptation--a means of adjustment. Mind
is an adaptation of the organism.
Man is viewed as an organism, placed amid the
changing whirl of things, stimulated into action
by his needs and wants, adapting himself to con-
ditions, making the situation over, or meeting
it habitually where he can and suffering the
consequences where he cannot make the necessary
adjustment
.
3 ^
"The business of mind is to have, and to continually reconstruct
useful habits. "‘->4 There is no doubt but that the theory of
evolution played an important part in his development. It
suggested to him that this organ of adaptation was the product
of evolutionary forces operating on the individual and on the
race. Dewey says: "Wot only is one form of life a3 a whole
selected at the expense of other forms, but one mode of action
32. Howard, DLT, 51.
33. Ibid., 60-61.
34. Dewey, Art. (1900)^, 105.
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in the same individual is constantly selected at the expense
of others. "35 Mind is the result of biological adaptation and
selection by the organism. Thinking is then an instrument of
adaptation. Dewey, writing in an introduction to Hook's
Metaphysics of Pragmatism says this:
He makes it clear that "instruments" denote objects
having a definite existential status and office, and
that "action" does not cease to be continuous with
the energies of nature when it is expressed in the
behavior and habits of a living organism. There is
then no difficulty in making it clear that thought
,
which in science deals with the objects which have the
status of instruments, is itself a further tool of a
distinctive type, and yet like other instruments,
one set to operate in a common world of existences . 36
3. Behaviorism . There are many behavioristic statements
to be found in Dewey’s writings as well. Indeed in the "Preface"
to the Essays in Experimental Logic , he points out that his use
of the theory antedated the use of the term in psychology .37
In the Essays he adds:
Instrumentalism means a behavioristic theory of think-
ing and knowing. It means that knowing is literally
something which we do; that analysis is ultimately
physical and active; and meanings in their logical
quality are standpoints, attitudes, and methods of
behaving toward facts, and that active experimenta-
tion is essential to verification. Put in another
way it holds that thinking does not mean any trans-
cendent states or acts suddenly introduced Into a
previously natural scene, but that the operations
of knowing are (or artfully derived from) natural
responses of the organism. 38
In another connection he says that "knowledge which is not pro-
jected against the black unknown lives in the muscles, not in
consciousness . "39 In Experience and Nature we read that:
35. Dewey, Art. (1898), 337.
36. Hook, MOP, 4) supra, 103-104.
37. Supra, 14.
38. Dewey, EEL, 331-332.
39. Dewey, HNC, 177.
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The "seat" or locus of mind--its static phase--
is the qualities of organic action, as far as
these qualities have been conditioned by lang-
uage and its consequences .40
Meaning is not indeed a psychic existence; it
is primarily a property of behavior, and second-
arily a property of objects. 41
In another passage in the Essays we read:
Thinking is mental, not because of a peculiar stuff
which enters into it or of peculiar non-natural
activities which constitute it, but because of what
physical acts and appliances do; the distinctive
purpose for which they are employed. 42
Yet, in spite of this strong behavioristic trend, Dewey
does not go quite all the way. For example.
Take speech as behaviorist ically as you will, in-
cluding the elimination of all private mental states,
and it remains true that it is markedly disting-
uished from the signaling acts of animals. Meaning
is not indeed a psychic existence; it is primarily a
property of behavior, and secondarily a property of
obj ects .43
In another passage he points out that description is inadequate
which "reduces speech to vocalization or making of sounds and
thinking to a silent exercise of the organs of vocalization
and other structures . "44 This he feels is an oversimplified
theory of mental processes. He would not agree with Watson
when he says that thinking is "the silent exercise of the
organs of vocalization. 43 Further, Dewey affirms the existence
of consciousness as response to meaning. Intellect is "possession
40. Dewey, EAN, 291-292.
41. Ibid., 479-480.
42. Dewey, EEL, 14.
43. Dewey, EAN, 179; supra, 104-106.
44. Ratner, PJD, 70.
45. Watson says ."that what the psychologists have hitherto
called thought is in short nothing but talking to our-
selves .. .that muscular habits learned in overt speech
are responsible for implicit speech. "-BEH, 191-192.
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of and response to meanings . "^6 The mental is "aware of mean-
ings"^ and thinking is "response to the doubtful as such. "48
In this response to meanings human beings function at a level
. above the physical. The psycho-physical level will be considered
later. The conclusion to be drawn from this is that Dewey is
not a consistent psychologist. He is neither wholly a function-
alist nor a behaviorist. But we must consider his position
further.
4. Self Psychology . At times, Dewey almost becomes some-
thing of a self psychologist. At other times, he seems to deny
completely, the existence of the self. This was evident from
a consideration of his functional and behavioristic tendencies.
Yet, when he comes to write his Ethics
,
he seems to forget this
belittling of the self.- We read:
The self should be wise or prudent, looking to an
inclusive satisfaction and hence subordinating the
satisfaction of an immediately urgent single ap-
petite; it should be faithful in acknowledgment of
the claims involved in its relations with others;
it whould be solicituous, thoughtful, in the award
of praise and blame, use of approbation and disap-
probation, and, finally, should be conscientious
and have the active will to discover new values and
to revise former notions. 49
Men are not only conscious but can become "aware of awareness . " 50
There is, on the basis of this, a self which knows itself as
itself. In his A Common Faith he says that the integration of
46. Dewey, EAN
,
272.
47. Ibid
.
,
258.
48. Dewey QFC, 224.
49. Dewey ETH, 315.
50. Ratner (ed. ), PJD
.••
'
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the self is a mark of genuine religious experience .^1 Love joy
points out that one of the most important premises of his thought
is the idea of man as an agent and a "reflective agent, in a
physical and social environment . "52 <phe intelligence he is
talking about is creative intelligence.
The pragmatic theory of intelligence means that
the function of mind is to project new and more
complex ends--to free experience from routine and
caprice. Not the use of thought to accomplish
purposes already given either in the mechanism of
the body or in that of the existent state of
society, but the use of intelligence to liberate
and liberalize action is the pragmatic lesson. 53
What he is really doing is using the term "self" in this ethical
and religious content, but he does not mean by it what is meant
by self psychologists.
5. Relation of mind and body . This relationship is not
dualistic for Dewey rejects all dualisms. "The idea that matter
and mind are two sides or ’aspects’ of the same things, like the
convex and the concave in a curve, is literally unthinkable . "54
He rejects also any theory of epiphenomenalism, that thought and
action do not and cannot work together. It is contrary to his
whole basic premise that knowing is a kind of action. He rejects
what he calls "the so-called automaton or epiphenomenal theory
of consciousness" which makes perception "an idle and super-
ficial attachment to a mechanical play of energies. "55 On the
contrary mind and body are "different levels "of increasing
complexity and intimacy of interaction among all natural events. 5?
51. Dewey, CF, 17.
52. Love joy. Art. in ECR, 77.
53. Dewey, Cl, 63.
54. Dewey, EAN, 74; supra 50-52
55. Ibid., 315.
56. Ibid., 74.
57. Ibid., 261.
..
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Dewey takes a genetic approach to the problem. It cannot be
settled by taking a cross-section of the body-mind unity. Rather
this unity must be treated as a process of growth. Dewey out-
lines four stages in the process of development. (1) The psycho-
physical organism, which represents simply the organization of
energies upon lines of need-demand-sat isfact ion. 58 (2) The
level of sensitivity, discriminatory response--this is the
animal level as compared with the plant level of the first. 59
(3) The level of feeling, marked by response to distant stimuli
as characteristic of the higher animals. 60 (4) Mind, whose
distinguishing characteristics are communication, language,
and response to meanings. 61
Gonsciousness is present on all levels but at the level of
psycho-physical organisms it is only "the totality of actualized
immediate qualitative differences," while at the level of mind,
it is the totality of "actualized apprehensions of meanings ."62
Consciousness is those meanings of which one is aware at the
moment while mind is "the whole system of meanings as they are
embodied in the workings of organic life. "63 Mind is an achieve-
ment of the psycho-physical organism. Mind represents the highest
level of action of natural events. But though mind and body
represent different levels of interaction, mind is bound to body,
having an essential connection with it. Every mind that we know
58. Ibid.
,
253-254
59. Ibid
.
256.
60. Ibid. 256-257
61. Ibid. 258.
62. Ibid. 303.
63. Loc. cit.
..
.
.
.
.
.
157
empirically is connected with some body. 64 jt will be evident
from this discussion that Dewey does not actually hold to the
existence of a conscious self in spite of the many seeming ref-
erences to the contrary found in Experience and Nature
,
as well
as elsewhere. Mind, he says, in the Preface to the revised edition
of this book is "a genuine character of natural events when these
attain the stage of widest and most complex interaction with
one another. "65 gut this is not as behavioristic as it at
first seems for some of the distinguishing marks of this "char-
acter of natural events" are consciousness, 66 unity, 67 awareness
and manipulation of meanings, 68 space and time transcendence, 69
and striving for known ends. 17 0 According to Dewey, while man is
part and parcel of nature, a natural event, at the same time,
he is a conscious, thinking, feeling, and willing being. On the
whole it will have to be said that Dewey does not maintain nor
develop a consistent psychological theory.
Dewey rejects any thought of survival of the mind or self.
Man is not a being of infinite worth. ^1 "Individuals will always
be the center and the consummation of experience • "*72 The only
society worth serving is one "constituted of individuals of
significant qualities." 173
64. Ibid.
,
277.
65. EAN, Rev., vi.
66. EAR, 298.
67. Dewey, ETH, 336; CP, 53.
68. Dewey, EAN, 298, 388.
69 • Ibid. 256-257.
70. Dewey, ETH, 317.
71. Dewey, ION, 74-75; 154*, supra
72. Dewey, Art. (1930), 181.
73. Dewey, DEE, 142; RIP, 186.
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C. Logic
It is obviously impossible to consider all the aspects of
Dewey’s logical theory, so this section will be limited to a
consideration of the naturalistic element in it, and an exam-
ination of his criterion of truth.
There can be little doubt that Dewey was and still is
greatly interested in the development of a ’’new" logic--a new
instrument for the discovery of truth. Dewey’s earliest logical-
writings were concerned mainly with a criticism of accepted
theories of logic. This attitude is seen in his Studies in
Logical Theory and Essays in Experimental Logic . One of the
chief causes for his dissatisfaction was his firm belief that
the older theories separated science from morals. He wanted an
instrument which would be applicable to the whole of existence.
He was searching for an instrument which would discover truth
by discovering the "conditions of controlled inquiry." In his
own words:
The construction of a logic, that is, a method of
effective inquiry, which would apply without abrupt
breach of continuity to the fields designated by
both these words (which) is at once our needed
theoretical solvent and the supply of our greatest
practical want. ^
There can be no doubt that throughout his whole lifetime Dewey
has been working on this problem of reconstructing logical theory
This is evident from all his logical writings which culminated
in Logic: The Theory of Inquiry , 1938.
It is well to note at the beginning the importance of the
74. Adams and Montague (ed.), CAP, II, 23.
••
.
.
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term ’’experimental” in his theory. Dewey's new logical theory
was to be an experimental or empirical logic. The following
shows that he believed that
Experimental logic would solve the controversy, now
for centuries old, between reason and sense exper-
ience, by making both concepts and facts elements
in and instruments of intelligently controlled
action. 7 $
Dewey was searching for a logic which would be clearly applicable
to the whole of experience.
It is well to remember also, as Piatt points out, that, for
Dewey, empirical logic Is naturalistic logic, for "experience
and nature are not separate entitles conjoined or added to-
gether, but they are synonymous terms. Piatt goes on to say:
Much of the difficulty in understanding Dewey would
be obviated if more attention were paid to his
naturalism and less to his empiricism. Instrumental
and experimental logic is naturalistic
,
not a logic
of a separate world of thought but a logic of natural
events which are functioning on a meaning level. 77
In his reply to critics in this same volume, Dewey concurs with
this writer'3 judgment concerning his position. "I fully agree
with the proviso that my idea of experience and hence of em-
pirical method is naturalistic.” 7^
1. Dewey's concept of Thought or Inquiry . Because Dewey
is a thoroughgoing naturalist, it follows that "thinking" is
a natural event. Indeed, his logical theory begins with the
assumption that reflective thinking is an activity which can be
identified in the same way as the interplay of physical and
75. Seligman and Johnson (ed.), Enc. Soc. Sc ., IX, 603.
76. Donald Piatt, Art. (1939), lOT",
77. Loc. cit.
78. Dewey, Art. (1939), 529.
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chemical forces. Furthermore, he assumes that thinking is an
activity which occurs only whan some felt difficulty in a sit-
uation calls it forth as an instrument for the resolution of
that difficulty. This is evident from what he says in many
different places. "Thinking is a kind of activity which we per-
form at specific need, just as at other need, we engage in other
sorts of activity."^ "Thought arises in response to its own
occasion. "80 "Thinking is what some of the actual existences
do. "81 "Many definitions of mind and thinking have been given.
I know of but one that goes to the heart of the matter:
—
response
to the doubtful as such , "82 it is clear then, that, for Dewey,
thinking is a biological tool of adjustment which the human
organism calls into use in problematic situations. Thinking,
according to this view, is never spontaneous. It is also evident
that the term "thinking" is synonymous with "inquiry" as used
in his Logic . Here, he speaks of the "indeterminate situation"
which evokes inquiry. "Thus it is of the very nature of the
indeterminate situation which evokes inquiry to be question-
able. "83 inquiry is the result of a situation which is "uncertain,
unsettled, disturbed , "84 inquiry is the process by which the
problematic or indeterminate situation is changed into one which
is no longer problematic, or, at least, less problematic than
79. Dewey, SLT , 2.
BO. Ibid., 3.
81. Dewey, EEL, 31.
82. Dewey, 'ciFC , 224
.
83. Dewey, LOG, 105.
84. Loc. cit.; supra
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before. Inquiry, he defines as:
the controlled or directed transformation of an
indeterminate situation into one that is so deter-
minate in its constituent distinctions and relations
as to convert the elements of the original sit-
uation into a unified whole. 85
Prom all of this, it is evident that thinking and inquiry mean
the same thing. His Logic as an investigation of "controlled
inquiry” is an investigation of his naturalistic view of "think-
ing" as an instrument evoked by the organism in an indeter-
minate, doubtful, or problematic situation. The extent to
which he carries his naturalistic view can be seen by his
apparent rejection of any value whatsoever in "mental" states.
Dewey says:
Consequently, situations that are disturbed and
troubled, confused or obscure, cannot be straight-
ened out, cleared up and put in order, by manip-
ulation of our personal states of mind. The attempt
to settle them by such manipulations involves what
psychiatrists call "withdrawal from reality." Such
an attempt is pathological as far as it goes, and when
it goes far it is the source of some form of actual
insanity. The habit of disposing of the doubtful as
if it belonged only to us rather than to the exis-
tential situation in whTch we are caught and im-
plicated is an inheritance from subjectivistic psy-
chology. The biological antecedent conditions of
an unsettled situation are involved in that state
of imbalance in organic-environmental interactions
which has already been described. Restoration of
integration can be effected, in one case as in the
other, only by operations which actually modify
existing conditions, not by merely "mental" processes .86
In this rather strong and name-calling language, Dewey rejects
the value of mental states in solving problems. Rather, sit-
uations are to be settled by "existential operations" which
85. Dewey, LOG, 104-105
86. Ibid., 106.
..
-
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may be taken to mean the representation of one ’’thing" by an-
other "thing.” To say it in another way, unsettled or troubled
natural events are organized, settled, or become no longer
troublesome by means of operations instituted and carried through
by other natural events, the most important of which is thinking
or inquiry. This seems to be what Dewey is saying.
There is no doubt then, that Dewey’s view of "inquiry" is
simply the natural development of his earlier view of "thinking."
As he said so many years before writing his logical masterpiece.
No one doubts that thought, at least reflective
as distinct from what is sometimes called con-
stitutive thought, is derivative and secondary.
It comes after something and out of something, and
for the sake of something. No one doubts that the
thinking of everyday practical life and of science
is of this reflective type.&7
If we ask in what sense we are to understand thought
as a derived procedure, we are plunging ourselves
into the very heart of the logical problem: the re-
lation of thought to empirical antecedents and its
consequents, truth, and the relation of truth to
reality
Piatt well points out that
Dewey is empiricist and naturalist in recognizing
the derivative r6le of thought, the dependence of
thought upon a non-logical subject matter. [ButJ
he is a reationalist par excellence in recogniz-
ing the paramount r6le of intelligence in the
conduct of life. 69
The obvious relationship between thinking and inquiry is also
evident from the Essays where Dewey clearly defines his theory
and purpose. Setting out from the conviction that knowledge
implies judgment the essays try to show: (1) that such terms as
87. Dewey, SLT, 1: EEL
88. Dewey, SLT , 3.
89. Piatt, Art. (1939),
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’thinking, ’ reflection,’ judgment’ denote inquiries or the
result of inquiry, and (2) that inquiry occupies an inter-
mediate and mediating place in the development of an experi-
ence. 90 We must bear in mind also, Dewey’s broad definition
of "experience’' which is not consciousness but all natural
events. Dewey does not make the distinction between "situa-
tions-experienced" and "situations-believed-in" as is made by
an idealist such as Edgar S. Brightman. Brightman holds that
experience is consciousness. All knowledge is the result of
situations-believed-in, which are coherent interpretations of
all the facts of experience. For Dewey, consciousness, while
not wholly ignored, "is only a very small and shifting portion
of experience." 9 -1- Consciousness is the focus of attention
while experience is the whole periphery which is broad enough
to include all else, that is. Nature. A very interesting sug-
gestion concerning Dewey’s view of thinking as instrumental
appears in Howard’s treatment of Dewey’s logic, written several
years ago. It is certainly valuable in this connection and
we quote:
Dewey's instrumentalism rests upon a very special
psychological interpretation which puts action first
and thought second. Unable to discover an overt
connection between fact and thought, he delves under-
ground for it, and finds it in the activities of the
nervous organism. This discovery, he believes, solves
once and for all the ancient riddle of the relation
of thought to reality. 92
Mind, this critic rightly goes on, is for Dewey an adaptation
90.
91.
92.
Dewey, EEL, 1.
Ibid., 6; supra, 106-107.
Howard, DLT, 36.
..
.
.
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of tiie organism. Consciousness is interpreted on the basis of
an evolutionary and naturalistic metaphysics.
Man is viewed as an organism, placed amid the
changing whirl of things, stimulated into action
by his needs and wants, adapting himself to con-
ditions, making the situation over, or meeting it
habitually where he can and suffering the con-
sequences where he cannot make the necessary ad-
justment.^^
The purpose of reflection is to enable man to adapt himself to
his environment. Logic, then, is a theory about the function
of mind, thinking, or inquiry, as it functions in this process
of continuous adjustment. "The business of mind is to have,
and to continually reconstruct useful habits. "94 What of the
self? Does all this account for the facts? Some of us would
disagree but Dewey insists that "the notion which I would
suggest as substitute is that of the self as always concrete
specific activity. "95
2. Conception of Logic . When we come to a more general
consideration of his great work in logical theory. Logic: The
Theory of Inquiry
,
we are brought face to face with Dewey’s belief
in the absolute necessity of a new logic. In concluding his
chapter on "The Needed Reform of Logic," Dewey sums up the sit-
uation in this fashion.
The subject-matter and methods of modern science have
no such direct affinity with those of common sense as
existed when classic science and logic were formulat-
ed... The demand for reform of logic is the demand for
a unified theory of inquiry through which the auth-
entic pattern of experimental and operational Inquiry
of science shall become available for regulation of
93.
94.
95.
Ibid., 60-61.
Dewey, Art. (1900), 105-124.
Dewey, Art. (1893), 653.
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the habitual methods by which inquiries in the
field of common sense are carried on; by which
conclusions are reached and beliefs are formed
and tested. 96
Having shown the need for a new logic, it is well for us
to consider just what he thought this new logic ought to be,
even more, must be. Dewey outlines carefully what he believes
a proper logical theory must be and do.
a. Logic is a progressive discipline . It rests upon an
analysis of the best methods of inquiry that exist at a given
time. "The idea that logic is capable of final formulation is
an eidolon of the theater. "9V
b. The subject matter of logic is determined operationally .
The methods of inquiry are operations performed or to be per-
formed. Logical forms are the conditions the inquiry, qua in-
quiry, has to meet.
c. Logical forms are postulational . By this he means that
the forms are neither final, arbitrary, nor a priori . They are
not "given and imposed from without."98 This point will be
developed later.
d. Logic is a naturalistic theory . By which he means that
"there is no breach of continuity between operations of inquiry
and biological operations and physical operations . "99 All the
operations of logical inquiry, he says, are observable. "Con-
ceptions derived from a mystical faculty of intuition or anything
that is so occult as not to be open to public inspection and
96
.
Dewey, LOG, 97-98.
97. Ibid., 14.
98. Ibid.
,
17.
99. Ibid. 19.
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verification (such as the purely psychical for example) are
excluded. ”100 if we take this statement at its face value,
it is a clear denial of the existence of consciousness, for
such a thing, if it exists, and there are some who believe
that it does, is certainly not open to public inspection.
Dewey does not define what he means by public inspection, but
surely it must be taken to mean visible to all who care to
investigate in a more or less scientific fashion. This state-
ment is not in keeping with others in his writings concerning
the existence of consciousness.
e. Logic is a social discipline . "Inquiry is a mode of
activity that is socially conditioned and that has cultural
consequences • ”101 it is, he adds, "cultural naturalism"102
f. Logic is autonomous . "Logic as inquiry into inquiry
is, if you please, a circular process; it does not depend upon
anything extraneous to Inquiry. "103 He does not believe that
logic is in any way dependent upon metaphysical or epistem-
ological assumptions or presuppositions.
With this brief consideration of the nature of logic for
Dewey, let us turn to his conception on the realm in which
logical theory operates, namely, the existential matrix of
inquiry, biological and cultural.
3. The Matrix of Inquiry . Dewey’s naturalism Is further
developed in his view of the matrix in which all thinking or
inquiry takes place. Simply, it is the realm of natural events.
100. Loc. cit.
101. Loc. cit.
102. Ibid., 20.
103. Loc. cit.
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for that is the only realm there is. Why do the pragmatists
root thinking of inquiry so completely within nature? Profes-
sor Piatt furnishes a possible answer when he says:
Unless our minds are already in some ways in touch
with reality, unless one connection in some assign-
able fashion is broken relative to other connec-
tions that remain intact, this question is meaning-
less. Unless thought is a function of an active
thinker and unless his thinking is rooted in other
activities that on occasion demand thinking and
provide a consummating terminal for thinking,
thought is a complete mystery—unthinkable even as
a mystery. 104
Dewey, he says, begins with the world of common sense, for,
apart from this world there can be no inquiry.
The assertion of the existential basis of inquiry is
an assertion that epistemological subjectivism and
solipsism are masquerades, imposters, fabrications
of thought which is forgetful of its origin and
function. The origin consists in natural events
which are organisms in interaction with other nat-
ural events. 105
Dewey opens his discussion of the existential matrix by as-
suming that "logic is naturalistic" 106 without any consider-
ation whatsoever, he dismisses the "pseudo-problem" of mind
and matter.
The fact that inquiry involves the use of biological
factors is usually supposed to pose a special meta-
physical or epistemological problem, that of the
mind-body relation. . .When, however, biological fun-
ctions are recognized to be indispensable constit-
uents of inquiry, logic does not need to get en-
meshed in the intricacies of different theories
regarding the relations of mind and body. 10^
Dewey’s position is typical of the naturalistic school. It is
to accept the fact of the presence of mind, yet, make no attempt
104. Piatt, Art. (1939), 112; supra, 76-77.
105. Ibid., 113.
106. Dewey, LOG, 23.
107. Loc. cit.
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to offer an explanation of this fact. There is another point
which he mentions here which is extremely important. It will
come out again and again. It is the principle of continuity.
It is upon this idea of continuity within nature that the
naturalistic theory is primarily based. Nature of experience
is one continuous whole. Here Dewey says that:
The primary postulate of a naturalistic theory of
logic is continuity of the lower (less complex)
and the higher (more complex) activities and forms.
In this connection Piatt well points out that
Dewey’s logical theory is an elaboration of the
thesis that the only way to secure continuity is
to recognize it when you see it and hence to start
with it as an indefeasible fact of ordinary experience . 109
This factor will be further considered as his position is de-
veloped. By this principle there is excluded from the scene or
existential matrix "a totally new outside force as a cause of
changes that occur. ”110 All causation (whatever that may be)
is to be found within nature. But this view tells us little
because of his vague view of nature.
Dewey takes up at great length the question of organic be-
havior. Such behavior is very important for his theory for it
has "direction and cumulative force By means of this
natural change and development the organism finds new and more
satisfactory ways of functioning. ’’This modification con-
stitutes what is termed habit. Habits are extremely im-
portant for the naturalist for they "are the basis of organic
108. Dewey, LOG, 25.
109. Piatt, Art. (1939)
110. Dewey, LOG, 24.
111. Ibid., 31.
112. Loc. cit.
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learning . f,H3 such modification "is equivalent to giving some
definite direction of future actions."!!^ The conclusion of his
belief in the all importance of hibitual development of organic
behavior is evident because "in the human organism, organic
retention (or habit patterns) give rise to recollection. "115
Dewey thus comes out for a definite behavioristic view of the
development of mind. Past troubles in logical theories have
arisen because it was assumed that thinking processes were
"mentalistic. " Such a view makes a great and impassable gulf
between reflective thinking and logic. "But the recognition
of the natural continuity of inquiry with organic behavior--
the fact that it is a developed mode of such behavior--de-
stroys the assumption. ”116 Dewey wants none of this "bifur-
cation" of nature which has caused so much trouble and raised
these "pseudo-problems." "Personally, as has just been said,
I doubt the existence of anything ’mental’ in the doctrinal
sense alleged. "117 He concludes this chapter by asserting that
the thoroughgoing naturalist is committed by the logic of his
position "to belief in continuity of development, with its
corrollary of community of factors in the respective patterns of
logical and biological forms and procedures . "H8
After this consideration of the biological matrix, Dewey
up the cultural matrix of inquiry.
113. Loc. cit.
114. Ibid., 32.
115. Ibid., 34*, supra. 104-105.
116. Dewey, LOG, 36.
117. Loc. cit.
118. Ibid., 41.
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functions in a cultural as well as a biological environment. And
Any theory that rests upon a naturalistic postulate
must face the problem of the extraordinary differences
that mark off the activities and achievements of hu-
man beings from those of other biological forms.
I
19
Such difference (false of course) have led to the idea that man
is completely separated from the other animals by properties
which have come from a non-natural source. One of the. most
important reasons for such a position is the fact that man uses
a tool called "language." Dewey takes the position that lang-
uage is a natural tool which man has developed. He does not
seem to see that it is quite possible that man developed lang-
uage because he was different in the first place. But Dewey
maintains that it is a mistake to suppose that language is
"simply a means of expressing or communicating 'thoughts’—
a
means of conveying ideas or meanings that are complete in them-
selves apart from communal operational force. "120 Dewey sums
up his position with this statement.
We are thus brought back to the original problem;
namely, transformation of animal activities into
intelligent behavior having the properties which,
when formulated, are logical in nature.
The habit of reasoning once instituted is capable
of indefinite development on its own account. J-22
All of which may be true, but this in no way explains how the
habit of reasoning was instituted in the first place. Dewey
does not attempt to explain how the above tranformation took
place.
119. Ibid.
,
43.
120. Dewey LOG
121. Ibid. 56.
122. Ibid. 57.
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4 « Logical Forms . Dewey holds to the natural development
of all logical forms. There are no a priori postulates. His is
a completely empirical logic.
The theory £higj
,
in summary form, is that all
logical forms (with their characteristic prop-
erties) arise within the operations of inquiry and
are concerned with control of inquiry so that it
may yield warranted assertions . 123
The whole problem of logic is reduced to this position. It is
the problem "whether inquiry can develop in its own ongoing
course the logical standards and forms to which further inquiry
shall submit."!24 He believes that logic can. The extent to
which he is willing to go is seen in his consideration of the
laws of contradiction, identity, and excluded middle. Ac-
cording to one view, these laws represent ultimate invariant
properties of objects "to which inquiry must conform. "125
But Dewey maintains a completely opposing view.
According to the view here expressed, they represent
conditions which have been ascertained during the
conduct of continued inquiry to be involved in its
own successful pursuit ... the second position £his^7
implies, as has already been stated, that the prin-
ciples are generated in the very process of control
of continued inquiry, while, according to the other
view, they are a priori principles fixed antecedent-
ly to inquiry and conditioning it ab extra . !2b
Logical forms as postulates "are not given and imposed from
without. "127 >phe basic or fundamental thesis of the whole
volume is that "logical forms accrue to subject-matter when
the latter is subjected to controlled inquiry. "12B "The forms
123. Ibid.
,
3-4.
124. Ibid., 5.
125. Ibid. 11.
126. Dewey, LOG,
127. Ibid., 17.
128. Ibid., 101.
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in question are not fixed and eternal. "129 Concerning the form
of "substantiality" he says that it is a form that accrues to
original existence when the latter operates in a specified
functional way as a consequence of operations of inquiry . "130
When he comes to a consideration of "causation" he adds that
"the evidence is conclusive that the category of causation
accrues to existential subject-matter as a logical form when
and because determinate problems about such subject-matter are
present . "151
In discussing the relation of matter and form, Dewey agrees
that there is no "formless-matter" nor "matterless-form" for,
if form is wholly apart from matter, it could never be applied
to it. "For the issue is precisely whether such forms can be
applied to matter. If they cannot, applied logic is a meaningless
term. "152 ^t this point his logic is close to that of Aristotle.
But he wrongly says that formal logicians hold to a theory of
"pure forms" for "it is precisely on this fundamental matter of
conditions of application that the formalistic theory breaks
down. "153 no formal logician, nor possibly any other, ever
held to such a view as he attacks. Dewey maintains that all
logical forms arise in the process of inquiry and may be used
to aid in further inquiry, in which process further forms may
be developed. He tries to be consistently naturalistic.
The whole relation of subject-matter and form Dewey sees
through the principle of continuity. "The problem that then
129. Ibid
.
,
102.
150. Ibid., 129.
131. Ibid
.,
459.
132. Ibid. 375.
133. Ibid., 375.
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arises with reference to the relation of subject-matter to form
seems to me insoluble except on the ground of the continuity of
inquiry. "134 "The interpretation here advanced is that the kind
of situation involved is such as, in the continuum of inquiry,
to warrant a probability solution. ”135
5. Criterion of Truth . The ultimate purpose of logic is
to achieve reliable knowledge or truth. For Dewey, the outcome
of inquiry is "warranted assertions." 15® The settled outcome
of inquiry ought to be a unified whole which is another way of
saying warranted assertibility . Throughout his whole volume
Dewey talks constantly about "coherent wholes" 151? and similar
terms. No one doubts that such is his evident goal. But there
is a problem of exactly what he means by the method by which
such "wholes" are reached. He talks constantly of the 'experi-
mental" or "scientific" method. But this method may be taken
to mean either of two things. It may be the strict method of
the scientific laboratory, such as is used in physical and
chemical experiments. 15® Or it may be interpreted in a broader
sense comparable to the method of coherence of idealists such
as Edgar S. Brightman, "except for its pluralism." 159
There can be little doubt that Dewey uses the scientific
method in this second sense. Dewey does assert that all know-
ledge is probable. Certainty is a delusion. The "scientific
method" "Is adequate satisfaction of logical conditions imposed
134. Dewey, LOG, 469.
135. Ibid., 472.
136. Dewey, LOG, 4, 9, 104, etc.
137. Ibid., 13, 25, 68, 130, etc.
138. Ibid., 439.
139. This qualification was made by E. S. Brightman in a
comment; for a definition of coherence, see Brightman,
NAY, 106-107.
..
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by control of Inquiry . "140 Then he speaks of "science in its
narrower sense, "141 if there is science in a "narrower" sense
obviously there is science in a "wider" sense. Furthermore,
"dogmatic restriction of science to generalizations compels
denial of scientific traits and value to every form of practice . "142
It is evident that the scientific method can then be interpreted
in the broad sense of application of intelligence to value
propositions and problems. This interpretation is supported by
Larrabee in his Reliable Knowledge 143 jn other of his writings
we find Dewey mentioning the scientific method. He asserts that
"there is but one method for asserting fact and truth--that
conveyed by the word ’scientific' in its most general and
generous sense. "144 Doctrines to be convincing to the modern
man must be "brought to agree with the deliverances of science. "145
Scientific procedure in "actual knowing is superior to all other
procedures . "146 some experimental act is necessary for know-
ledge. "Scientific method is the only method that has proved
a ’fruitful’ method of thinking. "147 His emphasis upon this
method is of primary importance.
We turn now to his explanation of this method as found
in many of his writings. It is the method in which:
Observation is determined by experimental conditions
depending upon the use of certain guiding concep-
tions .. .reflection is directed and checked at every
140. Ibid., 453.
141. Ibid., 439.
142. Loc. cit.
143. See, 473, 498, 504, etc.
144. Dewey, CF, 33.
145. EAN, 137.
146. QFC, 85f
•
147. CAE, II, 774.

point by the use of experimental data, and by the
necessity of finding such a form for itself as will
enable it to serve in a deduction leading to the
evolution of new meanings and ultimately to ex-
perimental inquiry which brings to light new facts. 3-48
It is the method of "making hypotheses which are then tried out
in actual experimental change of physical conditions
.
"149 it is
evident from this that Dewey also conceives of the "scientific
method" in the narrower of the two senses mentioned above. This
is even more clearly seen in the following:
Moreover, in experiment , everything takes place above-
board, in the open. Every step is overt and capable
of being observed. . .The entire process by which the
conclusion is reached that such and such a judgment
of an object is valid is overt. It can be repeated
step by step by any one... A public and manifest
series of definite operations, all capable of public
notice and report, distinguishes scientific knowing
from the knowing carried on by inner "mental" proces-
ses accessible only to introspection, or inferred by
dialectic from assumed premises .150
Concerning the 11 instrumental" theory of knowing, he says that it
is not a theory about personal disposition and satisfaction In
knowing, "but about the proper objects of science, what is
’proper’ being defined in terms of physics . 3-51
At this point it is interesting to consider the interpre-
tation given to Dewey’s scientific method by two of his well-
known followers. First of all let us look to John H. Randall Jr.
who interprets the method in its broader sense. To quote him:
For despite all his analysis of the procedure of
the natural sciences, Dewey’s experimentallsm is not
primarily based on the methods of the laboratory.
(Italics ours ) . It is at once the experimentallsm
148. Dewey, EEL, 89-90.
149. Dewey, EAN, 155.
150. Dewey, QFC , 289.
151. Dewey, EAN, 151.
..
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of practical common sense, and the coming to self-
awareness of the best and most critical tech-
niques and concepts of the social sciences. In
the broadest sense, it is the experimentallsm of
the anthropologist, of the student of human in-
stitutions and cultures, . .It is a method of in-
quiry, of criticizing traditional beliefs and
instituting newer and better warranted ones. 152
But Joseph Ratner is inclined to look upon this method in the
narrower sense, as is seen from his " Introduction to John Dewey’s
Philosophy . "153 He says:
Control of philosophic arguments about the world by
experience of the world is what Dewey fundamentally
means by empiricism in philosophy, by scientific or
experimental method.
I
54
Now Dewey’s basic position, his basic argument
about philosophic method, is that theory in phil-
osophy is no more privileged than theory in science. 155
The only genuine passport, the only passport com-
manding entrance into Being, Reality, Nature or
whatever else you care to call it, by capital
letter or small, is the passport that is filled
out, signed, countersigned, stamped and sealed by
public experience. 156
That the method of experimentation is the very
essence of the method of modern science is the
flesh and blood (not the bone) over which Dewey’s
whole philosophy contends . 157
It is not surprising that confusion results over exactly what
Dewey means by the experimental or scientific method.
It seems evident to this writer that Dewey uses ’’scientific
method" in two different senses. It is, first of all, the
experimental method of the physical sciences. But in the matter
152. Randall
153. Ratner,
154. Ibid.,
155. Ibid
.
,
156. Ibid.,
157. Ibid.
,
Art. (1539.), 82.
in IMW , 3-241.
3.
4.
5.
58; many others might also be quoted
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of social inquiry, in testing and verification, he constantly
uses the method of coherence, using scientific in the "wider”
sense referred to above. Dewey says that "the end of science
is putting the facts into coherent form"158 its goal is a
"coherent and self-luminous system of meaning. "159 Coherence
is also an ethical criterion. 160 The whole office of phil-
osophy as the ultimate arbiter of the sciences is to subject
"values, criticisms and critical methods to a criticism as com-
prehensive and consistent as possible . "161 it is also evident
that, by the adoption of the criterion of coherence as ultimate,
Dewey is criticizing his own narrower use of the scientific or
experimental method. It seems that he is far more likely to
restrict his method when he is tryirg to show the impossibility
of the existence of the supernatural. This seems evident from
The Quest for Certainty and his more recent article in the
New Leader on "Dualism and the Split Atom. "162 in the latter
he especially urges us to forget the "supernatural" which has
caused a "split in the very nature of things" and urges us
to "carry forward the application of our best scientific
procedures" which is the only way to get ourselves out of the
present dilemma. Here his use of "scientific" seems to be
restricted to the narrower sense.
While we may not agree with everything that Dewey says, it
would be most unfair to say his logic has little or no value.
158. Dewey, LCS, 115.
159. Dewey, EEL, 90.
160. Dewey, ETH, 201.
161. Dewey, EAN, 404.
162. Dewey, Art. (Nov. 1945); supra, 47-48, 51-52.
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Moreover, it would not be true. He has succeeded in develop-
ing the first satisfactory organic logic. As one critic remarks.
The only fault to be found with Dewey’s exposition
of operational logic is that he has done his task
so thoroughly and so effectively as to seem to
thrust all other forms of logic into the discard--
where, however, they refuse to stay. 153
While this is somewhat an overstatement, nevertheless, we must
admit that Dewey has produced a great piece of work. It remains
for those who disagree with him to develop a better system of
logical theory. There is great need for a similar logic de-
veloped from the idealistic point of view.
D. Epistemology
In his well known essay, "Pragmatism versus the Pragmat ist , " 1°4
Mr. Lovejoy has made a devastating attack upon the inconsis-
tencies in Dewey's theory of knowledge. Using many quotations
from Dewey '
3
writings, Lovejoy points out both epistemological
monistic and dualistic elements in his theory. It would be
possible to follow this plan, but in so doing, all value of
trying to discover what is Dewey's theory would be lost. It
is sufficient to call attention to this cogent criticism.
Lovejoy makes one statement in this essay which, in the opinion
of this v/riter, contains more truth than Professor Lovejoy himself
seems to have realized. To quote him:
163. Buckham, Art. (1944), 356.
164. See Drake and others, ECR
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We seem once more—the pragmatist is constantly
giving us these exciting moments --to be on the point
of finding in pragmatism a tertium quid
,
a new in-
sight which will enable us to escape from both horns
of the traditional dilemma. 1^5
Whether or not he hoped to escape the "traditional dilemma,"
it is evident that Dewey was developing a new theory of know-
ledge. Consequently, his theory ought not to be too severely
criticized along traditional lines, lest its value be wholly
overlooked. His theory of knowledge follows consistently his
functional view of thinking or inquiry. Dewey’s epistemology
stands or falls with his whole system of which it is an integral
part. It would seem that if the validity of his theory of mind
can be established, the truth of his epistemology will naturally
follow.
1. Knowledge and action . Dewey’s basic thesis is that
knowing is a kind of doing. The sub-title of his The Quest for
Certainty is "A Study of the Relation of Knowledge and Action."
In this book he says "that the experimental procedure is one
that installs doing as the heart of knowing ."( Italics ours
. )
l*3®
"Our main attempt will be to show how the actual procedures of
knowledge, interpreted after the pattern formed by experimental
inquiry, cancel the isolation of knowledge from overt action. "-^7
To give a passage where Dewey clearly states the thesis upon
which he is working:
165. Love joy. Art. (1920), 57.
166. Dewey, QFC, 36; supra, 85-86.
167. Ibid., 48.
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The sum and substance of the present argument is that
if we frame our conception of knowledge on the experi-
mental model, we find that it is a way of operating
upon and with the things of ordinary experience so
that we can frame our ideas of them in terms of their
interactions with one another, instead of in terms of
the qualities they directly present, and that thereby
our control of them, our ability to change them and
direct their changes as we desire, is indefinitely
increased. Knowing is itself a mode of practical
action and is the way of Interaction by which other
natural interactions become subject to direction.
(Italics ours,)
Knowing is a form of doing and further he adds "We define mind
(italics ours) and its organs in terms of this doing and its
results, just as we define or frame ideas of stars, acids, and
digestive tissues in terms of their behavior . "169 Prom all
this it is evident that Dewey’s theory of knowledge hinges upon
his definition of thinking of inquiry. As Mr. Parodi puts it:
He wanted to see intelligence, though asserting
its primacy in human endeavour, only the instrument
of action, the sole effective means of universal
reconstruction in a civilization which he, in spite
of all the denials of today, considers as essen-
tially human, natural and democratic ... 1^0
Knowing, according to Dewey, is something which happens to a
thing in the natural course of its career. Knowing is the
representation of a thing (natural event) by another thing
(natural event). He objects to what he calls a characteristic
assumption of most epistemologies:
that the organ or instrument of knowledge is not a
natural object, but some ready-made state of mind
or consciousness, something purely ’subjective,' a
peculiar kind of existence which lives, moves, and
has its being is a realm different from things to
be known. 1^1
168. Dewey, QFC, 106-107.
169. Ibid., 229.
170. Parodi
,
Art .(1939), 230.
17 JL . Dewey, IDP
,
98.
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In passages such as these Dewey is not arguing against a dual-
istic epistemology, as some, including Lovejoy, have supposed,
but he is arguing against the metaphysical bifurcation of nature
and that is all. Dewey is simply saying, as any idealist would
say, that there is but one realm (one order or kind) of being
or existence. For Dewey that realm is the world of natural
events and mind is just one of these events. Knowing, for Dewey,
is a series of organizing acts of the organism. It is the adjust-
ment of the organism through controlled action in an effort to
restore the equilibrium which has been upset by a doubtful or
problematic situation.
This problem has been discussed in the preceding section
dealing with Dewey’s logical theory. His theory may be stated as
follows: An organism finds itself in a troubled or doubtful sit-
uation. Thinking or inquiry occurs in an effort to find a solu-
tion to the immediate or pressing problem. In other words, the
organism pursues a controlled or directed course of action, bring-
ing into play acquired habits, etc., resulting from past experience.
When the situation is no longer troubled a solution is reached
and inquiry ends. That which brought about the termination of
the doubtful situation is knowledge. It is, to use his term-
inology, warranted assert ibility. The whole purpose of inquiry
is to settle troubled situations and bring the organism as a
whole into a state of unity or coherence. The very process by
which this is done is the process of knowing, or reaching
warranted assert ibility
.
Mere perception is never knowledge for Dewey but "where
there is knowledge another relation is added, that oi one thing
..
.
*
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meaning or signifying another. "172 There is no "immediate
knowledge" such as "apprehension" by "a seizing or grasping,
intellectually, without questioning. "175 Such knowledge is
never immediate but it only appears so because the knower is
forgetting past experience. Actually, "it is a product me-
diated through certain organic mechanisms of retention and
habit, and it presupposes prior experience and mediated con-
clusions drawn from them" 174 Dewey affirms the necessity of
mediation in order to produce warranted assert ions . 175
2. Warranted Assert ibility . Knowledge, for Dewey, consists
of "warranted assertions. "176 a warranted assertion is reached
when inquiry has been satisfactorily terminated. 177 jt does not
mean absolute certainty but rather probability, probability is
"the mark of every proposition effected by inference from the
set of matter-of-fact propositions ... "178 "The interpretation
here advanced is that the kind of situation involved is such as,
in the cont inuum of inquiry, to warrant a probability propo-
sition. "179 jn this latter case Dewey is discussing scientific
subj ect matter. A warranted assertion is then the most likely
or coherent conclusion possible on the basis of the empirical
evidence offered. It is never certainty.
3. Verification . For Dewey, verification consists in
following out a plan of action. It is the process leading to
172. Dewey, EEL, 246.
173. Dewey, LOG, 143.
174. Lo c • c 1 1
•
175. See LOG, 139f, 159f, and others.
176. Dewey, LOG, 4, 9, and others.
177. Ibid., 104-105, 117, and others
.
178. Ibid., 319.
179. Ibid., 472.
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warranted assertibility
. Dewey gives the example of a person
lost in the woods. This is a troubled or doubtful situation. ISO
The problem is to find one’s way home. What is needed is a
practical plan for action which will eventually lead to success.
In this case he points out that the plan for action or idea
is not some little psychical entity or piece of
consciousness-stuff, but is the interpretation of
the locally present environment in reference to
its ab s ent p ort ion
,
that part to which it is
referred as another part so as to give a view of
a whole. ^1
The individual must act. He must do something in this inde-
terminate situation. He follows a plan for action and as a
result eventually comes to familiar surroundings. The sit-
uation is now no longer doubtful for the problem has been
solved. The plan for action has been verified by consequences.
It was not verified until the plan was shown to be valid and
the way out of the troubled situation had been found. As Dewey
says:
The scientifically important thing in the logic
of scientific inquiry is that it was treated simply
as an hypothesis to be employed in directing op-
erations of observation, an idea to be tested of
"proved" by the consequences of these operations . 1°2
No clearer statement of Dewey’s theory of verification can be
found than that of Parodi who sums it up as follows:
Truth is not verified by just any kind of satis-
faction, but only by that satisfaction which is
born of che fact that a working hypothesis or an
experimental method applies to the facts which it
concerns and affords a better ordering of them. No
misconception concerning the instrumental logic of
pragmatism has been more persistent than the belief
that one would want to make of thought merely a
180. Ratner, (ed.), IMW, 941-943.
181. Ibid., 943.
182. Dewey, LOG, 430* supra, 50-51, 80.
.
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means for a practical end, --"practical" being taken
in the sense of certain material utilities, like
drinking and eating. But what Dewey affirms lies
in that rule of logic which refers each thought,
every reflective considerat^pn nto consequences
for final meaning and test
.
,f 183
Dewey’s idea of verification is that of consequences pure and
simple. If the desired result can be or has been attained,
then the plan of action was valid. The result shows that it
was a warranted assertion. Had the plan failed the opposite
would be true and one would have to formulate a new plan for
action and try once again.
4. The Indeterminate Situation . The doubtful or inde-
terminate situation is the one preceding the institution of
inquiry. It will help considerably in understanding Dewey’s
position if an understanding of exactly what he means by this
is at hand. Mr. Dewey was critized by Russell on the following
passage in his Logic concerning the troubled situation.
Situations that are disturbed and troubled, con-
fused or obscure, cannot be straightened out, clear-
ed up and put in order, by manipulation of our
personal states of mind.3-85
The point under consideration is whether a "doubtful situation"
is possible without a "doubter." Dewey replied in an article
as follows:
When the term "doubtful situation" is taken in the
meaning it possesses in the context of my general
theory of experience, I do mean to say that it can
exist without a personal“^oubter . . .186
It is hard to see how a "situation" can be doubtful about any-
183. Parodi, Art. (1939), 233-234; his closing quotation
is from EEL, 330.
184. Russell, ITM, 407.
185. Dewey, LOG, 106.
186. Dewey, Art. (1941), 183.
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thing, yet this seems to be his position. The doubtful belongs
not to us, he says, but to the situation.
E. Metaphysics
1* Definition of Metaphysics . In dealing with metaphysics
it is well to bear in mind that Dewey's whole system must be
taken into account. His psychology, logic, and epistemology
are all an integral part of his philosophical framework which
might also be spoken of as "metaphysics."
In his Experience and Nature
,
Dewey defines metaphysics as:
A statement of the generic traits manifested by
existences of all kinds without regard to their dif-
ferentiation into physical and mental. -*-87
In an article written two years later (1927), he elaborated this
definition into the following:
This is the extent and method of my metaphysics.
The large and constant features of human sufferings,
enjoyments, trials, failures, and successes, to-
gether with the institutions of art, science,
technology, politics, religion which mark them,
and communicate genuine features of the v/orld which
man lives in. 188
The method of obtaining metaphysical knowledge is, of course,
the experimental method of which he says in the former of these
two sources:
Experience as method warns us to give impartial
attention to all of these diversifications. (Political,
religious, etc.) Non-empirica 1 method sets out with
187. Dewey, EAN, 412.
188. Dewey, Art. (1927), 19.
«.
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the assumption that some one of these groupings of
things ia privileged. 189
In his reply to his critics in the Schilpp volume, he says that
the problem of metaphysics is not one of the relation of the
physical or external to the mental or internal. It is rather
the problem of the relation of immediate qualities ( conscious-
ness or Brightman's situations-experienced ) to objects of science
( situat ions-believed-in)
. The latter function as the existen-
tial causal conditions of the former. He insists that all
qualities, even the tertiary ones and, a fortiori, those of
color, are doings of natural conditions . If continuity is a
natural category, the problem of huw specific transitions occur
in the case of qualities is the same sort of problem that is
found in any case of temporal sequence where the latter stage
is qualitatively unlike the earlier one. That qualitative
transitions occur is something characteristic of nature. It
is something to be accepted and not necessarily to be explained .
His view is, he says, "realistically naive. "190 The quality
occurs exactly, in principle, as any natural event, say a
thunderstorm. There is no passage from the physical to the
mental, for the external to something felt or of the nature of
a psychical consciousness, but from objects with one set of
qualities to objects with other qualities . (Italics ours.)
When a quality is called a "sensation" it has been placed in a
specially selected connection, that of being related to an organ-
ism or self. One may not know whether the quality belongs to
189. Dewey, EAN, 15.
190. Dewey, Art. (1939), 599} supra, 70-72.
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any particular* object of the environment. The occurrence of
qualities is a purely natural event. The final reference of
qualities to intra-organic events is itself a reference to one
kind, of object in the natural world. All things may be ex-
plained, in so far as any explanation is possible or required,
on specifiable natural conditions. The great problem to be
explained by other views is f,given a separate existential
realm of consciousness or of the mental, how to get out of it
over into a world that is ’external* to it? tl19 ^ in nature
there is room for contingency and novelty. However, the first
appearance of qualities is unpredictable. The relation between
qualitative things and scientific objects is marked by con-
tingencies, because nature is not a closed box of tight neces-
sities. An element of chance pervades all nature. The prag-
matic answer to this problem is set forth by Hook in the fol-
lowing terms:
Prom the point of view of scientific pragmatism
the fact that we do not accept a deduction as a
valid consequence unless it is ultimately veri-
fied by an examination of the nature of things,
proves that if the agreement between thought and
things, mind and extension, idea and ideatum be
regarded as an article of scientific faith, it is,
if scientific inquiry is to be possible at all, a
necessary article of faith . And a necessary art-
icle of faith is but a different expression for a
matter of utter necessity . 192
2. Need for Metaphysics . That the pragmatist sees clearly
necessity for having a well-developed system is well recognized
by Professor Hook who may be considered an authoritative in-
191. Loc. cit.
192. Hook, MOP, 82-83.
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terpreter of Dewey, since the latter places his unqualified
approval upon the work of the former in this field. Dewey says
that "he (Hook) makes it clear that r instrument s'' denote objects
having a definite existential status and office, and that 'action'
does not cease to be continuous with the energies of nature when
it is expressed in the behavior and habits of a living organism.
.
Hook says:
Unless pragmatism is to experience the same fact which
has befallen the positivism of Comte and the phenom-
enalism of Mach--philosophies proudly and avowedly anti-
metaphysical--it must analyze the implications of what
it means to have a method and examine the generic
traits of existence which make that method a fruitful
one in revealing them. 194
Pragmatism together with evolutionary naturalism and pos-
itivism revolves around the conception of man as homo faber
which sums up his activities as (1) a sign-making animal,
(2) an instrument -using animal, (3) and a "brainy" animal. 195
Pragmatism will stress ways and means, methods and instrumen-
talities. Pragmatism must reject all radical forms of nominal-
istic doctrine for it is committed to the belief in
the objective existence and physical efficiency of
habits, tendencies, and universals, and that sense
impressions must be interpreted as checks and signs
of what things are said and taken to be not as rev-
elations of what they intrinsically are. 196
Pragmatism begins with human thinking and what it means.
It rejects the view of the epiphenomenalist who makes thinking
analogous to physical reflection. Likewise, the pragmatist
193. In Hook, MOP, 4.
194. Hook, MOP, 6.
195. Hook, MOP, 7.
196. Ibid., 8.
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rejects the view of those, meaning the idealists, who look upon
the mind as a "witches cauldron. " Pragmatism is a mediate view,
for thought is to be viewed as an instrument. Metaphysics must
deal first with the instrument and then with the subject matter
or that which is instrumentalized. The only way to approach the
nature of things is through the things which are thought, never
through the act of thinking
.
The problem of the pragmatist becomes clear from all this.
He must show that pragmatism is more than epistemology. If the
pragmatist does not go further, he must suffer the fate of Comte
and Mach. The instrument must also be the basis of an adequate
metaphysics. It must provide a sufficient explanation of "all
that there is," otherwise it is doomed to failure at the start.
It is well to understand what the pragmatist means by
solving a problem. Hook says:
Paradoxical as it may sound, the pragmatist maintains
that a genuine and scientific way of answering ques-
tions in philosophy consists in discovering reasons
why it is irrelevant to ask them.
Prom geometry and time he draws illustrations to show what is
meant by a meaningless question. He concludes that "it is
not a question of truth but of convenience. " Dewey likewise
says:
questions concerning the relation of mind and body
in the knowledge act, of the construction of the
world of physics from sense data, etc., are all
rendered unintelligible in their current expression
as soon as the fundamental assumption shared by all
parties to the discussion is challenged. ^-99
197. Hook, MOP, 11.
198. Ibid., 13.
199. Dewey, EEL, 406
..
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When a problem is held to be artificial or false it is only the
result of a prior metaphysical structure. Whether such a structure
is logical or metaphysical is only a verbal matter. ^00 Here
Mr. Hook would seem to make no distinction between metaphysics
and epistemology, contrary to the statement he has already made.
He goes on to say on the same page (1) that the search for
structure, or thinking is itself a functional operation, (2) the
true character of any structure can only be found by social agree-
ment, (3) and hence, that the structure of the world is not com-
plete. This passage is all-important for the pragmatist as well
»
as for an understanding of pragmatism. Further he says that H in
its ultimate foundations logic becomes metaphysics
.
,f His-
torically, logical systems have not only shown metaphysical
leanings, but have been openly erected upon metaphysical found-
ations •
The metaphysical implications of the pragmatic-
realist logic of leading principles is an open
universe in which there is an element of radical
indetermination, in which physical constants are
• limits of variation and physical laws summations
and prognostications of physical flux... Logic
can never be a closed system so long as science
is not
•
In Experience and Nature Dewey defines "experience" as
the field, the sun and clouds and rain, seed and harvest, and
the man who labors, plans, suffers, and enjoys. 203 Experience
is inclusive of both situations-experiences (consciousness)
and situations-believed-in. On the basis of this broad def-
200. Hook, MOP, 14-15.
201. Ibid., 93.
202. Loc. cit.
203. Dewey, EAN, 28.
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Inition the empirical philosopher sees thinking as "a continuous
process of temporal re-organization within one and the same
world of experienced things. 204 as has said in many places
before, reflection is a natural event, for thinking occurs in
the same way as happenirg s of the planets, as thunder-storms,
etc. Much of the present difficulty is caused by language.
The use of "mind” instead of "mental," and "mentally," that is,
the general use of nouns instead of adjectives and adverbs has
caused endless confusion. The result has been the idea that
"mind" is a "thing" instead of an activity of the organism.
Language has helped greatly in this bifurcation of nature,
against which his philosophy is a protest.
It would be difficult to find a fact more significant
of the traits of nature, more instructive for a natur-
alistic metaphysics of existence, than this cleavage
of the things of human experience into actual but
hard objects, and enjoyed but imagined objects. One
might think that philosophers in their search for
some datum that possesses properties that put it be-
yond doubt, might have directed their attention to
this direct phase of experience, in which objects are
not a matter of sensations, ideas, beliefs or knowl-
edge, but are something had and enjoyed.
His whole system of metaphysics is a protest against splitting
reality in two "with no community and no bridge from one to the
other. "206 Mind is a product of emergent evolution in the
natural history of the organism. It is the result of social
intercourse for "if we had not talked with others and they with
us, we should never talk to and with out selves . " ^07 That " state
204. Loc. cit.
205. Dewey, EAN, 83-84.
206. Ibid., 169.
207. Ibid., 170.
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of things in which qualitatively different feelings are not
just had but are significant of objective differences IS MIND .
"
208
(Italics and emphasis ours.) There is a world of inner experience
but man’s great mistake has been the failure to see that this
world is dependent upon an extension of language. Language, like
money, is a symbol. But before money became a symbol, it was a
physical thing, so also with language. Language "is not a mere
agency for economizing energy in the interaction of human beings.
It is a release and amplification of energies that enter into it,
conferring upon them the added quality of meaning ... "209 But
Dewey’s conception of just what the mental is or how it operates
does not seem to be at all clear even to himself for,
It is difficult to state the exact physiological
mechanism which is involved . But about the fact
there is no doubt . It constitutes the intelligi-
bility of acts and things. Possession of the capacity
to engage in such activity is intelligence . 2^Q
(Italics ours).
It tells very little about the nature of things to say that
"intelligence and meaning are natural consequences of the
peculiar form which interaction sometimes assumes in the case
of human beings. " 2H (Italics ours). Mind is, he says, an
instrumentality which the organism has developed. It is well
to remember that for Dewey, mind is not consciousness. H©
contrasts the two as follows:
While on the psycho-physical level, consciousness
denotes the totality of actualized immediate quali-
tative differences, or "feelings,” it denotes, upon
the plane of mind, actualized apprehensions of
208. Ibid.
,
258.
209. Ibid. 174.
210. Ibid. 179-180.
211. Dewey EAN , 180
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meanings, that is, ideas. There is thus an obvious
difference between mind and consciousness; meaning
and an idea. Mind denotes the whole system of
meanings as they are embodied in the workings of
organic life; consciousness in a being with lang-
uage denotes awareness or perception of meanings;
it is the perception of actual events, whether
past, contemporary or future, in their meanings,
the having of actual ideas. The greater part of
mind is only implicit in any conscious act or state;
the field of mind--of operative meanings--is enorm-
ously wider than that of consciousness. Mind is
contextual and persistent; consciousness is focal
and transitive. Mind is, so to speak, structural,
substantial; a constant background and foreground;
perceptive consciousness is process, a series of
heres and nows. Mind is a constant luminosity; con-
sciousness intermittent, a series of flashes of
varying intensities. Consciousness is, as it were,
the occasional interception of messages continually
transmitted, as a mechanical receiving device selects
a few of the vibrations with which the air is filled
and renders them audible. 21?
For a fuller understanding of the meaning of the "instrument,"
Hook’s treatment will be considered.
3. Metaphysics of the Instrument . Using Blake's print
which shows "The Ancient of Days" circumscribing the boundaries
of the earth. Hook says that besides "frenzied fancy" this
picture also illustrates a profound metaphysical principle.
For it may be given to a primal divinity to create
subject matter with the very instruments which can
only be intelligibly used or applied within that
subject matter and which logically presupposes it. 213
But man for his part must content himself with using instru-
ments whose limits are tentatively assumed.
The instrument functions as a sign and has three distinct
and fundamental references, (a) It is an instrument in reference
212. Dewey, EAN, 303-304 j supra, 85f.
213. Hook, MOP, 17.
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to some thought or Intuition responsible for its construction
and existence as a tool, (b) it is an instrument for some
aggregate of entities or domain of relations in which it is to
be applied, (c) it is an instrument in respect and because of
its form, arrangement or structure. 214 It is in other words a
thing to be used. It has no more significance other than that
one uses the best instrument available for the work at hand.
The purpose of the instrument is to perform properly its
function.
It a tool is a transformative agency it can neither
beget nor devour the existence it modifies; and if
mind is instrumental and efficient in a world scarred
with stria of shifting things and events, it cannot
have created that world. 215
These relations, he goes on, show that nature instrumental-
ized is nature grown or brought to self-consciousness
.
He now comes to the relation of the theory of the instrument
to metaphysics:
If metaphysics then be regarded as an account of the
generic traits of nature, if the categories which
are the basic terms and elements of all scientific
explanation and therefore themselves defy explan-
ation, call rather for metaphysical analysis and
description, then a ’theory of the instrument’,
whether the instrument be regarded as a scientific
contrivance or a fundamental category, in not only
relevant but highly essential to an understanding
of the world we live in. 216
We do not find things locked fast in a complete and closed
system. . .proof positive that the cosmic dish is spleen with
chance
•
214. Ibid., 18.
215. Ibid., 17-18; supra, 67, 106.
216. Ibid., 19.
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For Hook, as for Dewey, then it is evident that there can
be no such thing as metaphysics as an explanation of reality.
The only reality existing is nature itself, and by nature he
means the world of empirical science. There is no plan nor
purpose in nature for the world exists by chance and in his
own words
:
Even if all application is risk and life itself a
gamble, the existence of mechanical agencies proves
that the cards of the universe are not stacked against
us, that the game is on for a genuine stake and that
there are some exciting hands to be played out before
everything becomes extinct in a common doom.^--7
But it seems that Hook's argument for the mechanical agencies
being proof that vie have a fifty-fifty chance is wishful
thinking and contrary to his conclusion. If the cards of the
universe are not stacked against us, then all will not end in
a common doom.
By an instrument he means v/hat Dewey means: "a thing used
as an agency for some concluding event. "218 it reveals both
the surface of things and the principles of organization or
logical articulation with which the stuff of experience is
thickly veined.
As we have intimated the function of the instrument is
to achieve ends impossible without its use, as an airplane is
a means for flying. The instrument tells us something about
the subject matter in which it is applied and in which it
functions. There is an instrument which is best for each
subject matter. There is no difficulty in telling th best
use for the instrument, nor the best instrument to use for the
particular subject matter. Evidently this is a matter of
217. Ibid., 24.
218. Dewey, EAN, 128.
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common sense or intuition for:
Each material has its own idiom determining alike
the generic character of what it can be made to
represent as well as the kind of instruments which
can be used upon it, is so evident in fine and
industrial art that we miss its import. 219
We are perhaps unfair when we use the terms, "common sense"
or "intuition" above. He says it is empirical so we leave it
at that, for:
The point was to show that even in the world of
ordinary social intercourse, particular instruments
are taken not only as signs of instrumental function
but as clues to subject matter as well?20
Further he says that an instrument is a monument to a
felt lack in existence.
It imports therefore an attempt to stabilize and
fasten for future purposes the probable direction
and intent of natural .forces and define for physical
reference the reliable substantive aspects of natural
events . 221
Subject matter may have an order of its own independent of
all else, god, man, or demiurge, but when instruments are ap-
plied to that subject matter it becomes significant. The subject
matter has been instrumentalized. This is important when we
consider thought as an instrument.
The instrument never gives life or career to matter but
it gives matter an opportunity to attain the organized life
and activity of a career. The career is then never finished
so long as potentialities remain dormant. It is the purpose
219.
220 .
221 .
Hook, MOP, 21
Ibid., 22.
Ibid., 22.
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of the instrument to make available and liberalize the careers
of other things.
The instrument has also a faith. This faith extends to
the belief that besides effecting changes in the subject matter
for which the instrument was made, "instruments may be succes-
sively applied to new subject matters and new problems whose
kinship with the old have been unsuspected or overlooked. "222
The instrument presupposes a certain differentiation in
both structure and function and this has metaphysical conse-
quences. "It emphasizes the facts of immanent teleology and
leads to a reaffirmation of the naturalistic doctrine of
Aristotle purified of its ethical expression. "223 As well as
natural selection of the thing, there is also human selection,
for human selection is not natural with respect to the thing
selected.
Instrumentation can be most effective only when
the continuities of natural growth as well as our
interpretation of them reach certain stopping
places or resting places in the light of which,
not by the power of which, the direction of the
movement seems purposeful, i.e., capable of de-
veloping into what it does develop. ^24
The value qualities of judgments cannot be derived from the
preferred objects.
The instrument shows forth its own history of continuity.
The eye, ear, etc., are instruments for seeing, hearing, etc.
Without any break or sudden leap, thought or
inference steps in as an instrument in piercing
stray hints together, manipulating things, men-
tally reconstructing the situation in order to
discover what is spatially beyond and temporally
T!22. Hook, MOP, 25.
223. Ibid., 26$ supra, 27.
224. Ibid., 27.
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remote* Therefore what is true of all instru-
ments is true of thought as an instrument . 225
His purpose is to make thought no more and no less than the
knife which is best for cutting leather or the hammer for
driving nails. Thought is an instrument for working over
subject matter. The subject matter acted upon by thought
does not result in "idea” but new subject matter which is the
result of the "thought -instrumentalization.
"
He summarizes by saying:
That instrumentalities can never become trans-
muted into irrecoverable certainties, for their
effective application depends upon definite ob-
jective environmental traits as well as upon the
passing needs and purposes of those who live and
react in that environment . ^26
The instrument is also self-critical, always correcting
and adapting itself to the subject matter. If an instrument
could speak it would insist "that all scientific and meta-
physical explanation is an exhaustive description of a
natural fact... "^27 Instruments are not ends in themselves
but are the effects of prior changes and intentions as well
as the means to further changes which in their turn are in-
struments also.
Professor Hook sums up the position of Dewey on instru-
ments in the following words:
All of those things which appear in the garb of
shining immediacy, whether it be precious stones
or metals, the sensations of traditional empiri-
cism, or the sense data which have become the
225. Hook, MOP, 28
226. Ibid., 30.
227. Ibid., 30-31.
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counters and money of contemporary philosophic
exchange, are, as Professor Dewey has on so many
occasions shown, end-terms analyzed out for def-
inite scientific purposes by means of physical or
analytical instruments from impure, unrefined and
loosely delimited segments of experience. 22^
Hook now turns to the subject of communication. Words, he
says, are instruments used to render other instruments more
effective. He concludes his consideration of the instrument
by saying:
Every instrumental operation, whether it be scientific
or artistic, industrial or personal, implies an order
to which it owes its existence and an order in virtue
of which its ends are realized.
The instrument enables us by the utilization of nature to
create new ends by the mechanics of transformation. With all
this behind him, Mr* Hook turns to the relation between, or
rather the similarity of thought to any other instrument.
(1) The instrument is used to eliminate certain difficulties
and to transform possibilities into actualities. Thinking
likewise takes place in indeterminate situations to fix belief
by effecting a relative stability in subject matter. (2) The
instrument does not make over existence but is mediate in
nature and operation. So also thinking is essentially mediate
acting upon the immediately given, not known . (3) The con-
struction and application of the instrument implies an anterior
knowledge of laws and processes other than those it is to dis-
cover. So the presence of effective thought presupposes a
whole body of prior knowledge which is used to clarify the
presentations of sense and convert them into knowledge terms.
228. Hook, MOP, 33
229. Ibid., 38.
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(4) There is continuity and coherence among the parts of a
machine. Coherence is necessary for thought's satisfactory
completion. (5) There is an organic unity in the instrument
which gives impetus and direction to growth and improvement.
The living moment of thought results from its mediate character.
(6) Both instruments and thoughts represent the social character
of experience. With the former the reference to action is open
and unquestioned; with the latter it is - indirect and removed.
(7) Instruments may be taken from their context and made to set
up aesthetic goods. So also thinking may be separated from
vital problems and become an immediate instrument of enjoyment.
He concludes that thought cannot be epiphenomenal but
that ( 1 ) it is of the same generic order as the object to which
it is applied
, (2) it implies an incomplete system of relation-
ships among things, (3) it must forego all claims to finality
and accept its status as an instrument striving for greater
effectiveness.
The three generic references of thinking as instrumental
he summarizes thus: (1) thinking is an instrument in reference
to some non-cognitive experience, (2) with respect to and be-
cause of its mode of functional activity, (3) whose exercise
is conditioned by certain structural organizations in nature.
We use good thinking because it is more fruitful. Hook speaks
as if "good thinking" were a "thing;” for him it is a natural
..
.
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event. We cannot take our* standards of either logic or ethics
out of this v/orld of matter, mind, and motion.
In the Schilpp volume, Mr. Murphy has this to offer on
Dewey 1 s system:
There is nevertheless a skeleton in the closet of
this admirably planned metaphysics, which has
seriously compromised its good repute and thus
given aid and comfort to its speculative rivals. It
consists in an unhappy discrepancy between ex-
perience as it ought to be if its place in the
natural world is to be made intelligible, and ex-
perience as it must be if Dewey’s epistemology is
correct, m the former, "experience" is the es-
sential link between man and the world which long
antedates his appearance in it. m the latter,
"experience" is the terminus of all knowing, in the
sense that all our cognitive claims refer ultim-
ately to what experience will show itself to be in
a ’resolved' situation and to nothing else. If this
latter account is true, all statements about a
natural environment outside of these immediate ex-
periences become on analysis simply means of facil-
itating cognitive transitions to such enjoyed Im-
mediacies and the world which should have provided
the background for our experience, and the measure
of its metaphysical significance, "collapses into
immediacy," and Mr. Dewey’s naturalism reduces, as
Mr. Santayana has said, to a "philosophy of the
foreground. ”230
4. Concept of Nature . As early as 1905, Dewey called
himself a "natural realist. "231 in 1907 in a letter to James
he contrasts his "naturalistic pragmatism" with the "humanistic"
type. 232 jn hi 3 discussions with Santayana, he called his
philosophy "empirical naturalism" or "naturalistic empiricism.
In EAN, Rev. he upholds this view.
Negatively his doctrine is the rejection of anything
"supernatural." He rejects any idea of the supernatural as
230. Murphy, Art. (1939), 221.
231. Dewey, Art. (1905) , 324-327.
232. Perry, TCWJ, II, 528.
233. Dewey, Art 1927 ) 57.
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an "encumbrance" in his A Common Faith * ^34 In most of his major
writings for the past thirty years, he has opposed the super-
natural which is the realm of "striving, transciency, and frus-
tration. "235 it is the world of the imagination.
He, likewise, rejects the older mechanistic materialism.
Historically speaking, materialism and mechanistic
metaphysics--as distinct from mechanistic science--
designate the doctrine that matter is the efficient
cause of life and mind, and that "cause" occupies a
position superior in reality to that of "effect."
Both parts of this statement are contrary to fact.
As far as the conception of causation is to be in-
troduced at all, not matter but the natural events
having matter as a character, "cause" life and mind.'^6
Matter is not a metaphysical cause but a character of natural
events. The "dead matter moved under the impulse of insen-
sate forces is now discredited" and the principle of indeter-
minacy of modern physics was "the final step of its dislodge-
ment."^7 Nature is not a mechanism in that older coneeption
of the term, but "something problematic, undecided, still go-
ing on and as yet unfinished and indeterminate."^© Nature is
amenable to intelligent human control. ?39 The supernatural
is defined as "that which lies beyond experience . "^40 it will
be seen that the definition of "supernatural" depends upon
the prior definition of "experience," and Dewey defines ex-
perience as
The entire organic agent-patient in all its
interaction with the environment natural and
social .. .Experiencing is just certain modes of
interaction, or correlation of natural objects
among which the organism happens, so to say.
234. Dewey, CF, 6.
235. Dewey
,
EAN , 55; CF, 48.
236. Ibid. 262.
237. Dewey QFC, 98, 110, 204.
238. Dewey, EAN, 348-349.
239. Dewey QFC , 106.
240. Dewey, Art. (1930), 177.
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to be one. It follows with equal force that
experience means primarily not knowledge, but
ways of doing and suffering . 241
Consciousness, he holds, is but a small portion of experi-
ence. Experience includes all the physical features of the
environment extending in space and time as well as all the
habits and interests of the organism. 242 Qn the basis of this
the " supernatural " is much like a "transcendent" object in the
philosophy of Kant. It is beyond all possible experience and
if it exists, must be unknowable. The supernatural lies beyond
all possibility of interaction with the organism.
a. Nature, then, for Dewey is a totality which includes
(1) the physical, (2) the psycho-physical, and (3) the mental. 243
It is the sum total of all events. It is a single system subject
to the same causal laws. It includes physical nature and also
man, as well as mathematical and logical objects and values. 244
Its boundaries are co-terminous with what can be experimentally
verified. 245
b. Nature is a temporal process. It is a "history which
is a succession of histories . "246 phe natural is what occurs.
"Every existence is an event. "247 phe world is in the process
of tranformation. 248 phe permanent is merely those things
which undergo change more slowly than others. 249
241. Dewey
,
Cl, 36-37.
242. Dewey EEL, 6-7$ supra.
243. Dewey, EAN
,
261.
244. Dewey, 4FC, 195.
245. Ibid. 197.
246. Dewey, EAN, 100.
247. Ibid. 71.
248. Dewey, EPP, 56-57.
249. Dewey, EAN, 71.
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c. Nature is continuous. There is no breach of con-
tinuity between operations of inquiry and physical oper-
ations. 8^ "The primary postulate of a naturalistic theory
of logic is continuity of the lower and the higher activities
and forms. "251 Experience has temporal continuity.'"88
The continuity of nature is basic in his thought. "The
intelligent activity of man is not something brought to bear
upon nature from without; it is nature realizing its own proba-
bilities in behalf of a fuller and richer issue of events." 888
A naturalistic metaphysics is bound to consider reflection as
itself a natural event occurring within nature "because of traits
of the latter. "254 Nature, on the basis of this principle is
a system.
d. Nature contains real novelties. Nature is inde-
terminate, if it were not so, perception, knowledge, and experi-
ment would be impossible. 888 There are emergents in nature such
as life, association, communication, participation and mind.
Mind is a real novelty-- 888 a functional character of natural
events at the state of widest and most complex interaction. 887
5. Definition of Nature . It will be seen from this study
that "nature" is an all-inclusive term for both Woodbridge and
Dewey. Both are influenced by the Aristotelian view of nature
250. Dewey, LOG, 19; supra
,
46f •
251. Ibid.
,
23.
252. Ibid. 245.
253. Dewey, QFC, 214 -215.
254. Dewey, EAN, 68; supra. 48.
255. Ibid. 348-349; supra. 27, 62f
•
256. Dewey, EAN
,
272 -273; Cl, 66.
257. Dewey, EAN, vi, 75.
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achieving ends.^58 woodbridge has a fairly well developed
theory of natural teleology .^9 Dewey views nature in much
the same way, as always producing novelties. 260 The dynamic
view of nature pervades modern naturalism. Both these think-
ers reject the older rigid mechanistic view of nature. 261 por
Woodbridge, nature may be considered a synonym for God, as in
the thought of Spinoza. For Dewey, nature is likewise an all-
inclusive term, but it is not synonymous with God, since he does
reserve and use that term as an impersonal object of religious
devotion. The exact way in which he defines "God" will be taken
up in the next chapter. It is evident from this discussion that
these two naturalists mean different things by "nature." They in
turn differ from other naturalists, as was shown above. 268
Obviously all of these cannot be accepted as satisfactory. It
is evident from this that no definition of nature has as yet been
found which is acceptable to all naturalists. They do, however,
agree on the denial of the existence of a personal God.
Probably the most satisfactory definition would be the one
suggested by Kant. Nature, for him, is the universe as organized
in sense experience. This is a possible definition also, ac-
cording to Webster’s Dictionary
,
where nature is defined narrowly
as "the totality of physical reality, exclusive of minds and the
mental." Were this the accepted definition, then all values,
morals, all mental states, would be outside the realm of nature.
258. Supra, 27.
259. Supra, 62f.
260. Supra, 184.
261. Supra, 73, 182-183.
262. Supra, 2-3; Krikorian (ed.), NHS, 357-358.
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But these naturalists would reject this definition because they
root everything in nature.
Woodbridge comes close to this definition when he says
that nature is ’'pre-eminently the visible world. "^3 But "pre-
eminently” does not mean completely and he goes on to include
all mental events in nature as well. Were this definition
adopted, much confusion would no doubt be avoided. However,
since naturalists do not seem to feel the need for agreement
on what the term ’’nature” should include, there is little pros-
pect of an exact definition in the near future.
P . Summary
According to Dewey, the general purpose of philosophy is
”to reintegrate human knowledge and activity in the general
framework of reality and natural processes . "264 philosophy is
the great logic of experience. It is criticism of criticisms.
It is the development of an instrument to cope with all the
problems of men.
Dewey was interested in psychology before he turned to the
field of philosophy. In his early life he supported the older
soul psychology, but rejected this view under the influence of
James and Angell, turning to a functional, or even behavioristic
type.
Thinking, according to Dewey, is a kind of activity the
organism performs at specific need. Thinking arises in a
doubtful situation. The function of mind is to build and develop
263. Woodbridge, EON, 60; supra, 46.
264. Supra, 122.
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useful habits. Dewey has no clearly developed psychology but
shifts about among (a) functionalism (b) behaviorism, and
(c) self-psychology. 265
Mind is, for Dewey, a natural event. He defines four levels
in the process of its development: (1) The Psycho-physical or-
ganism, (2) the level of sensitivity, (3) the level of feeling,
and (4) mind. ^6 Mind emerges in the process of evolution.
Dewey's logic is the result of his theory of reflective
thought. It is the development of an instrument to be used in
"controlled inquiry." His logic is called "experimental." It
it logic not of a separate world of thought but a logic of
"natural events. "267 jn Hi g Logic, Dewey uses the term "inquiry"
which is to be taken as synonymous with "thought." This work is
his development of the instrument by which the organism controls
the indeterminate or doubtful situation in which it finds itself.
He outlines what he considers logic and develops his theory on
the assumption that inquiry operates within the one existential
matrix. The principle of continuity is basic. All logical
forms are developed within the very processes of inquiry itself.
They accrue to subject matter.
The purpose of inquiry is to reach "warranted assertions"
which, for Dewey, is truth. The "scientific method" which he
uses may be interpreted in two ways: (1) The laboratory method
of the physicist or chemist, or (2) the method of reaching
265. Supra, 125-135
266. Supra, 136.
267. Supra, 138-139
268. Supra, 146-150
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"coherent wholes" by the "adequate satisfaction of logical
conditions imposed by controlled inquiry," or "probability"
knowledge
.
Dewey’s epistemology is based upon his theory of inquiry.
Knowing, he says, is a kind of doing: "A mode of practical
action. "270 Verification is a matter of consequences. Only
when the desired conclusion has been reached and the problem
solved is a plan of action shown to have been warranted .271
Knowing begins with a troubled situation and culminates when
the situation is no longer doubtful.
Metaphysics, for Dewey, may be taken as an account of the
characteristics of existences all of which he calls "natural
events .
^
He explains all objects of experience as "natural."
Sidney Hook in his The Metaphysics of Pragmatism develops and
systematizes this field to a large extent. His work may be
summed up as "the metaphysics of the instrument' 1 or "instru-
mentalism. "
Dewey defines his system as "empirical naturalism" or
"naturalistic empiricism. "973 rejects both the "super-
natural" and "mechanistic materialism." Nature can be changed,
worked over, by intelligent human control. The natural is
what is "experienced," while the " supernatural " is beyond
possible experience, and hence unknowable. Nature may be
269. Supra, 162-153.
270. Supra, 158-161; Dewey, QFC, 106-107.
271. Supra, 162t163.
272. Supra, 165-167.
273. Supra, 181-182.
”
.
.
.
.
*
#
.
•
.
•
•
.
.
C,* , 4
:*»* M
v i a
.
t VC
,4r «V
* > •
•
189
summed up as: (a) a totality which includes the (1) physical,
(2) psycho-physical, and (3) mental; (b) the complete temporal
process; (c) continuity, and (d) the home of novelties or
emergent s . 274
G. Criticism
There are several criticisms which may be offered of Dewey’s
system.
1. The all-inclusiveness of nature. 275 Nature is defined
as the realm which includes all events. Hence, nature is in a
definite sense, all-that-there-is
. It is the physical, psycho-
physical, and mental, which does not define any one of them
properly.
2. Dewey's psychology is somewhat confused. He conceives
of mind in three different ways, (a) as a function of the organism
*
or a tool for organic adjustment, (b) as the behavior of the
organism, for knowledge "lives in the muscles, not in con-
sciousness , "276 ( c ) as a self. In his Ethics he constantly
speaks of the "self," as well as in other places. 277 it cannot
be said then that Dewey had a consistent psychological theory.
3. Dewey mentions some characteristics of mind which are
hardly in keeping with functional and behavioristic psychology.
Consciousness is not mind, but it fimctions at all levels of
experience. It is hard to see how mind as behavioristic or
274. Supra, 183-184.
275. Supra, 182-184.
276. Dewey, HNC, 177; supra 127, 132.
277. Supra, 134; Dewey, ETH, 315; CP, 17; Ratner (ed.)PJD, 85.
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even functional can be conscious, united, aware, capable of
manipulating meanings, transcendent over both space and time,
and able to strive for ends. Mind is conscious, thinking,
willing, and feeling, all of which suggests strongly the self-
p sychology . 27 8
4. Allport points out that, for Dewey, there is no ego
behind the actions of the individual. There exists no self
"separate from musculature." 279 Dewey himself says that knowl-
edge "lives in the muscles not in consciousness." 280 The only
unifying agent he recognizes is musculature. Just how the
muscles can unify the organism is rather hard to understand.
Thinking, remembering, anticipating, willing, in fact, all that
seems necessary to a self, are conscious actions, not muscula-
ture. The self seems to live in the activity of self-conscious-
ness rather than in muscular activity.
5. Dewey insists that reflective thought arises only in
response to the doubtful or in a troubled situation. This seems
to be contrary to fact. Thinking occurs spontaneously as many
have demonstrated. Furthermore this view is contrary to what
Dewey says in the previous point. What he says is far more than
can be said on a functional view of thinking
.
6. Mind-body problem. The best one can say for his solution
of the mind -body problem is that it is verbal. To say that there
is no distinction between them but that all is one realm does
278. Supra, 137.
279. Supra, 127.
280. Supra, 132.
281. Supra, 129-134
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not describe the facts. This is simply stretching the term
"nature" until it covers both mental, physical, and psycho-
physical events. It simply assumes that they all fall with this
category of nature, as they must, if nature is defined as in-'
elusive of, all events. But such definition, in no way explains
the presence of either or both, nor their relation with the
totality of nature.
Hocking offers some important and interesting differences
between mental events and physical event s;^82 (1) Mental events
observe themselves; bodily events do not; (2) Bodily events are
in space; mental events are not; (3) Bodily events are in the
present only; mental events are extended in time to the past and
the future; (4) Bodily events are facts; mental events are facts
with meanings . Dewey says that both kinds of events are found
within nature. This does nothing about their basic differences.
Dewey is guilty of the same fallacey with which he has often
charged the supernaturalists --the fallacy of hypostatizat ion.
He has said that they have made certain aspects of experience
into realities. Forms and Essences. Classification, he says,
has nothing to do with existence. ^83 But Dewey is himself
trying to account for mind by classifying it as a natural event.
7. Dewey says that logic is able to develop its own logical
forms. He rejects the eternal validity of the laws of contra-
diction, identity, and excluded middle, holding that they too
"represent conditions which have been ascertained during the
282. Hocking, TOP, 98-100.
283. Dewey, QFC, 35.
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conduct of inquiry. n2y4 This seems to be a rejection of the
rationality of the universe.
8.
In his Logic and elsewhere too, Dewey never clearly
describes the function of mental states. At times he gives
the "mental" no status at all. 2®^
9. Dewey’s experimental or scientific method of inquiry
is not clearly defined. It may be taken either in a narrow
or a broad sense. In the latter it is comparable to the
coherence criterion of E. S. Brightman; in the former, it is
similar to the method of the scientific laboratory
.
10. Dewey’s conception of knowing as a kind of doing is
based upon his logical theory. Since his theory of inquiry is
weak, his epistemology can be questioned at the same time.
11. Dewey says that inquiry or thinking is the response
of the organism to a doubtful situation. Reflective thinking,
he holds, is never spontaneous • ^87 There is no occasion to
think until some obstacle needs to be overcome and thinking
arises to serve the need of the situation. Paul E. Johnson
gives a cogent criticism of this position.
But reason does not oversleep so long as that.
Daydreaming uses imaginative reason in autistic
thinking. Subconscious motives work with clever
reasons to gain their desires. Reason is not a
separate faculty, standing aloof as a deus ex
machina until called to meet a crisis. Some
degree of reasoning is present in all conscious
experience that relates fleeting impressions into
meaning. There is no sharp line of demarcation
between experience and reason, for reason is the
coherent sense of experience . ^88
284. Supra, 151-152.
285. Supra, 141.
286. Supra, 153-158.
287. Supra, 139-140.
288. Johnson, POR, 172.
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12. Dewey’s definition of experience is broad and con-
fusing. For him, "experience" includes anything that may
affect an organism at any time.^89
13. Dewey admits difficulty in stating the exact physio-
logical mechanism "involved in thinking." He is definitely
vague at this point.
14. The naturalistic philosophy is pessimistic about the
future of humanity. Eventually all will become extinct in a
"common doom."^^ Human endeavor is sufficient, naturalists
say, to solve all problems that arise, yet they hold to the
ultimate doom of humanity. There is no hope for the future.
At the same time they criticize theists who see infinite worth
in man, and believe in the supernatural as a hope and guarantee
of the future.
289. Supra, 143,170-171.
290. Supra, 172.
291. Supra, 175.
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CHAPTER VI
APPLICATION TO THE FIELD OF VALUES
A. General Theory of Value
The problem of values is the possibility of formulating
scientific propositions about the direction of human conduct.
The whole problem was prompted by the elimination of value-
conceptions from nonhuman phenomena. For centuries, he says,
nature was supposed to be what it is "because of the presence
within it of ends
.
This is clearly the Aristotelian view
of nature. ^ But from about the seventeenth century teleology
was gradually eliminated from natural science and the problem
of values became a separate problem. From then on, he says,
the problem of valuation was associated with the sciences of
human activities and human relations. Values were located
in the "mental" or "psychical" field as opposed to the "phys-
ical. It is this "bifurcation" of experience that has
caused the modern problem of values. Dewey holds that on the
basis of his naturalistic philosophy, the problem of values
more or less disappears. For example, one need not debate
the question of the objectivity of values because nature is
the matrix "within which our ideal aspirations are born and
bred."^ All values arise with experience, remembering, that,
1. Dewey, Art. (1939)1, 2.
2. Supra, 27.
3. Dewey, Art. ( 1939 ) , 3.
4. Dewey, CF, 85.
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for Dewey, experience is more than consciousness, and includes
anything that may affect an organism at any time.
Let desires, skills, purposes, beliefs be what
they will, what happens is the product of the
interacting intervention of physical conditions
like soil, sea, mountains, climate, tools and
machines, in all their vast variety, with the
human factor.
^
The true worth of the goods presented by experience is not im-
mediately given. ^ Likings and desires conflict and discrimin-
ation between them is necessary. There is a basic distinc-
tion between "desired" and "desirable” for.
To say that something is enjoyed is to make a state-
ment about a fact, something already in existence;
it is not to judge the value of that fact. ..But to
call an object a value is to assert that it satisfies
or fulfils certain conditions. 7
1. Logic and Values . The function of thinking or inquiry
in value-experience is "the formulation of a judgment of value
in which particular satisfactions are placed as integral parts
of conduct as a consistent harmonious whole. ”8 The great dif-
ficulty in the development of past theories of values was the
failure to use the scientific method of inquiry.
Pre-scientific ideas and beliefs in morals and pol-
itics are, moreover, so deeply ingrained in tra-
dition and habits and inst itutions, that the impact
of scientific method is feared as something pro-
foundly hostile to mankind’s dearest and deepest
interests and values. 9
Many philosophies of the past have maintained and still do main-
5.
6 .
7.
8 .
9.
Dewey, LOG, 492.
Dewey, See ETH, 318-319.
Dewey, QFC, 260; see also 261 and others.
Dewey, ETH> 228.
Dewey, LOG, 77.
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tain that bhe domain of values is "wholly apart from any pos-
sibility of application of scientific methods.” 10 Dewey takes,
of course, the opposing point of view. He insists that the
only possible way to develop an adequate theory of values is
by the application of his experimental method of inquiry as
developed in his Logic . ”It is not urged that attainment of
a unified logic, a theory of inquiry, will resolve the split
in our beliefs and procedures. But it is affirmed that it will
not be resolved without it . 1,11 ( Italics ours.) The importance
of a proper theory of values is found in the fact that value
judgments enter into all final judgments. "There is no inquiry
that does not involve judgments of practice." 1 ^ The failure to
apply scientific inquiry to the field of social inquiry is due
to the "practical difficulties in the way of experimental
method in the case of social phenomena as compared with phy-
sical investigations." 1^
Nevertheless, every measure of policy put into oper-
ation is, logically
,
and should be actually, of the
nature of an experiment. For Cl) it represents the
adoption of one out of a number of alternative con-
ceptions as possible plans of action, and (2) its
execution is followed by consequences which, while
not as capable of definite or exclusive differen-
tiation as in the case of physical experimentation,
are none the less observable within limits, so they
may serve as tests of the validity of the conception
acted upon. 1^
2. Criterion of Yalue. The general criterion of value is
10. Dewey, LOG, 77-78.
11. Ibid.
,
79.
12. Ibid. 174.
13. Ibid., 508.
14. Ibid. 508-509.
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"the whole situation in which the desire takes effect." 15 But
there is also an appeal to consequences for the pragmatic el-
ement is never forgotten by Dewey. "The moral quality of any
impulse or active tendency can be told only by observing the
sort of consequences to which it leads in actual practice." 16
In every case of valuation there is involved observation of
"actual materials" and an estimate of their "potential force"
in the production of a "particular result." 1^
3. Organization of Values . Values, according to Dewey,
cannot be arranged into any system or hierarchy. We cannot
draw up a catalogue and say that
such and such goods are intrinsically and always
ideal, and such and such other ones inherently base
because material. There are circumstances under which
enjoyment of a value called spiritual because it is
associated with religion is mere indulgence; when
its good, in other words, becomes one of mere sen-
suous emotion. There are occasions when attention
to the material environment constitutes the ideal
good because that is the act which thoroughgoing
inquiry would approve. 16
Inquiry cannot determine true goods, once for all and so develop
any such table of values, arranged in unchangeable order from
higher to lower. Values have to be rearranged in terms of the
conditions of the concrete situation in which they arise. Dewey
makes no distinction between instrumental and intrinsic good.
There are several reasons for this position.
a. Means -consequences is a "single undivided situation."
1 ®
15. Dewey
,
ETH, 385.
16. Ibid. 250-251.
17. Dewey, Art. (1939)
18. Dewey, ETH, 230.
19. Dewey, EAN, 397.
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Means and consequences bear an organic relation to each other. 20
Every value is both an end and a means.
The doctrine of fixed ends not only diverts attention
from examination of consequences and the intelligent
creation of purpose, but, since means and ends are two
ways of regarding the same actuality, it also renders
men careless in their inspection of existing con-
ditions.
Ends are "terminals of deliberation, and so turning-points in
activity
.
"22 objects have a two-fold character; they have a
"direct individual and unique nature" as well as "relations or
continuities. They may be both enjoyed in the present and
potential means of later experiences. The great trouble with
theories that make a sharp distinction between ends and means
is "the failure to make an empirical investigation of the
actual conditions under which desires and interests arise and
function, and in which end-objects, ends-in-view, acquire their
actual contents. "24
b. Ideals and economic ends . The regarding of economic
ends as merely instrumental has resulted in "the obnoxious
materialism and brutality of our economic life. "25 such values
must be recognized as intrinsic also. Only then is life worth
while. Dewey develops this point in The Quest for Certainty .
4. Value and Desire . The cause of desire is always a
lack in the existing situation. Valuation takes place only
when there is something the matter, only when there is some
20. Ibid.
,
367-368.
21. Dewey HNC , 232-233
22. Ibid. 223.
23. Dewey QFC, 236-237
24. Dewey Art. ( 1939
)
1
,
25. Dewey RIP, 171.
26. See QFC, 280-281.
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trouble to be done away with, or some need to be made good.
Desire comes only when there is "some conflict of tensions to
be resolved by means of changing existing conditions
.
There
is always present a factor of inquiry whenever there is val-
uation.
The difficulty or problem of present value theory is that
mentalistic psychology has led to the reduction of values to
feelings. Values have been treated "as merely mental states. "^8
"When they are so taken (and only then), ends, needs, and satis-
factions are affected in a way that distorts the whole theory
of valuation. Dewey’s protest is against taking values as
mere feelings
,
and forgetting their existential status. "An
end, aim, or purpose as a mental state is independent of the
biological and physical means by which it can be realized. "^0
But in this statement, Dewey has omitted entirely the word
"merely" which seems so necessary and which he himself uses
d)Ove. The want or desire should not be treated as a mere state
of mind, instead of something lacking in the situation . Thus
the needful is what is existentially necessary if an end-in-
view (or ideal) is to be brought into actual existence. The
ideal is always a possibility of existence for Dewey. The ideal
cannot be found by examination of a state of mind but only by
examination of the actual conditions of the particular situation.
Satisfying a desire means meeting the conditions of the needful
27. Dewey, Art. (1939)^, 34.
28. Ibid., 36.
29. Loc. cit.
30. Loc. cit.
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or troubled situation.
5. Value and Existence . Ideals ar° "continuous with
natural events."^ They are the possibilities of natural events.
"The relation between objects as known and objects with respect
to value is that between the actual and the possible. The
actual is made of given conditions; the possible stands for ends
or consequences which may be brought into existence by the
actual. The possible is thus the ideal with respect to any
given situation. "If we agree to leave out the eulogistic
savor of 'ideal’ and define it in contrast with actual, the
possibility denoted by an idea is the ideal phase of the ex-
istent. "33 gut what has happened in actual experience has been
the hypostatization of the "ideal."
•
This hypostizat ion TsicJ has affected the three most
generalized forms of appreciation and produced the
concepts of the Good, the True and the Beautiful as
ontological absolutes. 34
According to Dewey, the basis for this is simply the "appre-
ciation of concrete consurmnatory ends. "35 The ideal is, for
him, the possible, not any absolute ontological existence.
There is no absolute end-in-view or goal. "As long as actual
events were supposed to be judged by comparison with some
absolute end-value as a standard or norm, no sure progreee was
made. "36 The only way to discover norms is by analytic ob-
servation of existing conditions. The results of experimenta-
31. Dewey, EEL, 336-337.
32. Dewey
,
QFC, 299.
33. Ibid. 300.
34. Dewey LOG, 177.
35. Loc. cit.
36. Dewey Art
.
(1939)1,
•.
.
.
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tion "form the content of the specific end-in-view, not some
abstract standard or ideal. "37
6. Objectivity of Values . Dewey is opposed to the ob-
jectivity of values in the sense of their being already in a
realm of Being as is pointed out in the above section. His
rejection of the "supernatural" is directed against such a
conception. "Nature has intelligible order as its possession
in the degree in which we by our own overt operations realize
potentialities contained in it. "38 But Dewey has a "kind" of
objectivity
.
a. Values are more than personal likings . Values must
have the objectivity of cognitive beliefs. 39
b. Social objectivity . Values are socially objective.
The projection and realization of ideals is a process extending
through generations of continuous effort.
The things in civilization we must prize are not
ourselves. They exist by grace of the doings and
sufferings of the continuous human community in
which we are a link. 4 ^
The responsibility of the present is the conservation and
expansion of such values for their transmission to future gen-
erations. Values are objective also in that they have a def-
inite influence upon human conduct. 41
c. Natural objectivity . Values are objective in the
sense that they are natural. They are rooted in natural con-
37. Lo c • cit
•
38. Dewey, QFC, 215.
39. Dewey, EAN, 424-425.
40. Dewey
,
CP, 87.
41. Ibid. 48.
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ditions. They are made "out of the hard stuff of the world of
physical and social experience • "42 Man’s labors on behalf of
the ideal are "the doing of the universe" because man is a part
of it. Dewey sums up his theory in this way: that (1) the
problem of valuation in general as well as in particular cases
concerns things that sustain to one another the relation of
means -ends; that (2) ends are determinable only on the ground
of the means that are involved in bringing them about; and that
(3) desires and interests must themselves be evaluated as means
in their interaction with external or environing conditions.
Ends-in-view, as distinct from ends as accomplished results,
themselves function as directive means, or plans. There is,
he concludes, no final theory of valuation. The theory must grow
and be improved by continuous and critical methods of investi-
gation. When all this is done.
The break will disappear, the gap be filled, and
science be manifest as an operating unity in fact
and not merely in idea when the conclusions of
impersonal nonhumanistic science are employed in
guiding the course of distinctively human behavior,
that namely, which is influenced by emotion and
desire in the framing of means and ends; for desire,
having end-in-view, and hence involving valuations,
is the characteristic that marks off human from
non human behavior. On the other side, the science
that is put to distinctively human use is that in
which warranted ideas about the nonhuman world are
integrated with emotion as human traits. In this
integration not only is science itself a value but
it is the supreme means of the valid determination
of al^ valuations in all aspects of human and social
42. Ibid., 49.
43. Dewey, EAN, 420.
44. Dewey, Art
.
( 1939
)
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B. Religious Values
1. The Religious Object
. The subject of religious values
warrants special and more extensive consideration, especially
because of the importance of the nature of the religious object.
The ideal had been defined as a ’’possibility of existence” re-
alized through the use of natural means by man who is a part of
nature. The objective of faith for Dewey is the active re-
lationship between the ideal and the actual. This union is his
”God •
»
We are in the presence neither of ideals completely
embodied in existence nor yet of ideals that are
utopias. For there are forces in nature and society
that generate and support ideals. They are further
unified by the action that gives them coherence and
solidity. It is this active relation between ideal
and actual to which I would give the name ”God.”^6
There are goods in nature but they need to be developed. The
only way this can be done is by ”a clear and intense conception
of a union of ideal ends with actual conditions...” 4^ It is
this concept ion--that the actual may become the ideal--that
arouses man and spurs him on. It is the function of such a
working union of the ideal and actual which is "identical with
the force that has in fact been attached to the conception of
God in all the religions that have a spiritual content ...
"
4&
God is not a particular Being but the unity of all ideal ends
arousing us to desires and actions. 4 ^ This is not the unity to
be found in one Being but ’’the unity of loyalty and effort
45. Dewey, CF, 43.
46. Ibid., 50-51.
47. Loc. cit.
48. Ibid., 52.
49. Ibid., 42.
,.
.
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evoked by the fact that many ends are one in the power of their
ideal... "50 The meaning of the term is selective. It "selects
those factors in existence that generate and support our ideal
of good as an end to be striven for. "51
There are times, however, when the object of religious
devotion becomes practically the whole of nature. Dewey speaks
of the "Universe" as such an object. 52 "The ideal means, as
we have seen, a sense of these encompassing continuities with
their infinite reach. "53 work of art elicits and accentu-
ates this quality of being a whole and bf belonging to the
larger, all inclusive, whole which is the universe in which we
live. "54 The suggestion that the religious object is either a
part or the whole of nature is found elsewhere as well. 55 what-
ever else the religious object may be, for Dewey, it is not a
person. The question whether Dewey is a theist was debated a
few years ago in The Christian Century . Dewey entered- the
debate and said that he was not a theist. Since Dewey himself
objects to being classified as one who believes in the person-
ality of God, this would seem to settle the controversy . 5°
2. Salvation . The doctrine of salvation is a pessimistic
view of human nature which stultifies human effort. 57 The
division of mankind into saved and sinners makes a breach in any
possible human brotherhood .5^ Dependence upon the supernatural
50. Ibid., 43; see also 33, 50, and others.
51. Ibid., 53.
52. Ibid., 19.
53. Dewey, HNC, 330.
54. Dewey, AAE, 195.
55. See Dewey, EAN, 420-421.
56. Aubrey and Wieman, Art. (1934), 1550-1555.
57. Dewey, RIP, 115-116; HNC> 295.
58. Dewey, CF* 33-34.
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for salvation represents an attempt to escape from, existence. 59
True salvation must come through science which, by its methods
of testing beliefs, gives men the intellectual and emotional
peace which they once found in religion of the supernatural
type,^ as well as by devotion to ideal ends which result in
society
3. Problem of Evil . This, for Dewey, is an unnecessary
problem. It arose because apologists ’’identified the existence
of ideal goods with that of a Person supposed to originate and
support them. Give up belief in God and there is no problem
of evil. It is not a theological or a metaphysical question
but ’’the practical problem of reducting, alleviating, and as far
as may be, removing, the evils of life.”^5 The optimistic view
of things--that this is the best possible world--is an obstacle
to the removing of evil, for it tends to make men satisfied
with things as they are. But just how man is to remove an
evil, such as an earthquake or a disease germ, neither of which
he is responsible for, Dewey does not make clear. He neglects
the problem of surd evil.
4. Immortality . Dewey takes an agnostic attitude toward
this problem. In a Symposium on the question of personal
immortality he says:
I have no beliefs on the subject of personal immor-
tality. It seems to be a subject, being one of
continued existence, for science rather than phil-
osophy, or a matter of physical evidence. If it can
be proved, it would have to be along the lines of
59. Dewey
,
QFC, 46-47, 275.
60. Dewey CAE, II, 456.
61. Dewey, CP, 17.
62. Dewey, CF, 45.
63. Dewey, RIP, 177..
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the psychical researchers, and so far I have not
been impressed with their results.'- 4
5. The Supernatural . A discussion of Dewey’s rejection
of the "supernatural" in general will be of importance, for
he not only rejects a personal God, but the supernatural in
any form or sense. The supernatural rests upon certain as-
sumptions which are not valid in the light of modern tech-
niques. The assumption that knowledge has to do with "ante-
cedent reality" by which he means "prior to and independent
of the operations of knowing."*^ The supernatural is reality
given "prior to experimental verification and redisposition. "66
It is held to be "in sufficient existence before the act of
knowing," instead of being "the outcome of directed experi-
mental operations . Thus he says God or the supernatural is
first set up and then "proved." Supernatural objects are not
consequent to verification but antecedent. To Dewey this is
a false line of reasoning.
Another argument is that cases of knowledge must corres-
pond with the antecedent objects. "The objects of knowledge
form the standards or measures of the reality of all other
objects of experience . Supernaturalism then appeals to the
correspondence criterion of truth. ^9 Scientific method shows the
falsity of these assumptions. Truth for science does not end
64. Dewey, Art. (1928)
65. Dewey, QFC, 196.
66
.
Ibid.
,
258.
67. Ibid. 171.
68. Ibid. 21.
69. Ibid., 109-110.
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in antecedent reality; for science the true is the verified.
Verification and truth are two names for the same thing.
Knowledge is always the consequences of experimental operations,
for Dewey. Nothing is true until it is verified.*7 ^- Things are
simply data or problems before verification is started; they
become objects as a result of the process. The main char-
acteristics of scientific knowing as opposed to those used by
the supernaturalistic types of philosophy are as follows:
a. All experimentation involves overt doing, the meaning
of definite changes in the environment or in our relation to it.
b. Experiment is not random activity but is directed by
ideas which have to meet the conditions set by the need of the
problem inducing the active inquiry.
c. The outcome of the directed activity is the construction
of a new experimental situation in which objects are differently
related to one another, and such that the consequences of directed
operations form the objects that have the property of being known.
For science, ideas are not that which must correspond to
antecedent reality or with themselves. They are hypotheses for
verification. The final value of ideas is not determined "by
their internal elaboration and consistency, but by the consequen-
ces they effect in existence as that is perceptibly experienced."
1^
Scientific men accept the consequences of their experimental
70. Dewey, IDP
,
138.
71. Ibid.
,
143; QFC,
72. Dewey QFC, 137.
73. Ibid. 86-87
74. Ibid. 165.
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operations as constituting the known object rather than feeling
under obligation to prove them by "identification with what was
said to be antecedently known. "75 Conceptions are instrumen-
talities which direct operations of experimental observations,
but "the knowledge-property resides in conclusions."^ "The
criterion of knowledge lies in the method used to secure con-
sequences and not in metaphysical conceptions of the nature of
the real. "77 This objection to the supernatural which is really
an epistemological one may be summed up as follows: the premises
upon which belief in the existence of the supernatural rests are
not in harmony with those of science. Religion is out of step
because "the final arbiter of all questions of fact, existence,
and intellectual assent" is the method of experimental inquiry. 78
Supernatural religion cannot meet this challenge and it would be
better to drop it entirely.
It is also an abstraction and rests on the fallacy of
hypostatization of "selective emphas is . "79 We find ourselves
in a world that is uncertain, unpredictable, uncontrollable, and
hazardous. Man prefers the permanent to the changing so he
elevates the eternal to the rank of primary reality. 81 Such
is the development of so-called Forms and Essences which so
profoundly influenced for centuries the course of science and
theology. What are these Essences, he asks but the objects of
familiar life divinized by the idealizing imagination? Man does
75. Ibid.
,
185.
76. Ibid. 192.
77. Ibid. 221.
78. Dewey, CF, 31.
79. Dewey EAN, Rev.,
80. Ibid. 42.
81. Ibid. 27.
29.
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just this to meet the demands of desire. Dewey finds nature
a satisfactory concept for the inclusion of the ideal and the
real, universals arid particulars, the one and the many, the
changing and the permanent.
Dewey also objects to the supernatural on the ground that
it had obstructed progress. The intolerance of the Church has
ever been a detrimental factor.^ Not until men gave up their
ideas of the supernatural and began to experiment were the
great acheivements of science made. Dewey continues to make
strong criticisms of supernatural and institutional religions.
This is seen in his recent articles "Antinaturalism in Extremis "
in the volume edited by Krikorian, 1944, and "Dualism and the
Split Atom," in the New Leader
,
1945.^4 in the latter article,
speaking of the role of religion in life, Dewey makes some
strong criticism. Religion, he says, is causing a split in the
very nature of things. The way out of our present difficulties
is not to return to religious authoritarianism "the dogmas and
institutions which embody and perpetuate the divisions from
which we suffer" but it is "to carry forward the application of
our best scientific procedures and results so that they will
operate within, not just outside of or against, the moral values
and concerns of humanity. Religion, that is, supernatural
religion (he means), stands in the way of the application of
intelligence to social relations.^6 jt stands in the way of an
82. Dewey, RIP, 105-106
83. Dewey, QFC, 102.
84. Dewey, Art
.
(1945).
85. Ibid.
,
4.
86. See CF , 78.
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effective realization of the sweep and depth of the implications
of natural human relations .87 it offers no solution for present
problems for belief in the supernatural "does not change- the
existential situation in the least. "88 Conflict and error still
empirically exist. 89 Science alone offers a way out of the
problems that besiege us. 9^ Belief in the supernatural is
really a waste of time.®-*- Dependence upon the supernatural
also leads to stagnation, for it is the surrender of human
endeavor. ®2 "While saints are engaged in introspection, burly
sinners run the world. "93 <phe only way out is to return to the
belief that the environment is something to be changed. 94
Furthermore, the supernatural is an encumbrance to religion.
The feeling Of dependence upon God can be found just as well in
nature.® 5 Faith may be had in intelligence itself without ref-
erence to supernatural powers. ®^ The supernatural has been a
blight upon the religious spirit, and its tie with religion and
religious values must be dissolved. Such is Dewey’s conception
of the supernatural and God. His naturalistic theory begins
with the rejection of a personal God.
C . Summary
In this chapter the application of Dewey's naturalism in
87. Ibid.
,
•ooo
88. Dewey, iFC , 35
.
89. Dewey, EAN , Rev., 54.
90. Dewey, RIP, 111-112; QFC
91. Dewey Art. (1930), 177.
92. Dewey, CF, 46; RIP, 50.
93. Dev/ey RIP, 196.
94. Ibid., 115-116.
95. Dewey, CF, 25-26.
96. Ibid. 6, 26.
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the field of values was discussed, with special emphasis upon
his conception of the nature of the religious object. It is
we 11 to bear in mind his great purpose, to reintegrate all
human knowledge and activity into the framework of natural
processes
. The modern problem of values, he holds, is the
result of the bifurcation of experience . 98 The older concept
of nature as producing ends was forgotten, teleology was elim-
inated from natural science, and values became a separate prob-
lem associated with human activities and relations. 99 Dewey
holds that all values arise from nature within which our ideals
arise. Values are to be determined wholly by the application
of his method of experimental or scientific inquiry to the field
of moral experience. It is false to believe that values
stand apart from the application of the scientific method of
inquiry as developed in his Logic
The general criterion of value is the whole situation, but
with special emphasis upon the sort of consequences produced.
The true criterion of values is consequences which produce a
"coherent whole" as outlined in his Logic . -*-94 Values cannot
be organized into any permanent system but must always be taken
in relation to the concrete situation. -*-05 makes no distinc-
97. Supra, 122.
98. Supra, 14, 194.
99. Supra, 27, 194.
100. Supra, 194-195.
101. Supra, 195-196.
102. Supra
,
138.
103. Supra, 197.
104. Supra, 138f
,
197
105. Supra, 197.
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tion between Instrumental and intrinsic goods. Every value is
both an end and a means, for they are both part of the single
individual situation. 100 Further, it is wrong to distinguish
between ideals and economic ends. 107
Values arise in a situation in which there is a lack. They
cannot be reduced to feelings or treated as merely mental states,
for they have an existential status. 10® The Value or ideal is
a possibility of existence for Dewey. The ideal is the possible
in an actual existing situation. Thus an ideal or value is a
possibility of a natural event. 10
.
9 In experience, however, the
ideal has been hypostatized into eternal Essences such as the
True, the Beautiful and the Good. 110 For Dewey, the ideal is
never any such absolute ontological existence, but always the
possible in a concrete situation. Dewey thus rejects the ob-
jectivity of values in the sense of their existing in some realm
other than nature. But they are objective in the sense of being
more than personal likings, and of being social and natural
ideals. 111 He looks for the time when truer values will be
produced by the full application of the scientific method to
the whole of experience. 11®
According to Dewey, "God," or the religious object, is the
relation between the ’’ideal” and the ’’actual.” He stresses the
106. Supra, 197-198.
107. Supra, 198.
108. Supra, 199.
109. Supra, 199-200.
110. Sup ra
,
200.
111. Supra, 201.
112. Supra, 202.
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active relationship because it is the conception that the actual
may become the ideal which urges man on. This driving force is
God.-*-^ God is also the unity of all ideal ends arousing us to
action. God is in a sense, a totality which at times is the
whole of nature. Dewey rejects completely the concept of
a personal God.^-^ He rejects the "supernatural" in any sense
because (1) it is reached by unscientific methods of knowing,
(2) it leads to abstraction, and (3) it is impractical and
leads to the stalemate of human endeavor.
D. Criticism
1. The modern problems of values has arisen, Dewey says,
because of the division of experience into the two world of
science and morals. Teleology was divorced from nature and
limited to human activities and relations • ^ This is wrong,
for values arise out of nature, man himself being one of its
natural products. Unconscious matter or some collection of
unconscious natural events is the source of all values. The
truth of this view stands or falls upon the naturalistic as-
sumption that nature is the ultimate metaphysical explanation. 118
2. Nature is a whole which includes man and values. Man
is characterized by this natural whole of which he is a part.
113. Supra, 203.
114. Supra, 204.
115. Supra, 204.
116. Supra
,
206-209.
117. Sup ra 194.
118. See discussion supra 116-119.
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Hartshorne points out that this can work both ways. "If man is
natural, then nature is manlike. "H- The doctrine that nature
is a whole, inclusive of man and his ideals, is idealistic as
well as naturalistic in its implications. Reality (or nature)
is qualitatively one for the idealist, but the one is mental.
As Pratt also points out, when man is included in nature, it
becomes increasingly more evident that nature is not a mere
collection of atoms ... "but a much richer organic whole...When
we have put life and mind into Nature the concept of Nature is
significantly enlarged. ..
3. Dewey emphasizes "continuity" as an all important prin-
ciple in his thought. All forms are bound together by this
principle, physical objects, man, values, and mental objects
are one. In this, Dewey is guilty of the fallacy of hyposta-
tization. "Continuity" does not order nature into a coherent
whole but is simply a term used to express the fact that con-
tinuity exists. "Continuity" so used becomes one of the
eternal "Essences" which he rejects, and calls a habit of the
supernaturalists .^2
Pratt has this to say about emergent evolutionists:
What they present us with is merely a theoretical
history, a chronological list of the order in which
things have appeared. Their history and their list
are probably correct, but if they stop with them
they have thrown no light on the extraordinary
things that they have described .
^
23
119. Hartshorne, BH,
120. Supra, 79.
121. Supra, 148.
122. Supra, 200-201.
123. Pratt, PR, 363.
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4. Dewey offers the concept of "nature" as an explanation
of change and identity, the one and the many, etc. Nature is
the ultimate ground of all. Borden Parker Bowne has offered
cogent criticism of such a view in his Metaphysics and
demonstrated that the only real basis for unity in the universe
must be found in the unity of intelligence or a personal world-
ground. Dewey ignores such criticisms or dismisses them with-
out proper consideration. Woodbridge does this also.-*- 2^
5. Dewey sees existence and values both rooted in nature.
An excellent criticism of this view has been offered recently
in E. S. Brightman* s Nature and Values . Brightman shows that
"nature" and "values" must both be grounded in the personality
of God. He gives the following main reasons for the superiority
of personal idealism: 125 (i) it is more empirical than natural-
ism. Naturalism neglects the fact that experience is personal
consciousness. (2) It is more inclusive than naturalism, for
it regards personality and value as essential clues to reality.
(3) It is more social than naturalism. For naturalism, society
is a manifestation of a nonsocial reality; for personalism,
reality is social throughout. It is the experience of persons.
(4) It is equally scientific with naturalism. It might be
added here that the method of coherence of E. S. Brightman is
quite similar to the scientific method of Dewey when the latter
is taken in the broader sense--the sense in which he usually
uses it--as a means of reaching coherent wholes. ( 5 ) jt is
124. Supra, 67, 87, 116-119.
125. Brightman, NAV, 115-123.
126. Supra, 154-157.
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based on faith in the unity of nature and spirit. To sum up,
it is a higher synthesis than naturalism because it is more in-
clusive, more coherent, more synoptic, and more objective than
naturalism.
6. Dewey’s method of discovery is based on two assumptions
which have not been shown to be true. He assumes that his
"scientific method" is the only one for arriving at truth, and
hence, the existence of the supernatural cannot be established.
He also assumes that man, by this method, is capable of indef-
inite progress, and that all his needs can be satisfied by
"natural" powers. Such assumptions have not been satisfactorily
demonstrated.
7. Dewey makes a strong attack upon organized religion
or the church in his articles "Antinaturalism in Extremis and
"Dualism and the Split Atom." Supernatural religious beliefs,
he says, are causing a split in the very nature of things. They
are obstructing the true course of progress, the application of
scientific method to the problem of values. While it is
quite true that the church had its faults in the past and still
has many in the present, it does not seem fair to say that super-
naturalism is the whole cause of the world’s ills. Moreover,
it is not true. Supernatural religions, especially Christianity,
usually stand for the highest of ideals, and seek the better
values in life. Dewey seems to be unaware of, or else he ignores,
the most important teachings of religions such as Judaism and
Christianity.
127. Supra, 195-196, 209-210.
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E. Dewey r 3 Contribution to Naturalism
Dewey has pointed out the main influences on the develop-
ment of his naturalism. He follows Aristotle in interpreting
nature dynamically.^- 2^ He is close to Spinoza in interpreting
nature in the all-inclusive sense.-5- 2® He adopted the theory
of biological evolution as an explanation of the process of
natural teleology,-5-^® as is seen in his Influence of Darwin on
Philosophy .
Probably no one thinker has so well developed and rounded
out his position as John Dewey. The first great step is seen
in his rejection of soul psychology for functionalism. The
muscular activity of the organism synthesized by habits becomes
the only necessary unifying agent for Dewey. His theory is
developed in such works as Studies in Logical Theory , Essays
in Experimental Logic
,
and How We Think . Dewey developed his
logical theory based upon his functional or instrumental view
of thinking. Besides the works mentioned above, there is also
his most systematic treatment of the subject. Logic: The Theory
of Inquiry . He outlined his epistemology, based still upon his
postulate as to the nature of thought, in such works as Logic ,
and The Quest for Certainty
,
as well as in numerous essays and
articles. His whole naturalistic metaphysics is set forth in
Reconstruction in Philosophy , and especially in Experienc e and
Nature
.
128. Supra, 13-14, 27.
129. Supra, 13, 34-36.
130. Supra, 39-40, 148, 183-184.
131. Supra, 125-137.
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In addition' to thoroughly developing his theory, Dewey has
also applied it to the problems of men. Human Nature and Conduct
is his social psychology. Liberalism and Social Action
,
Freedom
and Culture, and Problems of Men are devoted to social philosophy.
His Ethics covers the field of morals; Art as Experience applies
his theory to esthetics; A Common Faith takes up the problem of
religious values. Dewey has not only developed a metaphysical
theory, but he has tried to show that it also has practical ap-
plication.
Dewey, as well as Woodbridge, has combined the discoveries
of modern physical science, the functional psychology, teleology,
and biological evolution in his effort to formulate a naturalistic
philosophy
.
There seems to be little doubt that he has done
this better than Woodbridge. Furthermore, Dewey has developed
and used a more adequate method, freed, as it usually is, from
the experimental laboratory. Dewey has also applied his system
well in the field of values--a field which Woodbridge rather
neglected. On the whole, it can be said that Dewey has developed
a more scientific philosophical system than oodbridge. But,
like every system, Dewey's philosophy is based upon an assump-
tion, and the truth of the system depends to a large extent on
the truth of the assumption. Until the assumption that thinking
is purely an instrument of organic adjustment, invoked by the
organism in a troubled situation, and until the objections of-
fered by other thinkers are adequately answered, his view must
remain one of the solutions offered for the mind-body problem.
132. Supra, 121.
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CHAPTER VII
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
A. Summary
This dissertation has been an investigation of "nature" and
"naturalism" in the thought of Frederick J. E. Woodbridge and
John Dewey who were chosen as more or less representative of
naturalistic philosophy. The main emphasis has been an attempt
to discover the meaning of these terms as used by these two
naturalists. The study may be summarized under the following
general headings: (1) Main influences upon the philosophers
under consideration; including a brief historical survey of
naturalism; (2) The respective systems of these two philosophers
(3) A comparison of their respective views; (4) General con-
clusions of this study.
It was noted that confusion has been caused by inadequate
definition of terms especially in the field of philosophy.
"Nature" is used in many different ways by the philosophers,
not to mention its use in other connections. There is no unity
even among naturalists themselves as to what "nature" means.
In a recent manifesto of some of the naturalists this was
freely admitted. Naturalism is described as more of a "spirit"
or temperament, rather than a well-developed school standing
upon the same general first principles.^ To say that "nature"
1. Supra 2-3, 120-121; Krikorian (ed.), NHS, 357-358.
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is a name for "quite a mess of miscellaneous stuff" helps very
little.
A brief biography of each of the men under consideration
was given. V/oodbridge studied in Amherst College, Union
Theological Seminary, and the University of Berlin. He taught
for a time in the University of Minnesota and then in Columbia
University where he became Dean of the Graduate School in 1904.
j
Most of his literary work was done while he was at Columbia.
^
John Dewey was born in Vermont in 1859. He studied in the
University of Vermont and Johns Hopkins University. He taught
in the Universities of Michigan and Minnesota for a few years,
then in the University of Chicago, and finally in Columbia.
His literary career has extended over the past sixty-four years.
These men represent in literary production, two extremes;
Woodbridge ' s writings being rather limited, while Dewey has
probably published more than any oth^r American philosopher .
The most important influences upon these men were mentioned.
Probably Woodbridge owed most to Aristotle, Hobbes, and Spinoza.
4
Dewey was influenced by the Greek philosophers and especially
Aristotle. This is evident in the dynamic view of nature in
much of modern naturalism.^ Dewey's relation to Kant was namely
that of a protest against his division of experience into two
worlds, that of mechanical science, or the phenomenal order,
and that of moral and intellectual experience or the noumenal
2. Supra, 5-6.
3. Supra, 6-12.
4. Supra, 12-13.
5. Supra, 13-14.
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order. ^ Dewey began his philosophical career as an Hegelian
idealist. Hegel, he says, left a permanent deposit in his
thinking. The influence of Hegel is especially evident in
Dewey's emphasis upon continuity, coherence, and wholes. ^ Prom
Charles Sanders Peirce, Dewey mainly derived his pragmatism,
while his psychological theory was developed under the influence
of Angell and James.
®
The literature in the field was then surveyed.
^
In the second chapter the historical background of natural-
ism was taken up. Some possible definitions of "nature 11 were
also considered. Webster's Dictionary lists many, of which the
philosophical one was emphasized. It was pointed out that
confusion has resulted from the use of this philosophical
definition in at least three different ways: (1) Creative or
vital force; (2) Created being in its existential character;
(3) Creation, as a whole, especially the physical universe.
To this may be added the confusion resulting from the many other
possible definitions, not to mention their sub-variants. Edgar
S. Brightman in an article, lists five possible definitions of
the term: (1) Nature, for the Greeks, was the whole world
viewed as ordered process; (2) the created order as distinguished
from God as used by the Schoolmen; (3) all-that-there-is , as in
Spinoza's deus sive natura; (4) the phenomenal order, or organ-
6. Supra, 14.
7. Supra, 15.
8. Supra, 15-16.
9. Supra, 17-19.
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ized and categorized sense experience as suggested by Kant;
(5) as the world the sciences are investigating.-*-0 James M.
Baldwin in an article in his Dictionary notes the same general
confusion in the use of "naturalism." It is evident that the
definition of "natural" and "naturalism" will depend upon the
particular view of "nature" adhered to.H
The survey of naturalism from the early Greeks to the
present day shows various uses and definitions of nature. No
clearly defined view was found among most of the early Greeks,
with the exception of Democritus who had a fairly well-de-
veloped materialistic philosophy. Plato looked upon nature a®
the world of changing things as is distinguished from the world
of Forms. The idea of nature as the world of changing things
persisted in Aristotle, but with the added concept that nature
is always realizing ends or purposes .
^
The Epicureans elim-
inated all purpose from nature and regarded it as a mechanistic
system of atoms, while the Stoics looked upon nature as self-
moved both efficiently and teleologically. Nature was really
God for the Stoics.-*-0
The orthodoz Church philosophers, Augustine and Aquinas,
regarded nature as the created order, distinguished from God
who created all things ex nihilo .-*^ Giordano Bruno (1548-1600),
*
a monk who broke with the Church, taught that nature was made
10. Supra, 21-22.
11. Supra, 22-24.
12. Supra, 27-28.
13. Supra, 28-29.
14. Supra, 29-31.
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up of living atoms or monads, each one of them being an in-
dependent center of life but together organized in the system
called nature.
In the Modern period, at least three views are very im-
portant. Hobbes developed a completely mechanistic view of
nature, applying his theory to matter, man and society. All
movement whether physical, psychological or social, is control-
led by mechanical lav/s of cause and effect. 16 Spinoza, the
pantheist, developed a theory of nature or God as all that
there is. Nature and God are synonymous terms for him. ' .Every-
thing that is ls_ by absolute necessity. Kant thought of nature
as the -universe of organized and categorized sense experience.
*
Only objects of sense belong to the world of nature. What is
not in sense is not in nature according to this view.-^
The influence of Darwin’s theory of biological evolution
upon the development of naturalism was mentioned. Most modern
naturalists see nature as achieving ends through the processes
of biological evolution. 19
The history of naturalism in America shows that most of the
work of this school had been comparatively recent, mainly under
the influence of Woodbridge, Dewey, Santayana, Sellars and a
few others.^®
We will first consider Woodbridge' s view under several
headings
:
15. Supra, 31-32
16. Supra, 33-34
17. Supra, 34-37
18. Supra, 37-39
19. Supra, 13-14
20. Supra, 40-43
27, 39-40; infra, 62-69, 181-184.
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1* Nature . Woodbridge defines nature as "the familiar
setting of human history," or "public experience." Nature is
a sum that seems to leave nothing out. She is heaven and
earth, and sea, and all that in them is. 2 l The "natural" is
what is characteristic of nature. Nature, as all-that-there-
is, is clearly the physical universe existing in space and
time. All that the word "mental" does is to distinguish certain
actions from certain others which we are accustomed to call
"physical." Actually there is no difference, qualitatively,
between the two. Nature is structural, organized and scientific
knowledge of her is possible. 22 Space is really in nature for it
is the observable interplay of geometrical distinctions. Time
has reference to the presence or absence of events in nature.
Present events are in nature; past and future events are those
absent from nature. 25 Matter is the stuff of which nature is
made up. It is nature as the material world set over against
ourselves, but not different from ourselves. 2 ^ Nature is his-
torical. She is continually changing, in process, a history of
histories. 25 Nature is then the all-inclusive realm of being.
Just as God (or nature) included both thought and extension for
Spinoza, so nature includes both the mental and the physical for
Woodbridge. What Woodbridge has done is broaden out the term
"nature" to include all events. This is simply saying that nature
21. Supra, 46.
22. Supra, 53-54.
23. Supra, 55.
24. Supra, 56-58
•
25. Supra
,
58-62.
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is "everything,” and this neither explains the nature of "nature,"
nor says anything at all about the "everything." Verbal usage of
a term does not add to knowledge.
2. Epistemology . All our knowledge of nature is obtained
by scientific experiment, by going to nature as a physicist or
chemist goes, experimenting, and then accepting the results. 2^
All knowledge of nature must be scientifically verifiable.
While Woodbridge recognizes that to think of God or the infinite
is not at; all strange, but human, yet, to say that God existed
would be most unscientific. Such a thought cannot be verified .
^
The medium through which knowledge is gained is our bodies.
They are "conscious" bodies and nature responds to our efforts to
obtain knowledge. All mental states are really physical states--
functions of the body. The only kind of "stuff" in nature is
the substance of which she is made up, and just what sort of
substance that is "physicists and chemists are the sort of know-
ers who give us anything like an intelligible answer. The
substance of knowing is also the substance of nature. The order
and connection of ideas is the same as the order and connection
of things. 29
3. Man . Man as a whole, body and mind, is part and parcel
of nature. He is no exceptional event either, but of the same
kind as animals, plants, and atoms. He is first and last, a
product of nature and he ought not to believe himself to be
26. Supra, 47-48, 51-52.
27. Supra, 48-49.
28. Supra, 51-52; Woodbridge
29. Supra, 76.
EON, 35-36.
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anything more.^^ He is wholly natural for thinking is no dif-
ferent from walking. He is not "Nature’s last supreme act.” 3 ^
He is her child but he will not survive her. Woodbridge rejects
personal immortality. Man is a natural creature with a wholly
natural destiny. 3^ The nature of man is not explained at all,
but instead it is asserted that he is "natural" and "within"
nature. Naturalism gives to man his animal rights. His intel-
ligence is only an instrument of his animal life. He is no more
important in nature than anything else, indeed, not so important
/
as the atoms. Nature is no more tolerant of man than of any other
thing. 33
4. God. Woodbridge ’s nature, is the ultimate existence
for him. Nature is., and no further explanation is possible.
j
This assertion is similar to that of theists who assert that
God is. but just what he is or why he is calls for no further
elaboration. Nature is Woodbridge ’s ultimate in the same way
that God is for theists, but for him, God and nature are one
and the same. 3^ Woodbridge does not object to the use of the
term "God" should one feel the need of it. But he rejects the
view of a personal God, because such an hypothesis is unscien-
tific and cannot be verified. 33
5. History . History is purposeless if, by purpose, is
meant "some future event towards which the whole creation moves;”
30. Supra, 72-73, 1
31. Supra, 72.
32. Supra, 51.
33. Supra, 110-111.
34. Supra
,
53, 71.
35. Supra, 70.
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but history is purposeful "if we mean that the past is utilized
as material for progressive realization. . .of spiritual end 3 ."^
All that Woodbridge is really saying is that history is tele-
ological, if you will allow me to define teleology in my own
way. There is no single purpose in history, for history is
pluralistic. There are many histories in nature and no one of
them has preference over the others, not even man’s. Human
history appears purposeful but this is appearance only. It is
due to a biased point of view. The cosmos is impartial to its
many histories .
^
6. Teleology and Mechanism . Woodbridge holds to a view of
"natural teleology" for the whole of nature. Nature "suggests"
plot or design, for purposes are conceived and executed, or so it
seems to us. But all the happenings of nature are instances of
this same thing, yet it is not really purpose but progression.
The appearance of consciousness is an example of this teleology.
Yet, Woodbridge does not object to one’s thinking of one "Artist"
for the whole of nature should one’s religious nature demand it. 38
In his article on "Natural Teleology" he is trying to show that
(1) there is no relevant connection between the fact of teleology
and the operations of chance or design, and (2) that intelligence
may not be regarded as the source of the distinction between means
and ends, because it cannot be credited with creating the dis-
tinctions it discovers and because it is itself an instance of
36. Supra, 58-62.
37. Supra, 59-60.
38. Supra, 63-64.
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teleology. But this argument does not consider the possibility
of an infinite intelligence as the ultimate cause of teleology.
In the last analysis "natural teleology" is not teleology at all,
but simply natural progression.
Woodbridge rejects the older mechanistic view of nature,
which was based on Newtonian physics. It is not a machine con-
trolled by unchangeable mechanical laws. While it is true that
nature is partly mechanical, it is also true that she is con-
tinually producing "ideal products." It is always producing
novelties, achieving results or purposes which show that she is
not rigidly mechanical. ^0 His view is summarized as follows:
(1) Behavioristic distinctions are made, not in terms of structure,
but in terms of ends accomplished by behavior; (2) behavior is
consequently a teleological matter implying a natural teleology;
(3) the admission of natural teleology does not necessarily involve
either the doctrine that ends operate or the doctrine that struc-
tures contain resident powers by virtue of what they do; (4) the
relativity of ends is confirmation of teleology and not its undoing
(5) natural teleology constitutes the intelligibility of nature;
and (6) mind mqy be construed as an instance of teleology rather
than the cause of it.^l Mind is a development within nature, and
hence wholly within space and time.
7. Metaphysics . The problem for metaphysics is not to
explain or explain away existence, but to see what existence
39. Supra, 67.
40. Supra, 73-76.
41. Supra, 105-106.
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implies. The great mistake of past metaphysics, he holds, has
been the attempt to show that the implications of existence are
its causes or prior to it. What he means is that, since mind is
an existence discovered, it ought not to be considered the cause
of existence. Metaphysics means, or ought to mean, taking
things as they are, in all their plurality, without trying to
reach one ultimate cause for thirgs, such as God. Yet, again
Woodbridge does not object to the use of "God" "if our view
of things compels us to seek" such a cause. 43 Metaphysics,
for him, means admitting the existence of nature as a whole with-
out attempting to account for its what and why. Nature needs no
explanation and no justification of it is possible.
8. Mind . Woodbridge ’s theory of mind will now be reviewed.
Mind is first of all a realm of discourse. It is a part of the
natural world from which no one has ever succeeded in separating
it. There is no separate world of ideas apart from the world of
objects. Mind is not a determinate form of being but a
universe of discourse. It is not a "thing" which dwells in
bodies but is a name for the fact that object and idea are in-
separably united. There is but one realm of discourse and that
is the realm of nature. 45 if psychologists in the past have
suggested that mind is something which inhabits bodies, they
have seriously erred. Mind is something wholly present in nature,
not a separate entity. It is simply the assertion that animal
bodies see, think, remember, etc., as well as breath, digest and
42. Supra, 67.
43. Supra, 70.
44. Supra, 85-67.
45. Supra
,
85-86.
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walk.
Analysis shows us that man is nothing but a body. No such
thing as a "mind" can be found. The space -time realm is the
only one there is. To admit this is to find the real nature
of mind, that is, within this realm. Animal bodies engage in
different kinds of activity, some physical, some mental, but
both take place with space and time. 48 It is simply the things
man does that divide him into body and mind, but the distinction
is artificial, for man is one undivided. 47
The phrase "many minds" simply means that there are many
men or many bodies in nature. 48 Mind as such may be developed.
Man's development has been his intellectual growth--the growth
of mind as an instrument. All of man's actions, whether labeled
physical or mental are forms of behavior. Behavior is more than
musculature; it is teleological also. 4 ^
This natural realm has logical structure. It is unified
and coherent, systematized. It is the logical structure that
identifies this realm also as the realm of mind. Mind is a
collective name for all the empirical objects of thinking, for
the realm of experience is the realm of mind. 88
Thinking gives us knowledge of the physical world, but it
does not construct it. Woodbridge criticizes Berkeleian or
subjective idealism here, but his criticism does not affect
modern personalism. No personalist says that the mind (human)
46. Supra, 89-91.
47. Supra, 91-92.
48. Supra, 102-103.
49. Supra, 103-106.
50. Supra, 97; ROM,
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constructs the objective world: that is the product of the
infinite mind. Woodbridge does not deal with this point at all.
He holds that the brain is an instrument of thinking and operates,
much as a phonograph, in the production of ideas. Both are forms
of mechanism. Here he is decidedly behavioristic. Thinking is
the process of communication used by the organism. His view is
summed up as follows: (1) The difference between acts of think-
ing and acts of walking is that we call one mental and the other
physical; (2) Given ourselves as thinkers, we find nothing besides
our bodies which does the thinking. The agent is always our
bodily selves; (3) Thinking is co -extensive with the subject
matter .51
Objective mind means simply that the universe is constructed
rationally. This logical structure is discoverable, or, that is,
the universe is rational. 52 Being is logically constructed and
constitutes the realm of intelligibility irrespective of our
efforts to comprehend it. This rationality suggests a rational
purpose behind things. "Man believes in God because it seems
impossible that our fate her^ has no significance beyond our-
selves and no part in a wider plan. "53 But the existence of
such a being cannot be established. The basic categories of
nature are "space, time, and species" which together with thought,
make up the intelligible world. God does not enter into this
picture.
51. Supra, 97-98, 113.
52. Supra, 99-100.
53. Supra, 99-100; ROM, 51.
54. Supra, 100.
..
232
Language is not necessarily words, but simply a means of
communication. His view is summarized as follows: (1) Language,
which everybody says conveys ideas, is a material exchange and
as such is on a par, metaphysically, with every other material
exchange and they with it. (2) Ideas, although they are con-
veyed by something material, are not the material which conveys
them but an effect wrought in the exchange and so are not material
at all. (3) Ideas, because they are acquired and clarified by
experience, that is, by the contacts of our bodies with the rest
of the world, and because they are conveyed from one person to
another, are in spite of their immateriality, not some peculiar
idiosyncrasy in ourselves, but genuine discoveries and con-
stituents of the system of things. 0 ^ This is one of the hardest
passages in Woodbridge to understand. The ’'system of things" is
certainly in space and time. But ideas are not material so not
in space and time, the only realm there is. Just what "ideas"
are then seems impossible to say.
Consciousness is likewise a bodily action. It must be
defined as the same general type of existence as space, time,
or species. Its nature is akin to theirs.^ It is a system of
things or events in space and time, a "continuum of ob ject s . "57
Objects are in consciousness because things are in one space.
Through consciousness the world is not changed but a new re-
lation with nature is discovered.
55. Supra, 101-102
56 • Supra , 106
•
57. Supra, 107.
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In the fifth chapter a survey of Dewey’s philosophical
system was made. The main purpose of his philosophy, he says,
is to reintegrate human knowledge and activity within the
general framework of reality and natural processes. The great
task of philosophy is to develop an instrument or method for
dealing with the problems of men. It must be a tool for freeing
men from bias and prejudice and a way of clarifying their think-
ing especially along social and moral lines. In order to develop
this kind of an instrument, philosophy must become self-critical,
a criticism of criticism. 55 A difficulty in dealing with Dewey’s
thought is the fact that it is all of one piece. It is hard to
separate and treat under independent headings, but must be looked
upon as a whole. This is in part due to the early Hegelian
influence
•
A consideration of Dewey’s psychology showed that in his
early psychological writings, he supported the older soul-psychol-
ogy. But he abandoned this view during the 1890 ’s in favor of
the newer functional psychology of such men as Angell and James.
Dewey soon saw the individual and his actions as one. He rejected
the ego behind states of action in th« organism. Allport says
"There is no longer any self for Dewey separate from muscu-
lature. 59 After his rejection of the self, Dewey searched
about for something to take its place. It was many years later
that he was to find the unifying agent in "habit."59
58. Supra, 122-124.
59. Supra, 127.
60. Supra, 128.
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Dewey views "thinking” as an organic activity, as something
which the organism performs at specific need. Thought arises in
response to its own occasion. It is an activity as natural as
any other activity of ordinary experience. It is the changing
of physical things by physical means. Mind or thinking is an
instrument of biological adaption developed by the organism in
the course of evolution. 63
However, Dewey's theory of mind is not always consistent.
Besides this functional view, there is also a strong suggestion
of behaviorism at times. He himself says that his psychology
antedated the use of this term as a psychological system. Know-
ledge, he says also, lies in the muscles
,
not in consciousness. 63
Meaning is primarily a property of behavior and secondarily a
property of objects. But he does not go quite all the way.
Speech is, he adds, very markedly distinguished from the
signaling acts of animals. Unlike John Watson, Dewey does not
reduce thinking to "silent exercise of the organs of vocaliza-
tion.
Then there are passages where Dewey retains some of his
early self-psychology, contrary to his rejection of the ego.
He speaks of being "aware of awareness." This sounds like a
self that knows itself as itself. The self is also a "reflec-
tive agent." Dewey '3 psychology is not wholly consistent. 63
61. Supra, 130.
62. Supra, 131-133.
63. Supra, 132.
64. Supra, 133.
65. Supra, 134-135.
..
.
•
.
.
v
.
4
.
*
.
255
He rejects any suggestion of an epiphenomenal view of
mind in its relation to the body. These terms simply express
"different characters of natural events. "^6 The only difference
between a bodily event and a mental event is a matter of com-
plexity. The mental represents a higher organization of natural
events. This organization Dewey outlines on four main levels
as follows: (1) The psycho-physical organism which represents
the organization of energies upon lines of need-demand-satis-
faction. (2) The level of sensitivity, discriminatory response-
the animal level as compared with the plant level of the first.
(3) The level of feeling, marked by response to distant stimuli
as characteristic of the higher animals. (4) Mind, whose dis-
tinguishing characteristics are communication, language, and
response to meanings. Consciousness is present on all levels
but only on the fourth is there actualized apprehensions of
meanings Mind, Dewey says, is a genuine character of natural
events on the level of their most complex interaction. The
characteristics of this "complex interaction" he defines as
consciousness, unity, awareness, manipulation of meanings, space
and time transcendence, and striving for known ends. 6 ^
In his logic Dewey seeks to develop a "new" instrument of
inquiry. He rejects traditional logical theories as unsatis-
factory because they are incapable of application to existence.
His aim is the development of a logic which will apply to the
66. Supra, 135-136.
67. Supra, 136.
68. Supra, 137.
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whole realm of experience. 09 It is a logic of ’'natural events”
which are functioning on the meaning level. 170 Since thinking
is a natural event, logic must be naturalistic. Logic is the
science of thinking or inquiry conceived on naturalistic
terms. Inquiry is the process of transformation of the elements
of a troubled situation into a coherent whole (untroubled sit-
uation).17 -^ Logic is the science of the natural instrument the
human organism evokes in order to get itself out of a troubled
or doubtful situation. This problem is not solved by the manip-
ulation of personal states of mind, but by operations which
modify existing conditions
.
7/=5 Terms such as thinking, reflec-
tion and judgment denote inquiries or the result of inquiries.
Inquiry occupies an intermediate and mediating position in the
development of an experience.'7 '5 Experience is not to be taken
as consciousness but as inclusive of all natural events which
may at any time affect an organism. Consciousness is a "very
small and shifting portion of experience. 7 4
Dewey outlines the main theses of logical theory as follows:
(1) Logic is a progressive discipline; (2) The subject matter
of logic is determined operationally; (3) Logical forms are
postulational; (4) Logic is a naturalistic theory; (5) Logic is
a social discipline; (6) Logic is autonomous. 75
69. Supra, 138-139.
70. Supra, 139.
71. Supra, 141; LOG, 104-105
72. Supra, 141.
73. Supra, 143.
74. Supra, 143; EEL, 6.
75. Supra, 144-146.
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The thesis that logic is naturalistic is developed in the
light of inquiry. Inquiry or thinking is assumed to be a natural
event. If this assumption is admitted, then it follows that logic
is naturalistic. Dewey here assumed the continuity of all ex-
istences as natural events. Continuity is, he says, a primary
postulate of experimental logic. 7 ^ He rejects thinking as be-
longing to a mental realm, a thesis which has made an impassible
gulf between thinking and natural existence. By means of logic
conceived within the one matrix of inquiry, animal activities are
transformed into intelligent behavior. 7,7
All logical forms are developed within the operations of
inquiry itself and are not given or imposed from without. Logical
forms accrue to subject matter during the course of controlled
inquiry. This is another fundamental thesis of his logic. Even
the laws of identity, excluded middle, and contradiction are
included in this process of inquiry. 7 8
The ultimate purpose of inquiry is to produce warranted
assertions. A warranted assertion is reached by means of the
scientific method of investigation. Dewey does not give a
consistent explanation of what he means by this method, for he
speaks of science in the "narrower” sense, implying at the same
time a "broader” sense. 7 ^ Randall says that Dewey’s method is not
primarily based upon the method of the laboratory ,
^
while Ratner
76. Supra, 148-149.
77. Supra, 150.
78. Supra, 151-153.
79. Supra, 153-154.
80. Supra, 155-156.
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interprets the method in the narrower sense of experimentation.
There is evidence for both views in Dewey ’ 3 writings so that the
method may be interpreted either as (1) the laboratory method, or
(2) in the broader sense, comparable to coherence, in the pro-
duction of probable knowledge or warranted assertions • 88 The
second is by far the more common usage.
Dewey’s theory of knowledge is based upon the thesis that
knowing is a kind of doing, a bodily activity. Mind must be
defined in terms of doing and its results. 88 Knowing is a mode
of practical action. It is something which happens to an object
in the natural course of events. It is the representation of one
thing by another thing. The instrument of knowing, inquiry, is
natural, not brought in from another realm. it is the process
by which a troubled or doubtful situation becomes no longer
doubtful or troubled. ’When doubt ceases the problem is solved
and warranted assert ibility has been reached.
Verification is the following out of a plan of action which
brings about the successful or unsuccessful termination of inquiry.
Consequences are always the means of determining the truth of
the plan of action followed. 88
An indeterminate situation is the state of affairs before
inquiry begins. A doubtful situation does not require, according
to Dewey, a personal doubter to be doubtful. 88
Dewey defines metaphysics as a statement about the generic
81. Supra, 156.
82. Supra, 156-158.
83. Supra, 159-160.
64. Supra, 160-161.
85. Supra, 162-163.
86. Supra, 164-165.
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traits of existences without dividing them into physical and
mental. All knowledge about existences is obtained by his
scientific method. The most important metaphysical problem is
the relation of immediate qualities (consciousness) to objects
of science, (situations believed-in)
. The relations of subject
and object, an epistemological question, is then the greatest
metaphysical problem. There is passage within nature of objects
with one set of qualities to objects with another set of qualities.
This is a fact to be accepted, not necessarily to be explained.
When a quality is known as a ” sensation” it has been placed in a
specially selected connection, that of being related to an
organism or self.
Pragmatism recognizes the necessity of going beyond episte-
mology to develop an adequate metaphysics. Some theories have
collapsed because they have been anti-metaphysical. Dewey's main
protest in all his writings is against the "splitting” of reality
of nature in two. To divide experience into mental and physical
with no bridge between the two is fatal. His solution is to
say that both the mental and the physical are natural, belonging
to the only world there is--nature. This however, is only a
verbal solution of the problem since it fails to define the terms
clearly enough.
Mind is a state of things, he says, in which qualitatively
different feelings are significant of objective differences.
The world of inner experience is dependent, to a large extent
87. Supra, 165-166.
88. Supra, 167-169.
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upon the extension of language. Language is a symbol. It was
a physical thing before it became symbolic. It was developed
through social intercourse. Language is the release and
amplification of energies by a conferring on them of meaning as
an additional quality. 017 But just how the mental is produced or
how it functions, Dewey is not quite sure. Dewey is vague and
finally says that he does not understand the exact physiological
qn
apparatus involved in thinking. v
Dewey distinguishes between mind and consciousness. Con-
sciousness is present on all four levels of complexity mentioned
above. Mind is the fourth or highest level. A contrast of the
two on this level will show the difference .91
Mind
1. The whole realm of meaning.
2. All-inclusive.
3. Contextual and persistent.
4. Structural and substantial.
5. Constant luminosity.
6. All mental events.
Consciousness
Perception of single instances of
.
meaning.
Single instance of mind.
Focal and transitive.
Fleeting.
Intermittent luminosity.
Selective from mental events.
Mind or the mental is an instrument as has been said. Hook
outlines the functions of the instrument as follows: (1) An
instrument is such in reference to some thought or intuition
responsible for its construction as a tool. (2) An instrument
for some aggregate of entities or domain of relations in which
89. Supra, 172.
90. Supra, 172.
91. Supra, 172-173.
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.
.
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it is to be applied. (3) As an instrument in respect to and
because of its form, arrangement, or structure. 96 Such an in-
strument is thinking. It cannot be used as a means of creating
the world since it is an instrument by which the world is dis-
covered. Thinking is no different an instrument from hammers
and saws, or other such instruments." Hook concludes that
thinking is: (1) Of the same generic order as the object to
which it is applied; (2) An incomplete system of relationships
among things; (3) Not final but must forego all such claims and
accept the status of an instrument striving for greater effective-
ness . 94
Dewey calls his system "empirical naturalism" or "naturalis-
tic empiricism." He begins with a rejection of anything "super-
natural." The supernatural is, for him, comparable to the
realm of the imagination. 95 The supernatural lies "beyond
experience," which can be taken to mean beyond nature . 96 Nature
itself is a totality which includes all events, physical, psycho-
physical, and mental, as well as all values."
Nature is an all-inclusive term for both Woodbridge and
Dewey. Like Aristotle they conceive of nature as achieving ends. 96
This dynamic view of nature pervades modern naturalism. Both
Woodbridge and Dewey reject the rigid mechanism of Spinoza and
Hobbes." For Woodbridge, nature is a synonym for God, as in
92. Supra, 173-174.
93. Supra, 175-178.
94. Supra, 180.
95. Supra, 181-182.
96. Supra, 182-183.
97. Supra, 183-184.
98. Supra, 62f
,
119f
,
183-184,
99. Supra, 35-39, 73-74, 185.
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the thought of Spinoza. For Dewey, nature is also all-that-
there-is, hut he reserves the terra "God” for the impersonal
object of religious devotion. Neither of these definitions
of nature wholly agrees with any of those held to by other
naturalists mentioned. ^02 Modern naturalists are not too
interested in exact first principles, except that they deny the
existence of a personal God.^^^ If an exact definition of nature
were adopted, probably the most satisfactory one would be that
of Kant. Nature is the universe as organized in sense ex-
perience. -*-04 This agrees with Webster's Dictionary where one
of the possible definitions is "the totality of physical reality,
exclusive of minds and the mental." This leaves all mental states,
morals, and values outside the world of nature. Dewey and
Woodbridge would reject this definition because they root every-
thing within nature, although Woodbridge does come close to it
when he says that nature is "pre-eminently the visible world. "i05
But "pre-eminently" is not completely.
In the sixth chapter the application of Dewey's system to
the field of values was considered. The modern problem of
values stems from the bifurcation of experience and the elimin-
ation of teleology from natural science. Values were wrongly
associated with human activities only.' All values arise out
of nature. Logic, as the theory of inquiry, is the instrument to
100. Supra, 76-79.
101. Supra, 203.
102. Supra, 2-3.
103. Supra, 185.
104. Supra, 37-39, 185
105. Supra, 185, 46f
.
106. Supra, 194.
.,
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be used in the formulation of value judgments. Past theories
of value failed because they held that the domain of values is
wholly apart from the application of scientific methods. Dewey
holds that no real development of value theory is possible
unless the scientific method is used. 10 ’'’
His criterion of value seems to be twofold. The whole
situation must be considered as well as the sort of consequences
which result. 10^ Values cannot be organized into a final system
since a value must be determined in the concrete situation in
which it arises. Means and consequences cannot be separated
but are both parts of the whole situation, and they bear an
organic relation to each other. Every value is both an end
and ameans. No value is merely instrumental, but all values
are also intrinsic. HO Desire arises out of some lack in an
existing situation-some conflict of tensions to be resolved. 111
Values cannot be reduced to feelings, for they have an exis-
tential status. 112
All values are continuous with natural events. They are
possibilities of existences or natural events. The "ideal" is
the "possible" in contrast with the "actual" in a given sit-
uation. The eternal Essences of other systems of thought are
the result of the hypostatizat ion of the ideal, the making of
it into a thing or person. For example, the ideal of the good
has been made over into God.
107. Supra, 195-196.
108. Supra, 197.
109. Supra, 197-198.
110. Supra, 198.
111. Supra, 198-199.
112. Supra, 199.
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Values are not objective in the sense of existing in a
realm of being other than nature. But they are objective in the
sense that they are more than personal likings, are social, and
1 “1 *Z
are natural. The only way to determine values is by the
application of the scientific method to the whole of expert-
ence. 1^
The religious object, for Dewey, is the active relation-
ship between the actual and the ideal. This relation he calls
"God." God is the unity of all ideal ends arousing us to de-
sire and action. But at times the object of faith and devotion
becomes the whole of nature or the universe. But God never
means a person for him, since he has publically stated that he
does not hold to a personal God.^-^ He also rejects any doctrine
of personal salvation, as well as immortality. Real salvation
is to be achieved through science. Dependance upon the super-
natural is trying to escape from existence . He does not admit
the problem of evil since it suggests a personal guidance of
good and evil. The way to overcome evil is by the application
of science to the problems of life.
The supernatural is rejected by Dewey for several reasons.
The first is that it is built upon a false theory of knowledge.
The supernatural is first set up and then proved. It is ante-
cedent verification whereas science admits only of consequent
verification. The premisis upon which the doctrine is based
113. Supra, 201.
114. Supra, 202.
115. Supra, 203.
116. Supra, 204.
117. Supra, 204-206
116. Supra
,
206-206
.
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is out of harmony with science.
Secondly, the idea of the supernatural is an abstraction
and rests on the fallacy of hypostatizat ion of "selective
emphasis." The supernatural is the result of human desire for
eternal Essences upon which to stand. Dewey finds in nature
an all-sufficient ground for permanence and change, the one
and the many, universals and particulars
.
Thirdly, the idea of the supernatural has obstructed progress
and is an encumbrance to religion. It has ever been a detri-
mental factor in scientific and social advancement. Supernatural
religion has caused a split in the very nature of things. Further-
more, an appeal to the supernatural never solves a problem;
science alone shows us the way out of our difficulties . Dewey
rejects the supernatural in any form, as well as a personal God.
B. Summary of Criticisms
The main criticisms which were raised against Woodbridge
are as follows:
1. The mystical and intuitive element in his writings,
especially in An Essay on Nature , is not consistent in making
a good. scientific or philosophical investigation. He personifies
and worships nature throughout. x
2. At times his statements become somewhat idealistic. He
speaks of nature as "personal experiences." While he rejects
absolute idealism, he, at times, might well be interpreted as
119. Supra, 208-209.
120. Supra, 209-210.
121. Supra, 82-83.
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a pluralistic personalist .
^
3. He is impatient in dealing with some problems. For
example he dismisses " solipsism" as "unprofitable” without an
adequate examination.
4. He states that making the visible world problematic
destroys intellectual clarity. -*-24 It produces a reign of
confusion. If he means that questions are not to be raised,
this attitude really stalemates speculative inquiry. What he
means is not clearly stated.
5. His theory of knowledge is the scientific method taken
in the narrow sense of the laboratory experiment. Truth must
be discovered by experimental verification. He thus rejects
probability knowledge . -*-25
6. He holds that mind in the transcendental sense can have
no genesis. ^26 what he means is not well explained. Is mind
eternal? Tf so, it is not a product of emergent evolution.
Furthermore, if mind is eternal in the universe, this would
be idealism, not naturalism. His position is by no means clear.
7. It is very hard to see what he means by ideas. The
only realm of being is nature--the space-time realm. But ideas
are not material things, hence, they cannot be in space-time.
They are not "idiosyncrasies" of ourselves, but they are "objects"
in their logical connection. If they are not material how can
they be? His statements are very difficult to understand. -*27
122. Supra, 83.
125. Supra, 83; EON
124. Supra, 83.
125. Supra, 84.
126. Supra
,
114.
127. Supra, 115.
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8. He is troubled by the facts of mental behavior.
Behavior is teleological and this fact cannot be explained by
"structure.” He holds to purpose in nature but rejects a
directing agency although he knows such a position is "beset
with difficulties." He says that an eternal personality could
explain the facts, but this solution he rejects because God is
not scientifically verifiable.
9. His view of consciousness is somewhat neorealistic.
This view has little or no psychological or philosophical stand-
ing today. Critics have pointed out that his view of mind is
not consistent . ^0
10. Woodbridge offers several criticisms of idealism,
criticisms which at times show a misunderstanding of idealism.
The following differences between Woodbridge’ s naturalism and
personal idealism are seen: (a) Woodbridge holds that nature is
ultimate, while personal idealists hold that nature is part of
the experience of the mind of God; (b) Woodbridge sees purposes
and values arising from unconscious matter, personal idealism
roots purpose and values in God.-^l No personal idealist holds
that mind which emerges is the cause of the process, as Wood-
bridge suggests. The cause of the process is the eternal mind
of God. Both finite minds and nature exist because of the
eternal mind of God.^^ No personal idealist holds that mind
128. Supra, 115-116.
129. Supra, 116.
130. Supra, 116.
131. Supra, 116-119.
132. Supra, 117.
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is something which comes in from the outside and lives in animal
bodies. It is doubtful whether anyone holds such a view as he
suggests. 133 No personalist holds that reality is divided into
two worlds, physical and mental. Idealism is a protest against
such a view.
11. Nature, for Woodbridge, is all-that-there-is. It
includes both physical and mental events. To include all things
under the term "nature” does not explain them. The term so used
is too broad to be of much value. Nature, for him, is a
synonym for God, as for Spinoza. 134
The main criticisms of Dewey are as follows:
1. Nature is all-that-there-is for Dewey also. It includes
all events, physical and mental, and all values as well. To
include all within nature, gives only a verbal explanation of
things. It does not explain their real nature at all. 133
2. Dewey's psychology is somewhat confused. Kind may be
thought of as (a) behavioristic, (b) functional, and (c) as a
self. The functional or instrumental view, is most prominent.
Many of the ' characteristics of mind are then not in keeping
with functional psychology. He speaks of mind being conscious,
united, aware of awareness, manipulating meanings, trans-
cending space and time, and striving for known ends. This
suggests self-psychology. 133
3. Thinking arises, he says, only in response to the
133. Supra, 117.
134. Supra, 76-79.
135. Supra, 189.
136. Supra, 136, 189-190.
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doubtful, or in a troubled situation. This seems to be con-
trary to fact, as many have demonstrated that reflective thought
may be spontaneous. Johnson points out that reason is not a
separate faculty standing aloof until called to meet a crisis.-^
4. The best that can be said for his solution of the mind-
body problem is that it is verbal. To place both body and mind
with nature does not explain facts. It is simply a stretching
of the term to include the physical, mental, and psycho-physical.
It assumes that all these fall within nature, as indeed they
must, if nature is all-inclusive. Actually the mind-body problem
still exists in the same way as before this arbitrary inclusion.
Hocking’ s criticism of this view was noted.
5. Dewey does not clearly explain or define his scientific
method. It may be taken either in the narrower sense of the
laboratory method, or in a broader sense, which is the more com-
mon, comparable to the coherence criticism of Edgar S. Brightman.^-29
6. Like nature, Dewey uses nexperience n in a broad and
inclusive way. At times it is synonymous with nature.
7. He is never quite clear on the status of mental states.
What they are and what is their function is not clear. At times
he practically denies their existence.
8. Dewey, Woodbridge, and other naturalists reject personal
immortality and agree on the ultimate doom of humanity. They
see in man no eternal worth or value.
137. Supra, 192.
138. Supra, 191.
139. Supra, 192.
140. Supra, 141.
141. Supra, 51,
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9. Dewey’s thesis of the ideal is not satisfactory. There
is more to an ideal than a possibility of existence. It is some-
thing that ought to be realized. There is a distinction between
existence and obligation which he seems to ignore. To call both
existences and values, ’’natural events" does not explain their
sta:us at all. Actually there does not seem to be any reason
in the theory of naturalism for devotion to values at all.
Whether he admits it or not, a naturalist derives his ideals from
some other source than nature.
10. Dewey emphasizes continuity as an important principle
in his thought. All events, physical objects, mental states,
man and values, are bound together by this principle. This is
the fallacy of hypostatization again, for "continuity" does not
bind anything together. It is simply a term used to express
the fact that continuity exists. 143
11. When Dewey gives up the self his unifying agent
becomes the muscle of the organism. 144 just how the muscles
unify is hard to understand. Thinking, willing, etc., are acts
of consciousness, not of the muscles. The personality lives
in the activity of self-consciousness, not in the muscles.
12. It is a question whether nature, as such, is a suf-
ficient unifying factor for the multiplicity of the world. Bowne
and others find the unity of multiplicity possible only in
personality. Nature and values are also rooted, by idealists,
in the personality of God. 145
142. Supra, 200.
143. Supra, 214.
144. Supra, 127, 132, 190.
145. Supra
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13, Dewey’s method of discovery is based on two assump-
tions. He assumes that his method is the only one for arriving
at truth and further, that the existence of the supernatural
cannot be established by it. When Dewey deals with the super-
natural he is inclined to use his method in the narrower sense.
Others would say that the existence of God is a warranted
assert ion.
14. Dewey, like Woodbridge, holds that purposes arise
out of unconscious matter. All values are rooted in nature
also, since man is one of its products. Unconscious natural
events are the source of all values. The truth of this stands
or falls upon the assumption that nature is ultimate. Many
hold that values cannot arise in this way . -*-47
C. Comparison of the Views of Woodbridge and Dewey
The general views of these two thinkers may be compared
as follows:
1. Definitions of Nature and Naturalism
Woodbridge
a. Nature, existing in space-
time, is all-that-there-is;
the term "nature" is synon-
ymous with 'bod."
b. Naturalism as a metaphysics
is an investigation of what
existences are and what they
imply without seeking one
ultimate purpose to explain
them (other than nature it-
self which exists in space-
time )
.
Dewey
Nature, existing in space-
time, is all-that-there-is;
but the term "nature" is not
synonymous with "God." (See
below.
)
Naturalism as a metaphysics
is an account of the generic
traits of existences without
distinguishing them as "phys-
ical" and "mental;" or the
relation of natural events as
immediate qualities (conscious
ness) to natural events as
objects of science (situations
believed-in)
.
146. Supra, 216.
147. Supra, 213, 215.
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2. Points of General Agreement
a. Both reject a personal God or the " supernatural” in any form.
b. Man is wholly a product of nature.
c. Mind emerges from unconscious matter in the processes of
biological evolution and is an example of nature’s teleology.
d. Psychology: both have a functional or instrumental view
of mind; its is an instrument developed by the human organ-
ism.
e. Epistemology: both hold that knowing is a kind of action
performed by the organism.
f. Both reject personal immortality.
g. Teleology is natural—nature realizes ends or purposes.
Both follow Aristotle in interpreting nature dynamically.
h. Both reject Spinoza’s theory that nature is what it is by
absolute necessity.
i. Both reject the mechanistic materialism which followed the
rise of Newtonian science, a view well illustrated in the
philosophy of Hobbes.
j. Both accept the Darwinian theory of biological evolution.
3. Main Differences
Woodbridge
a. Attitude of investigation
is mystical and intuitive.
b. Method of discovery is that
of the scientific labora-
tory .
c. Verification if by labora-
tory experiment and accep-
tance of what can be scien-
tifically shown to be true.
d. Mind is defined as a realm
of discourse, or the as-
sertion that bodies think.
Dewey
Attitude of investigation
is logical, scientific, and
humanitarian.
Method of discovery is some-
times that of the scientific
laboratory but more often
"coherence .
”
Verification is by following
a plan of action, and truth
is warranted assert ibility
as shown by satisfactory con-
sequences .
Mind is defined as the most
complex organization of na-
tural events so that they are
functioning on the meaning
level
.
•.
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e. Consciousness is defined as
a relation among natural
ob j ect s
.
f. God is used as a synonym for
nature
.
g. The 11 supernatural" is re-
jected because it cannot be
scientifically verified.
h. Values are natural but he
has no clear or developed
discussion.
Consciousness is defined as
an awareness existing on all
four levels of organic events,
but only achieving meaning on
the level of mind.
God is the active relation be-
tween the ideal and the actual
or the totality of ideals
arousing man to action.
The "supernatural" is rejected
because (1) it is based upon a
questionable epistemology,
( 2 ) it is an abstraction and
an hypostatizat ion of selec-
tive emphasis, (3) it obstructs
progress and stalemates human
effort
.
Values are possibilities of
existences, ideals that may
become actual existences; they
are not feelings or mere men-
tal states.
D. Conclusions
The main conclusions of this study are as follows:
1. Influences on Woodbridge and Dewey. Dewey links his
own practical view of philosophy with the social outlook of
Plato. Both Woodbridge and Dewey accepted and developed
Aristotle’s dynamic view of nature; this is seen in their
natural teleology. Both accepted Spinoza's view of nature as
all-that-there-i s , but they reject his idea of absolute neces-
sity. Dewey openly, and Woodbridge more by implication, protest
against Kant's bifurcation of experience into the phenomenal
and noumenal orders. Dewey's emphasis upon continuity, co-
herence, and v/holes is due to his early TTegelianism. Both
accept the modern theories of physical science and reject the
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mechanistic materialism which followed the rise of Newtonian
physics, a view well illustrated in the thought of Hobbes.
Both accept Darwin’s theory of biological evolution. Both
are influenced by the functional psychology of Angell and
James, but Dewey to a greater extent than Woodbridge . Dewey’s
pragmatism was developed mainly under the influence of Peirce.
2. Nature for both Woodbridge and Dewey is all-that-
there-is; for Woodbridge the term nature is synonymous with
God as used by Spinoza; but, for Dewey, the term God is used
to mean the active relation between the ideal and the actual,
as well as the unity of all ideals arousing man to action.
3. Both Woodbridge and Dewey stress method; for Woodbridge
the method is that of the scientific laboratory; for Dewey, the
method may be that of the laboratory but more often is used in
a broader sense, comparable to coherence.
4. Verification for Woodbridge means to accept the results
of scientific experiment; for Dewey, verification is in general
by consequences, although in the case of value judgments, the
whole concrete situation must be considered. Truth, for Wood-
bridge, is what can be scientifically verified; for Dewey, it
is warranted assertibility
.
5. Both Woodbridge and Dewey reject teleology, in the
sense of a purposer guiding events to a definite goal or end;
but both accept a "natural teleology" by which nature's many
events progress toward many natural ends; purpose is rooted
ultimately in unconscious matter.
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6. Both Woodbridge and Dewey reject a personal God, or
the "supernatural” in any form; Woodbridge holds that such an
existent is unverifiable and unknowable; Dewey rejects the
supernatural because (a) the idea is based upon an unscientific
epistemology, (b) it is an abstraction and an hypostat ization
of ideals by selective emphasis, and (c) it is impractical,
obstructs progress, is useless for solving practical problems,
and stalemates human effort.
7. The central metaphysical problem for both is that of
the nature of mind and its relation to the body. Both hold that
mind is a "natural" event, an instrument of the human organism;
for Woodbridge, it is evidence for the fact that there are
thinking bodies; for Dewey, it is the most complex organization
of natural events so that they are functioning on a meaning
level
.
8. Consciousness, for Woodbridge, is a relation of object,
his view is somewhat neorealistic ; for Dewey, consciousness is
an "awareness" among natural events organized on the organic
level, from the psycho-physical to mind, but only on the level
of mind is there awareness of meaning.
9. Woodbridge roots values in nature but does not discuss
the problem at any length; for Dewey, values are possibilities
of existences; they are not feelings or mere mental states, but
have an existential status for they always belong to a concrete
situation; he stresses values as possibilities of existences,
more than matters of obligation.
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10. There is much need for clear and standardized def-
inition of philosophiac terminology. Ther term nature is used
in different senses by these two thinkers, although there is
much similarity in their general views. It was pointed out
that other naturalists use "nature" in other senses as well,
as was seen in the Krikorian volume. Naturalists do not wholly
agree as to what nature is. Probably the most satisfactory
definition of nature is that given by Kant who held that nature
is the world of categorized sense experience. There seems to
be little likelihood of ary general agreement in the near future.
..
.
.
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ABSTRACT
The central problem of this dissertation is the attempt
to define and criticize the use of the terms "nature” and
"naturalism" in the thought of Frederick J. E. Woodbridge and
John Dewey. The general plan of study is as follows: (1) a
consideration of the main influences upon these philosophers
including an historical survey of naturalism; (2) an exposition
of the respective systems of these two philosophers; (3) a
comparison of their views; and (4) general conclusions of the
investigation.
In Chapter I a brief biography of each thinker is given.
This is followed by a discussion of the main influences upon
each. Woodbridge was most influenced by Aristotle and Spinoza.
Dewey was influenced by Plato, Aristotle, Kanh and Hegel who
left, he says, a permanent deposit on his thinking. Both were
influenced by the psychology of Angell and James, while Dewey’s
pragmatism came from Peirce. The literature in the field was
then surveyed.
In Chapter II an historical survey is made of the develop-
ment of naturalism in philosophy. Ambiguity in the use of the
terms "nature" and "naturalism" is noted. Nature, philosoph-
ically, is used in at least five ways: (1) The world regarded
as ordered process. This is the view of most of the ancient
Greeks. The system of Democritus is the outstanding example
of naturalistic thought here. (2) Nature, as the created order,
distinguished from God. This view is well illustrated by the

285
orthodox church philosophers, Augustine and Aquinas. (3) Na-
ture as all-that-there-is. Spinoza’s deus siva natura is the
classic example. (4) Nature as the phenomenal order, organized
and categorized sense experience (Kant). (5) Nature as the
world the sciences are investigating.
The influence of Darwin’s theory of biological evolution
upon naturalism is noted, and the history of naturalism in
America reviewed. Men like Woodbridge, Dewey, Santayana, and
Sellars have done most of the work here.
In Chapter III Woodbridge ’ s concept of "nature” is con-
sidered. Nature is "the familiar setting of human history,"
or "public experience." Nature is pre-eminently, but not in-
clusively, the visible world. It is heaven and earth and sea,
and all that in them is, which includes the invisible. Nature
is the universe existing in space and time. All knowledge of
nature is obtained by scientific experiment. The "supernatural"
is rejected as unscientific and hence unknowable. All knowl-
edge is gained through our "conscious bodies." Man is part and
parcel of nature; he is no more exceptional an event than other
animals, plants, or atoms. Nature is no more tolerant of him
than of any other event, for he is a natural being with a
natural destiny. Nature for Woodbridge is what Spinoza means
by nature or God. Nature is historical, a history of histories,
but all histories are purposeless, for they aim at no one
ultimate goal. Teleology is wholly natural for there is no
guiding and unifying intelligence behind world events. The
true value of metaphysics is to see the implications of the
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many existences without reducing them to one ultimate cause.
In Chapter IV Woodbridge’s view of mind is taken up. It
may be summed up as: (1) The difference between acts of think-
ing and acts of walking is that one is called mental and the
other physical; (2) given ourselves as thinkers, nothing is
ever discovered besides our bodies which do the thinking;
(3) thinking is co-extensive with its subject matter. But
the nature and function of ideas is left rather vague and con-
fused. Consciousness is spoken of as a "continuum of objects."
In Chapter V Dewey’s philosophical system is taken up.
The purpose of philosophy, he says, is to reintegrate human
knowledge and activity with the general framework of reality
and natural processes. Dewey started out as a self-psychol-
ogist but soon moved to a functional view of mind. The shift
is extremely important for it is the key to his whole later
psychological and philosophical development. Thinking is a
kind of activity, a function which the organism performs at
specific need. The mental represents a "different character
of natural events." Natural events may be organized on four
levels of complexity: (1) The psycho-physical organism which is
the organization of energies on the basis of need-demand-
satisfaction (plant life); (2) sensitivity, discriminatory
response (lower animal); (3) feeling, marked by response to
distant stimuli (higher animal); (4) mind, the distinguishing
characteristics of which are communication, language, and
response to meaning. Consciousness is found on all levels
but only on the fourth is there actualized apprehensions of
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meanings. Mind is thus the most complex organization of natural
events, so that they function on the meaning level. Its main
characteristics are consciousness, unity, awareness, manipula-
tion of meanings, space and time transcendence, and striving
for known ends
.
Dewey bases his logic on the assumption of unbroken con-
tinuity between lower and higher forms or events. Continuity
is the basic category of experimental or naturalistic logic.
By means of such a logic, animal activities are transformed
into intelligent behavior. Knowing, for Dewey, is a kind of
bodily action. This follows his instrumental view of thinking.
The great problem of metaphysics is to determine the relation
of immediate qualities (consciousness) to objects of science
( situations-believed-in) . In Dewey's terminology, this is the
relation of the small and shifting portion of experience to the
whole of experience. Metaphysics is an investigation of the
generic traits of existences without dividing them into physical
and mental. Dewey's system is a protest against the " splitting"
of reality into two worlds, the mental and the physical.
In Chapter VI the application of Dewey's system to the
field of values is considered. Values arise out of nature,
for nature is the one and only realm of being. Value judg-
ments are formulated and tested by the scientific method of
inquiry. In every case of possible value the whole situation
must be taken into account, not the consequences alone. A
value is not a feeling or a mere mental state, but a possibility
of an existence. The ideal is the possible in contrast with the
..
.
.
.
.
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actual. The religious object or God is the active relation be-
tween the ideal and the actual and the unity of all ideals
arousing man to action. It is never personal.
The main defects in the thought of Woodbridge are: (1) his
mystical and intuitive attitude; (2) his impatience with some
problems; (3) his assumption that the space-time order is all
that there is; (4) his narrow view of knowledge and Verification;
(5) his unsatisfactory treatment of ideas; (6) his unsatisfactory
concept of teleology; (7) his too inclusive definition of nature.
The main defects in the thought of Dewey are: (1) his
psychology, confused with suggestions of behaviorism, functional-
ism, and self-psychology; (2) his view that thinking occurs only
in a doubtful situation; (3) his verbal solution of the mind-
body problem by stretching "nature" to include both physical and
mental events; (4) the ambiguity of his scientific method;
(5) his naturalistic theory of values, especially his failure
to relate existence and obligation; (6) his hypostatization of
"continuity"; (7) his unclear consideration of the status of
mental states; (8) his too inclusive definition of nature.
The main conclusions of the study are as follows:
1. Woodbridge was influenced mainly by Aristotle’s dynamic
view of nature, Spinoza’s pantheism, the biological evolution of
Darwin, the discoveries of modern physical science, and the
functional psychology of Angell and James. Dewey was also in-
fluenced by these, and in addition by Plato, Kant, and especially
Hegel v/ho left, he says, a permanent deposit on his thinking.
His pragmatism came mainly from Peirce.
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2. Nature for both Woodbridge and Dewey, is all-that-
there-is; for Woodbridge the term nature is synonymous with
God (Spinoza); for Dewey, the term God means (a) the active
relation between the ideal and the actual; (b) the unity of
ideals arousing man to action.
5.
Both Woodbridge and Dewey stress method; for Wood-
bridge it is the laboratory method; for Dewey, it is (a) the
laboratory method, or more often (b) coherence.
4. Verification, for Woodbridge, means laboratory demon-
stration; for Dewey, verification is by consequences, but, in
value propositions, the whole concrete situation enters in.
Truth, for the former, is what is scientifically verified; for
the latter, it is warranted assertibility
.
5. Both V/oodbridge and Dewey reject teleology in the
sense of any unified purpose in nature but accept "natural
teleology," the progression of many events to many ends.
6. Both reject the "supernatural" in any form; Wood-
bridge, because it is unverifiable; Dewey, because (a) it is
based on an unscientific epistemology; (b) it is an abstrac-
tion and hypostatization of ideals; (c) it is impractical,
obstructs progress, does not solve problems, and stalemates
human effort.
7. The central metaphysical problem is that of the re-
lation of mind and body. Both have an instrumental view of mind.
Woodbridge speaks of "thinking bodies;" for Dewey, mind is the
most complex organization of natural events so that they function
on the meaning level.
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8. Consciousness, for „oodbridge, is a continuum of
objects; for Dewey, consciousness is an "awareness" of natural
events on the organic level, but only on the level of mind is
there apprehensions of meaning.
9. Woodbridge neglects the problem of values; Dewey holds
that values are possibilities of existences; he stresses value
as such rather than matters of obligation.
10. There is much need for standardized philosophical
terminology. Nature is used in different senses by these think-
ers, although there is much similarity. They differ from other
naturalists, for there is no general agreement as to what nature
is. Probably the most satisfactory definition of nature is
Kant’s organized and categorized sense experience, but there
is not likely to be any general agreement in the near future.
..
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